EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION

Citizenship agendas in and beyond the nation-state: (en)countering framings of the good citizen

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This special issue analyzes the formulation, implementation, and contestation of citizenship agendas. We define citizenship agendas as normative framings of citizenship that prescribe what norms, values, and behavior are appropriate for those claiming membership of a political community. These agendas are concerned with defining the meaning of membership in explicitly normative ways that go beyond conventional, legal–formal citizenship status. Citizenship agendas prescribe relations between people and larger structures of rule and belonging, which are often but not exclusively nation-states. Such citizenship agendas invariably imply models of virtuous and deviant citizens, favoring particular subject-citizens over others, and suggesting ways to transform the latter into the former.

Some of these agendas are part and parcel of the working of the nation-state; other citizenship agendas, however, are produced beyond the nation-state. The articles collected here study various sites where the meaning of ‘the good citizen’ is framed and negotiated in different ways. We approach these framings as agendas that may coexist in apparent harmony, or merge, or clash. The various articles in this special issue engage with normative framings of citizenship in different contexts, ranging from security policies and social housing in Dutch cities, to state-like but extralegal organizations in Jamaica and Guatemala, and from the regulation of the Muslim call to prayer in the US Midwest, to post-conflict reconstruction in Lebanon.

In this introduction, we extend the discussion of normative framings of citizenship associated with the nation-state. Building on recent discussions in the field of citizenship studies, which emphasize that citizenship can also be conceptualized and investigated beyond the state, the first section of this introduction provides a more detailed outline of our approach to citizenship agendas in and beyond the state. In the second section, we suggest a typology of three different configurations between state and non-state actors within which citizenship agendas are produced, detailing the different mechanisms of collaboration or contestation between state and non-state/state-like actors. Drawing on the cases presented in the different contributions to this special issue, we attempt to structure the diversity in state/non-state citizenship agendas by differentiating between the

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regulated outsourcing, mutual formulation, and insurgent contestation of citizenship agendas. We end this introduction with some concluding remarks on the implications that the approach elaborated in this special issue might have for citizenship studies.

Shaping ‘the good citizen’ in and beyond the nation-state

Various authors working within citizenship studies have pointed to the mechanisms through which ‘the good citizen’ is framed by state actors (Pykett, Saward, and Schaefer 2010) and how this framing functions as a crucial governmental instrument through which populations are managed (Bhandar 2010). Such studies of state citizenship agendas, often invoking Foucault’s notion of governmentality as ‘the conduct of conduct,’ have explored the normative shaping of ‘good’ national citizens through the configuration of values, beliefs, and sentiments (Foucault 1991; Rose 2000). These studies demonstrate how states employ citizenship agendas as a governmental technique to inculcate responsible and virtuous behavior in citizens. They have examined, for instance, how formal forms of citizenship education such as civics curricula seek to regulate the conduct of citizens (Brooks and Holford 2009; Kennelly and Llewellyn 2011), or how immigrant integration policies promote cultural assimilation as the individual responsibility of new citizens (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010). In addition to such explicit state programs for the regulation of national political membership, citizenship agendas may also be advanced in less programmatic ways, for instance in political rhetoric or in the subtext of government policies. Having become a buzzword in popular, political, and policy-making circles, the term ‘citizenship’ itself is central to techniques of governmentality used far beyond state programs to describe and proscribe desirable behavior. Often, these agendas do not necessarily target the entire national population or territory, rather they are directed at specific subpopulations or subnational territories.

In this issue, several papers demonstrate how particular subjects are framed as deficient, as undesirables who must change their norms, values, and behavior in order to meet the criteria of good citizenship. However, as these contributions show, these citizenship agendas almost always emerge in complex interplays between state and non-state actors. This necessitates an approach to citizenship agendas that builds on recent work on citizenship beyond the nation-state, and attends both to the governmental role of non-state actors and to the rescaling of statehood.

Recent work in citizenship studies has emphasized the utility of ‘pushing’ the concept beyond its institutional-legal framework to include the role of non-state actors (Gordon and Stack 2007). Historically, state–subject relationships have largely gained shape through institutions other than ‘the state.’ As Lazar (2012) shows, collective civil society organizations may play an important role in the development of ‘mediated citizenship.’ Similar mediated state–subject relations may take place through informal clientelist networks (Koster 2014). In addition, others have pointed to the pluralization and hybridization of regulatory authority and political community to include non-state entities such as corporate actors, social movements, NGOs, and criminal organizations (Ong 2006; Trouillot 2001; Roitman 2007; Jaffe 2013).

What is the role of these non-state actors in delineating the parameters of citizenship? Is citizenship still tied to the nation-state, although mediated by non-state actors? Or can we also locate citizenship in non-state political communities? Lazar (2013, 2) argues that an anthropological focus on lived experience points toward an understanding of citizenship as ‘a mechanism for making claims on different political communities, of which the state is just one.’ Building on these approaches, this issue explores the blurred
boundaries between state and non-state, attempting to understand how citizenship can be conceptualized in relation to non-state or hybrid forms of governance.

In addition, recent scholarship on citizenship has included an extensive critique of methodological nationalism, the taken-for-granted focus on the nation-state as the standard of political community. Understanding citizenship as membership in a political community directs our attention to the various scales at which such communities take shape. Various scholars have begun to explore how the relationship between citizens and the state shifts when we take into account the rescaling of statehood to the subnational/municipal or supranational scale (Brenner 2004; Gordon and Stack 2007; Isin and Turner 2007).

Drawing on these debates in citizenship studies, we investigate how notions of national citizenship become entangled with other forms of political belonging, at different levels including the urban and the transnational. By utilizing such an approach, we hope to build on and extend existing work on citizenship agendas, which tends to concentrate on the relationship between citizens and the nation-state. Interrogations of the ways in which ‘good citizens’ are framed remain primarily concerned with who is a good national citizen in the eyes of the state. This special issue seeks to extend our understanding of citizenship agendas both in and beyond the nation-state, focusing on the role played by non-state actors and on the articulations between multiple, differentially scaled agendas.

Rather than a more or less unified national citizenship agenda, a plethora of competing citizenship agendas are put forward by various actors and at varying scales. National citizenship agendas are fleshed out and implemented at local, regional, or transnational scales, by institutions and actors who insert their own experiences, understandings, and interests (see, e.g., Verkaaik 2010). In addition, as political community and belonging are defined at nonnational scales such as that of the neighborhood, the city, or the world, the set of practices that ‘good citizens’ are expected to perform shift accordingly. The informal obligations that follow both the ‘transnationalization of the political’ (Balibar 2009, viii) and forms of political belonging tied to particular cities (Isin 2000; Varsanyi 2006) may coexist or become interlocked. We agree with Holston (1999, 169), who underlines ‘the possibility of multiple citizenships based on the local, regional and transnational affiliations that aggregate in contemporary urban experience.’ In addition, powerful non-state actors – including NGOs, corporations, and criminal organizations – also formulate citizenship agendas that affect those who dwell in the territories where these actors play a role in governing.

Citizenship agendas at these different scales or articulated by these different actors need not be mutually exclusive.

The various citizenship agendas that emerge in the center of the nation-state, at its margins and beyond, are often competing, contradictory, and ambiguous. This complexity necessitates an understanding of citizenship that goes beyond the idea of a single dominant discourse presumed in many theorizations of governmentality. The contributions to this special issue demonstrate the various articulations of multiple citizenships in different contexts.

**Citizenship agendas and configurations of state/non-state actors**

In the various contributions to this special issue, we can differentiate between three broad types of configurations of state and non-state actors in which citizenship agendas are articulated. While this typology of configurations is not exhaustive, and the three types are not necessarily mutually exclusive, we suggest that it covers many contemporary instances. A first configuration involves the *regulated outsourcing of citizenship agendas.*
In contexts across the globe, states have been ‘rolling back’ their direct role in the realization of citizenship rights to their subjects. Recent decades have shown many cases of outsourcing service provision to non-state entities, whether corporate or voluntary actors. Increasingly, governance assemblages, in which state and non-state institutions are entangled, are responsible for the management of populations and territories, as is illustrated by the contributions to this issue by de Koning (2015) and Koster (2015). Against the background of neoliberal modes of governing, national citizenship agendas come to be formulated and implemented by non-state actors within such assemblages. Although citizens can still make claims on the nation-state for the right to certain amenities (e.g., housing, security, social assistance, basic infrastructure, health care), service provision is taken on by voluntary or corporate actors. Non-state actors are responsibilized with guaranteeing citizenship rights, with the blessing and cooperation of the state, and in so doing take on the state-like moral role of ensuring that subjects display appropriate norms, values, and behavior. As de Koning shows for the domain of youth and security, and Koster for that of housing, the regulated outsourcing of citizenship agendas involves the cooperation of state and non-state actors, with non-state actors financially dependent or juridically attached to the state. This outsourcing of agendas is necessarily a fractured process in which different public and private interests may clash and compete. Although tensions may arise between state and non-state actors in their collaboration, they jointly articulate particular citizenship agendas. Neveu (2015) argues that such state citizenship agendas may be subverted and appropriated in the process of implementation. In her discussion of a participatory scheme and a social movement in France, she demonstrates how the seemingly apolitical ‘ordinary’ can become a site for politicization and contestation.

A second configuration involves the mutual formulation of citizenship agendas, with non-state actors taking on a more proactive, complementary role in negotiating the normative framing of citizenship with the state. This entails forms of collaboration (or collusion) in which political communities beyond the state develop framing of citizenships that intersect with state citizenship agendas. Here, non-state actors engage with the nation-state’s citizenship agenda, while claiming a place within the state or pursuing specific economic interests. In the contribution by Perkins (2015), we see how groups of citizens in the US city of Hamtramck, Michigan, engage with municipal regulations on rights to religious manifestations in public space. Focusing on the public and juridical debates around the Muslim call for prayer in Hamtramck, Perkins shows how different actors contested the material and spatial conception of shared civic culture and existing assumptions about political and religious differences. In so doing, through creating a distinct citizenship agenda, these actors set out to claim a place within the city for the Muslim religious community. Referencing both religious obligations and national rights, religious organizations actively shaped debates on good citizenship and, eventually, effected a broadening of City Hall’s framing of citizenship. Focusing on the electoral process in Jamaica, the contribution by Jaffe (2015) describes the entanglement of trade unions and criminal organizations with political parties, relationships that have tended to be collaborative rather than antagonistic. Approaching elections as sites for negotiations of political community and citizenship agendas both in and beyond the state, Jaffe shows how citizens engage with and are engaged by these different, entangled actors. She demonstrates that ideas about appropriate voting behavior have been framed not only by the formal institutions but also by unionists and gang members, enabling a particular citizenship agenda that blurs the boundaries of the nation-state.
A third configuration can be glossed as *insurgent contestations of citizenship agendas*. This involves a more contentious relationship between different political communities, with non-state actors developing citizenship agendas that may diametrically oppose those of the state. Here, we see non-state political communities that counter the state’s authority and notions of belonging. Non-state actors tend to turn to different strategies in advancing their ideas about citizenship, often attempting to usurp or appropriate the authority of the state in order to legitimize their governmental role of subjects. They tend to mimic the state in imposing particular moralities about good behavior and social justice. The contribution by Sharp (2015) shows how, in Guatemala, political communities below the state may usurp rights to define good citizenship and to impose severe sanctions for those who transgress their common law. However, this formulation of rights, obligations, and sanctions proposed by the older men in the community is contested by younger men, who draw on contrasting citizenship agendas that foreground individual rights within the framework of the national constitution. Hourani’s (2015) contribution on post-conflict urban planning in Beirut shows how Hizballah utilizes both legal and extra-legal power to pursue particular citizenship agendas. Referencing both national and ethnoreligious structures of rule and belonging, Hizballah has developed a morally loaded urbanism that attempts to displace that of the neoliberal Lebanese state.

Finally, the contributions to this special issue highlight the territorial dimensions of citizenship agendas. Although in the classic understanding the focus of citizenship is the state and its locus is the national territory, the different contributions to this issue show how alternative socio-spatial parameters of citizenship may gain shape. Often, citizenship agendas are not imposed on the population of the national territory, but focus on people in specific sites, such as a particular municipality (Sharp and Perkins), ‘ordinary’ public space (Neveu), or particular neighborhoods (de Koning, Hourani, Jaffe, and Koster). Citizenship agendas often include territorial negotiations about who has the right to live where, and what particular norms and obligations pertain to various categories of people in that territory. Non-state actors involved in producing citizenship agendas also actively claim particular territories, in another act of state mimicry, as becomes clear in the cases presented by Jaffe and Sharp.

**Concluding thoughts**

This special issue makes a contribution to citizenship studies in two ways. First, by focusing on agendas, it calls for specific attention to the variety of normative articulations of citizenship. By emphasizing the distinctions between good and bad citizens that underlie such agendas, the issue builds on theorizations of how ‘differentiated’ (Holston 2008) or ‘variegated’ citizenship (Inda 2005) is produced, expanding our understanding of how framings of citizenship may construct inequality rather than equality. Second, by emphasizing the possible involvement of non-state actors, we show how such differentiations are by no means produced by the state alone. This approach, building on recent explorations of citizenship beyond the state, allows an understanding of the production of inequality through more complex and sometimes conflicting forms of governance. As many states increasingly outsource service provision to, and care for, subjects to non-state actors, the role of the state in shaping the contours of citizenship is progressively appropriated by public–private assemblages of governance or even extra-legal organizations. The papers in this issue provide insights into the alternative forms of political community that may emerge in such contexts.
Rather than always taking the state as the point of departure in citizenship studies, in this special issue, we propose an analysis that starts by asking by whom and at what levels of scale subjects are governed and from which sites and within which configurations of states and state-like actors citizenship agendas are produced and negotiated. Whereas many of the contributions to this special issue foreground the governmental sides of citizenship agendas, Hansen’s (2015) afterword highlights the aspirational side of citizenship agendas. As Hansen points out, citizenship has become a dominant form of claim-making for people around the world. Citizenship agendas are not only forms of control; they also provide people with important horizons of aspiration and action, with full citizenship remaining an aspiration that fuels struggles against exclusion and inequality. However, citizenship agendas may equally be taken up in pursuit of more conservative and exclusionary futures. With the perspective on citizenship in and beyond the nation-state that we develop in this special issue, we hope to contribute to a sophisticated analysis of citizenship as both a form of control and a horizon for collective struggles.

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Note
1. This stretching of citizenship has been met with some critique. Stack (2013), for instance, proposes the term ‘civil sociality’ to refer to understandings of obligations and good behavior that are grounded in ‘society’ rather than in (state) authority and law. Nuijten (2013) views citizenship as but one, although very dominant, ‘language of the political,’ and argues that marginalized groups in particular may draw on other languages, such as patronage.

References


This article approaches electoral acts and performances as central sites for the negotiation of citizenship relations. I argue that, in order to understand how these relationships are shaped, we must attend to governmental actors beyond the nation-state, from trade unions to criminal organizations. Focusing on the case of Jamaica, I show how non-state actors have come to play a central role in hybrid forms of governance, shaping citizens’ allegiances to multiple, overlapping political communities. How are campaigning and voting affected by such multiple allegiances? What new understandings of citizenship can we develop if we take the role of non-state actors in the electoral process seriously? I suggest that we should study elections as a site where citizenship – understood here in its broad sense of membership of a political community – can develop both within and beyond the nation-state.

**Keywords:** elections; Jamaica; trade unions; organized crime; hybrid governance

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**Introduction**

Immediately after the date of Jamaica’s 2011 national elections had been announced, the streets of Kingston, the island’s capital, began to sprout signs of the political contest. Supporters of the two main parties would go out in public wearing their party colors – green for the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), orange for the People’s National Party (PNP) – to assert their allegiance. Campaign motorcades rushed through the streets, honking their horns, with supporters hanging out the windows, ringing bells and blowing horns. Flouting the country’s political code of conduct, party activists sought to demarcate electoral turf by spray-painting party graffiti on walls and hanging up green or orange flags on lampposts and buildings. On a major public road near an uptown ‘ghetto’ neighborhood, activists hung up a large orange banner exhorting passersby to ‘Vote PNP’. To the side of the banner the person responsible had painted ‘Spanglers’ in large letters – a reference to a criminal gang that had long been associated with the PNP. Meanwhile, whenever buses carrying JLP supporters passed by, shouts of ‘Shower! Shower!’ would echo through the air; their party slogan is a reference to the Shower Posse, a JLP-affiliated gang.

The entanglement of criminal organizations and political parties in Jamaica comes out clearly around election time, both in campaigns and on election day itself. This entanglement offers new perspectives on the relationship between elections and citizenship. In this article, drawing on 12 months of fieldwork in Kingston, I explore how electoral acts and performances can be central sites for the negotiation of citizenship relations and the articulation of citizenship agendas. I argue that, in order to understand
how these relationships and agendas are shaped, we must attend to governmental actors beyond the nation-state, from trade unions to criminal organizations. Recent scholarship emphasizes that populations and territories are governed not so much by states, as through governmental assemblages that connect a range of state and non-state actors. Such hybrid forms of governance necessarily impact the ways that citizens understand themselves as part of multiple, overlapping political communities. How are campaigning and voting affected by allegiances to gangs and other non-state actors? What can we learn about structures of rule and belonging if we take the role of these non-state actors in the electoral process into account? Can we understand elections as doing more than merely affirming citizens’ relations to the state? I suggest that we should study elections as a site where citizenship – understood here in its broad sense of membership of a political community (Leydet 2011) – can develop both within and beyond the nation-state.

This article begins with a discussion of recent anthropological research on voting and electoral politics and of interdisciplinary research on hybrid governmental assemblages, exploring the contributions of these fields to citizenship studies. I connect the understanding of elections as a site of citizenship practice to recent research on non-state governmental actors. Next, I discuss two eras in Jamaica’s electoral history, focusing on the ways in which multiple governmental actors sought to produce a specific type of political subject. The first section focuses on pre-independence voting, and shows how the formation of the two main political parties was entangled with that of the labor movement. This entanglement informed specific ideas of what constituted a good Jamaican citizen, but it was also central to the development of violently expressed partisan political identities. This history foreshadowed the emergence of so-called garrison politics in postindependence Jamaica. Garrison politics is a type of electoral turf politics that is achieved through communal clientelism and that has relied on brokers known as ‘dons’. These dons, inner-city neighborhood leaders who are often involved in criminal organizations, have longstanding connections to Jamaica’s two main political parties. The associated entanglement of criminal organizations, political parties, police and bureaucrats produces a specific type of political subject. In the ‘garrison communities’ where dons’ authority is strongest, voting behavior is affected by a mix of deeply felt party-political loyalty (known as ‘political tribalism’) and the sometimes violent pressure exerted by dons and their organizations. While this kind of political clientelism has been documented in numerous cases, there has been little reflection on how it affects the central citizenship experience of voting.

Elections and citizenship

Within classic perspectives on citizenship, such as those set out by T.H. Marshall ([1950] 2013), the right to vote and the right to stand for election form a central element of citizenship. These approaches take these political rights and electoral competition to be at the core of democratic citizenship. Such perspectives evince liberal conceptions of citizenship that focus on the individual citizen, whose personal status as a member of the political community entails a bundle of rights and responsibilities (see Schuck 2002). However, voting entails much more than an individual right or a singular, personal act. Elections are also important sites for the negotiation of collective belonging to political communities such as the state. Indeed, the act of voting is a key symbolic moment for the performance of citizenship: citizens enact their allegiance to the political community by asserting their democratic right to determine how and by whom they will be governed. The symbolic significance of this political act makes it an important site for anthropological
explorations of citizenship. Citizens perform and enact their relationship to the state through the act of voting, and more broadly through their participation in electoral politics. Approaching the electoral process from an anthropological perspective can demonstrate the broader salience of voting and electoral politics to citizenship studies. This perspective entails understanding elections not only as a political right that is part of the formal-legal ideal of citizenship; it also involves approaching elections as performances that reflect, reproduce and contest the state–citizen relationship as it is experienced in everyday life.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, most anthropologists interested in politics and the state have tended to leave the study of elections to political scientists, focusing instead on other forms and sites of politics. Elections have received limited anthropological attention; prominent collections of readings in political anthropology (Vincent 2002), the anthropology of the state (Sharma and Gupta 2006) and the anthropology of citizenship (Lazar 2013) include remarkably few discussions of the electoral process. More recently, however, a number of anthropologists have begun to engage in ‘electoral ethnography’, focusing on the practices and meanings associated with electoral processes in sites across the world. Rather than seeing voting as a neutral technology of democratic citizenship that has a single, universal meaning and effect, they explore the variety of ways that different actors interpret and appropriate the electoral process and how this affects citizenship.

Bertrand, Briquet, and Pels (2007) demonstrate how earlier communitarian, public forms of voting were displaced by the technology of the secret ballot, with liberal conceptions of politics framing this individual expression of political opinion as the only legitimate expression. Within such perspectives, they argue, the secret ballot is seen as enabling the development of modern, rational individual citizens whose political choice is freed from the various sociopolitical relationships (ethnic allegiances, religious ties, patronage relationships, etc.) in which they are embedded. This privileging of a singular, specific form of voting not only indicates the prevalence of a particular citizenship agenda, one that privileges individual voting behavior over other collective forms of political action. It also points to the form of technological determinism that underlies the assumptions of many organizations promoting democratization: ‘the medium – the secret ballot – is often taken to produce the message – free individual political choice’ (Bertrand, Briquet, and Pels 2007, 5). In fact, as various authors studying democratization have noted, introducing electoral competition does not automatically displace other forms of political relationships, such as authoritarianism or patronage (Paley 2002; Arias and Goldstein 2010; Koster 2012). The electoral process can easily accommodate forms of political choice that are not necessarily free or individual – an empirical reality that challenges liberal imaginations of citizenship as the relationship between autonomous individual citizens and the state.

The collective nature of voting comes out clearly in ethnographic studies of corporate clientelism. Rather than seeing clientelism as the straightforward manipulation of passive poor, recent studies have pointed to the possibilities that electoral bargaining can offer for collective agency and the formation of citizenship. Lazar (2004), for instance, shows how the clientelism that characterizes Bolivian election campaigns offers a means for marginalized indigenous citizens to negotiate their relationship with the state both instrumentally and affectively. Working in the city of El Alto, Lazar found that residents of low-income urban zones understand the impersonal, ‘rational’ workings of delegative electoral democracy as antithetical to their interests. To render what they see as unrepresentative politics more responsive, they act collectively to develop direct relationships with politician-patrons. In so doing, they enact a form of citizenship that is more collectivist and emotional than formal models might imply.
In contrast to the assumptions of liberal political philosophers, such electoral ethnographies show that voting always involves more than just individual political rights and that the expression of political preferences and opinions is rarely free and autonomous. This does not necessarily diminish their importance to political subjects. Working in rural India, Mukulika Banerjee found that while the most disadvantaged citizens have a realistic view of the limited impact their vote can make, they still enthusiastically support and participate in the electoral process. She argues that precisely those people ‘living in semi-forgotten corners of the nation’ feel that voting provides an ‘opportunity to prove one’s membership of the nation and confirm one’s status as a citizen’ (Banerjee 2007, 1560). For many marginalized citizens, voting is not necessarily a way to change specific policies or to endorse a specific political ideology, but neither is it a fully instrumental votes-for-goods transaction. Rather, participation in elections is seen as a dignified means of asserting belonging to the modern nation, of narrating and performing a relationship of mutual obligation.

The relevance of elections to citizenship studies, then, lies not only in their centrality to political rights but also in the fact that they are important symbolic moments in which political community is shaped and experienced. Electoral campaigns and the act of voting are moments that allow citizens to imagine and perform their relationship to the state. They are also moments when specific citizenship agendas are communicated by governments, political parties, brokers and citizens themselves. Voters may be interpellated as free-thinking rational individuals, as duty-bound group members, or as emotional subjects connected to with politicians through kinship-like relations.

Research that has studied the role of elections in relation to citizenship in this broader sense has tended to assume that the political community in question is the state. However, the nation-state is by no means the only significant player in the formation of political community. A range of authors emphasize that government and politics are not necessarily located in the state, and urge us to study more closely the role of non-state governmental actors (e.g. Trouillot 2001; Nugent 2004; Sassen 2006; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). In the context of neoliberal globalization, specific attention has focused on how governance is increasingly achieved through networks or assemblages of state, corporate and voluntary actors. However, there are many historical precedents for this type of co-rulership. As Thomas (2011, 6) notes, ‘the regulatory, disciplinary, biopolitical, and distributional practices of governments throughout the Americas (and beyond) have often been suffused with and enacted by extra-state, non-state, or quasi-legal entities’.

To what extent, and how, do hybrid governance arrangements affect the relationship between citizens and the state? What types of political subjectivities and citizenship agendas emerge as governance is achieved through assemblages of state and non-state actors? In the sections that follow, I consider the role that non-state governmental actors play in the electoral process, focusing specifically on the role of trade unions and criminal dons. While elections are commonly understood as connecting citizens to the democratic state, I draw on different periods in Jamaica’s history to show how they are sites for the experience and negotiation of political community both in and beyond the state.

**Shaping pre-independence electoral subjectivities**

As a British colony in which the majority of the population of African descent had been enslaved until Emancipation in 1838, Jamaica had a very restricted franchise until the mid-twentieth century, with the right to vote and the right to stand for election largely restricted to light-skinned land-holding elites. Universal suffrage was only granted in 1944, nearly
20 years before Independence in 1962. The decision to transfer power to local leaders followed the emergence of the nationalist movement and severe labor unrest throughout the British West Indies in the 1930s. The labor rebellions were at the basis of the formation of Jamaica’s first political parties and trade unions in the 1940s and 1950s. The rise of these parties and their leaders was entangled with the development of the labor movement. The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU), led by Alexander Bustamante, formed the basis of the JLP. The founder of the PNP, Norman Washington Manley, was involved in the development of the Trades Union Council (TUC), later superseded by the National Workers Union (NWU).

The JLP and the PNP, which remain the two main political parties today, both sought to educate the new electorate into their new status as franchised citizens through union activities. The middle-class, light-skinned (‘brown’) union and political leaders sought to instill a sense of political consciousness and political agency amongst the darker-skinned (‘black’) working poor (see Hintzen 1997). The PNP and its union partners in particular distributed political literature and organized study groups throughout the island, with the aim of inculcating a nationalist desire for independence, a sense of the rights and duties of citizenship, as well as a socialist sensibility (Thomas 2004, 53). While the brown men who led the unions depicted the black laboring classes as in need of political education, unionization arguably channeled the workers’ struggles into a form of organized protest that was politicially legible to the colonial government. 

As in other contexts, these early understandings of citizenship gained shape through the entangled relationship of the labor movement with party politics: the relationship between many citizens and the state was mediated through the union. The political education initiatives of the 1940s and 1950s were informed by ideological motives, including notions of uplift and emancipation. However, the connection between party loyalty and union benefits also meant that the relationship had clientelist elements from early on, with union supporters standing to gain access to employment if their party won. This entanglement of political and union allegiances meant that early citizenship agendas propagated by the pre-independence state also reflected a mix of interests. Normative framings that prescribed what values, attitudes and behavior were appropriate for Jamaicans en route to independence were strongly influenced by the concerns of the labor movement and its middle-class leadership. As Thomas (2011) shows, for instance, in the mid-twentieth century such citizenship agendas emphasized the need for ‘traditional’ nuclear families with male breadwinners, in order to guarantee the reproduction of industrial labor.

The relationship between electoral politics and unionism also meant that BITU–TUC rivalry, which took on violent forms in the streets of Kingston in the 1940s and 1950s, quickly blurred into party-political violence. As identification with the interests of a trade union formed the basis for party-political identities, the willingness of labor movement activists to fight for the economic benefits associated with the dominance of their union became difficult to distinguish from a willingness to use violence to achieve a party-political victory. While it is well-known that political tribalism and garrison politics turned the streets of downtown Kingston into urban battlefields in the 1960s and 1970s, the earliest elections were also already marred by violent and sometimes deadly conflicts between PNP and JLP supporters (Sives 2010).

Violence, collective political identities, and – perhaps equally important – a sense of excitement and fun came out in an account of these early elections by Mr Douglas, an 83-year-old gentleman from West Kingston whom I interviewed together with my research assistant Romeo Dennis. Mr Douglas recalled the 1949 elections vividly, and
told us how he had left Kingston to attend an election rally in the rural parish of St Elizabeth, where the campaign took place in a festive atmosphere. Despite the rivalry between the JLP incumbent Cleve Lewis and his PNP challenger Edward Vivian Allen, the competition was expressed in good fun and through musical battles rather than actual violence, while alcohol always contributed to the high spirits. ‘I never forget it’, he told us, describing the rally and the JLP supporters’ attempts to discourage their opponents through music. He began to sing: ‘Tell them Lewis, no enter the election contest, tell them Lewis, no enter the election contest. We have no gun, we have no revolver, JLP is the rock of Gibraltar. Tell them Lewis, no enter the election contest!’ The PNP supporters would respond in kind, Mr Douglas explained, singing derogatory songs as well. ‘We would get a kick out of it!’

Mr Douglas experienced these early elections as a form of political festivity, which offered Jamaicans a sensory, serious-but-fun form of engagement with the new political structure. While these recollections are mainly happy memories, the reference to guns and revolvers in the JLP supporters’ campaign song indicates that party-cum-union violence and intimidation were a background presence during the 1940s elections. A number of factors served to train Jamaican voters into not only a national but also a party-partisan sense of political community. In addition to instrumental factors, such as the economic benefits that could accrue to union members/party supporters, the violent clashes between supporters hardened the boundaries of party-political belonging. However, beyond these economic and coercive factors, the festive atmosphere and embodied sensation of these early electoral practices and performances were conducive to the experience of both national and partisan belonging.

The early pre-independence election campaigns were part of the initial production of what we might call ‘electoral subjectivities’. During these moments, the newly formed political parties and trade unions used structured political education drives to mobilize colonial subjects to see themselves as rights-bearing democratic citizens and workers. The entanglement of the labor movement and party politics, and the intertwined mobilization of labor and the electorate, can be seen as an early instance of hybrid governance. Through this entangled arrangement, a new population of voter-citizens developed an allegiance to the emergent nation as well as to the party and the union. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, this form of hybrid governance and the allegiances it produced began to change, with criminal leaders taking over the role of union leaders in terms of political mobilization and co-rulership.

Garrison politics, political tribalism and donmanship

By the late 1950s, loosely organized political gangs with access with firearms had emerged on the scene in Kingston. However, electoral violence grew in significance following Jamaica’s independence from Great Britain in 1962. During the Cold War, the two main political parties were distinguished through ideological opposition, with the PNP promoting democratic socialism and Cuba, and the JLP aligned with US capitalism. In the 1960s and 1970s, both the JLP and the PNP constructed new housing schemes in inner-city neighborhoods. Party-affiliated ‘area leaders’ helped ensure that loyal political supporters were allocated housing within these new developments, and forcefully persuaded those residents who supported the ‘wrong’ party to leave the neighborhood. The often violent forms of party-political cleansing resulted in neighborhoods that were homogeneous in terms of party-political loyalty. Both the JLP and the PNP distributed weapons to their local area leaders – who would later become known as ‘dons’ – to defend and expand
their party’s electoral turf. Given their function as fiercely protected political fortresses, these areas became known as ‘garrison communities’ and the associated form of neighborhood-based clientelism as ‘garrison politics’. During elections, these inner-city areas became Cold War battlefields between armed PNP and JLP supporters, culminating in the 1980 elections when electoral violence resulted in nearly 800 deaths.

In recent decades, electoral violence has decreased significantly, as politically connected area leaders began to focus on criminal competition rather than ideological warfare. As dons gained independent access to money and weapons, in part through their involvement in the transnational drugs trade, their role within garrisons shifted from brokers to co-rulers. The dons currently exist in an uneasy symbiotic relationship with politicians, colluding rather than competing in the governance of inner-city neighborhoods (Jaffe 2013). As Harriott (2008, 17) notes, ‘Organized crime groups may establish their own quasi-governmental administration in some localities . . . but they do not contest for control of the political administration as an independent force that is external to the political system’. In this section, I discuss how forms of citizenship related to this hybrid form of governance emerge around elections.

Elections are obviously key moments in maintaining the system of garrison politics: party-loyal dons integrate inner-city residents into the political system while policing their electoral turf. Marcia, a JLP politician in her thirties, told me about her first experience with voting, growing up in a PNP-affiliated garrison community:

Eighteen years old and I’m going to vote now and I said, ‘Yes, I’m going to exercise my right to vote!’ I felt so excited and I got up early in the morning and I said to two ladies that lived in my lane . . . ‘I’m going to vote, you coming with me? I’m going to exercise my franchise to vote.’ And I’m not going to lie to you, I didn’t know who I was going to vote for, I just knew that I was going to vote. And I went up to [the polling office] and some men in orange asked me where am I going, I voted already . . . I never forget it.

She explained that the men in orange were representing the PNP. I asked whether the men knew her personally.

Well, yes, I guess, they say I vote already so I say ‘What, no, I haven’t voted!’ He say ‘Yeah man, go to your yard, you vote already.’ I was so angry that the women that I came with had to physically take me out and say ‘No, Marcia, no.’ Because of course you know it could get ugly. And I cried. It was tears of rage.

Marcia’s description of her initial excitement at being an 18-year-old exercising her right to vote for the first time illustrates the strong affective and performative meaning attributed to elections – voting inaugurates a young person’s relationship to the state as an autonomous adult. However, the reality of garrison politics, and the hybrid governing structure of local area don and political party, reshape this relationship. The PNP’s ‘men in orange’ mediate citizens’ relationship to the state by channeling it through the party and the party-affiliated criminal gang, disciplining neighborhood residents’ political preference to fit within this partisan-criminal political community. In Marcia’s case, this disciplining backfired as her frustration with garrison politics fed her desire to become a politician and align herself with the forbidden green party, the JLP. In many other cases, however, the don-mediated partisan loyalty that garrison residents are taught from birth is extremely strong.

This fierce form of partisan loyalty is known as political tribalism, a form of political identity connected to either the PNP or the JLP. These loyalties are expressed and reinforced by a range of visual and verbal symbols, or public identity markers, including specific colors, images, hand signals and slang. PNP supporters wear orange, call each other ‘Comrade’ and signal their party allegiance through a raised fist, while green-clad
JLP supporters known as ‘Labourites’ make a V-sign. These ‘tribal’ identities are reinforced through the territory of the garrison neighborhoods, where political graffiti and murals depicting the party leaders mark the physical borders of the community (Jaffe, Rhiney, and Francis-Rhiney 2013).

Political tribalism is what makes garrison politics more than a neighborhood-based form of collective clientelism. It is intrinsic to the production of electoral subjects whose voting behavior may be less instrumental than it is affective. This became evident to me during a focus group discussion I held in 2012 with a group of gang-affiliated young men from a West Kingston PNP garrison neighborhood. They were explaining to me their relationship to their political representative, and proved very articulate in their analysis of how electoral politics worked to their disadvantage. They expressed a feeling of being what they called ‘shortchanged’. By this they meant that while they were more or less the PNP’s ‘mother garrison’, they received very little in return for their vote. One participant, Roshawn, pointed out that their loyalty was not being rewarded, even though their MP had recently moved to a position within the cabinet that would allow him to direct construction work and jobs to his own constituency:

He’s at Ministry of Works right now, that’s where more [construction] work should come in to the communities. So that means he’s still not effective, he’s not doing an effective job, because if he’s changing one point to a next point where he’s Minister of Works that means more work should go on in his community and there is no work going on!

Another young man, Damion, chimed in: ‘We are being shortchanged . . . we’re not getting the real results from him, the help that the community needs, employment, sanitary convenience and all of them things affect we’. To clarify the point, I asked the men whether, given that they had been a PNP area for a long time, they were wondering why the community was not in a better state. Damion explained that it was actually disadvantageous to be known as a fully loyal PNP community; neighborhoods that were known to be contested received much more attention:

If you reside on a battleground it can go either way, you will get the full support of the party. But we are predominant PNP stronghold, we’re gonna get shortchanged owing to the fact that they know that we won’t change our political allegiance.

A third participant, Barry, concurred: ‘Through him know that, him just abuse the situation, through him know we are die-hearted PNP’.

As they narrated it, it was actually exactly because they were a hardcore PNP area that they were not receiving any attention in terms of jobs or development projects. Contested areas could expect a lot of attention from politicians, whereas the electorally safe garrison areas would vote for the right party anyway. I asked them whether they felt that if half of them suddenly started to vote JLP, they would get more attention, more jobs and more money. Couldn’t they leverage their vote a little more to get the MP’s attentions, and threaten that they were going to vote JLP next time? This idea was rejected immediately. ‘But is that something that is impossible!’ Damion exclaimed. ‘Impossible!’ two other participants interjected as well. ‘He knows that we could never vote JLP. We just couldn’t do it, we are PNP to the bone. Plus if we were even to suggest switching it would cause too much tension in the community’.

Even as inner-city residents are fully capable of understanding how garrison politics work to their disadvantage, the deeply felt identifications produced over the decades keep them tied unhappily into the same system. For ‘die-hearted’ supporters, voting – for the right party – is not so much a political right as it is a political duty. Their expressions of unconditional support indicate their experience of partisan belonging as something
essentialist and involuntary. Being PNP is a form of political subjectivity that is experienced as a territorial, emotional and an embodied condition (to the bone, diehearted). As residents of a PNP garrison neighborhood, just thinking of voting for the JLP is a hurtful proposition. In addition, Damion’s reference to ‘tension in the community’ underscores the continued threat of violence that is entangled with party loyalty.

The *nah switch* (won’t switch) mentality expressed by the young men from West Kingston was also evident during the campaigns leading up to the December 2011 national elections. One of the main issues during the electoral debates was the incumbent JLP government’s handling of the extradition of the island’s most prominent don, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, in 2010. The party – and in particular Bruce Golding, who had stepped down as Prime Minister and party leader shortly before the elections – had come under attack for first, trying to prevent the JLP-affiliated Dudus from being extradited to the US, and then, killing over 70 Jamaican citizens in an ‘incursion’ to capture him. Nonetheless, the JLP still had many passionate supporters. The morning after a major ‘Labourite’ (JLP) rally where the new party leader and incumbent Prime Minister Andrew Holness had made an appearance, I met a JLP supporter named Keesha. She had attended the all-night rally and was still dressed up in a green shirt, sporting green hair extensions and green nails. We got into a discussion about the position of the JLP and I asked her whether she felt comfortable voting for the party in the wake of the 2010 incursion. She vehemently rejected the idea that this could influence her voting behavior: ‘Me love my party bad! Me a go vote Andrew! Me would vote Bruce! Even if it were a rat, me would vote Labour!’ Like the PNP stalwarts, Keesha saw the act of voting as more than a duty – this was an expression of unconditional love, an affective, enduring relation to the political.

The night before, I had bumped into a cavalcade of buses waiting to leave for the JLP campaign rally. Inside the buses, there were mostly green-clad women, leaning out of the windows and putting on a show for passersby, waving green flags and leafy green branches, shouting ‘Shower! Shower!’ and making the V-sign. While most of the female campaigners waited inside the buses, outside on the street masked green men lounged about, drinking white rum (see Figure 1). I asked one of them why he was hiding his face. ‘Don’t be afraid’, he told me, ‘It’s just a style, just an election thing... Normally you can’t do this because 5–0 [the police] will come catch you!’ Later that evening, I saw the buses rush past on their way to the rally. They were quite a spectacle in the otherwise quiet night as they flew by, horns honking and lights blinking, with people leaning out the windows, ringing bells and again shouting ‘Shower! Shower!’

As noted in the introduction, electoral campaigning demonstrates the entanglement of criminal–political forms of authority and political belonging. ‘Shower!’ has become the uniform slogan associated with the JLP – the shout rings out from buses, at campaign rallies, as a greeting between green-clad supporters on the street. However, the word refers directly to the Shower Posse, the international criminal gang that was run by Dudus’ father, Jim Brown, the so-called ‘don of dons’. The Shower Posse members were JLP stalwarts, acting as criminal–political enforcers in and beyond their home base in the West Kingston garrison of Tivoli Gardens. While the etymology of the political rallying cry ‘Shower’ is undisputed, these origins do not inform its use directly or consciously. When I asked people about the use of the term, both JLP and PNP supporters would recognize its posse roots, but tell me that ‘when we say “Shower” now it just means JLP’. However, as the symbolic link between a criminal organization and a political party, the term cannot ‘just’ refer to the JLP. In repeatedly shouting out a gang name in a range of contexts, these
green-clad supporters produce and reproduce their allegiance to party leaders and criminal organizations, to political community both in and beyond the state.

Throughout my fieldwork in downtown Kingston, I was struck by the inseparability of dons and politicians, not only in their governmental practices but also in how residents represented and related to ‘the state’. The entanglement of these governmental agents has become almost intrinsic to imaginations of the state. This was also clear in May 2010, when hundreds of mainly female12 West Kingston residents demonstrated peacefully in front of the Jamaican parliament in protest of the JLP government’s decision to extradite Dudus, the island’s most powerful don. Their destination, the house of parliament, was clearly not coincidental. The protest was directed at the democratically elected parliament, in defense of a leader whose authority was rooted in various sources but not in democracy. Were these protesters enacting their democratic citizenship rights, and performing their relation to the Jamaican state, by partaking in a longstanding tradition of somewhat rowdy but generally peaceful citizen protests? Or were they undermining the rule of law and the legitimacy of Jamaica’s democratically elected government by protesting the extradition of a man who later pled guilty to serious drugs and arms-trafficking charges? I argue that they were doing both: the political rally recognized and reinforced different types of authority and allegiance simultaneously, demonstrating the entangled character of residents’ political subjectivities.
Conclusion
In this article, I have sought to demonstrate how a closer, ethnographic examination of the electoral process can shed new light on how citizenship is experienced, imagined and performed. A number of anthropologists have begun to explore how elections offer citizens an opportunity to enact their relationship to the state. My purpose in this article has been somewhat different, as I have attempted to demonstrate that what elections reveal goes beyond engagement with formal politics and statist citizenship. What is revealed about the political, when we look at elections through different eyes? I have argued that the entanglement of the state with other governmental actors – from more established institutions such as political parties and trade unions to less formal structures of criminal authority – compels us to view elections as sites for negotiations of political community both in and beyond the state. Approaching elections from this perspective can help us understand how citizens engage with and are engaged by these different, entangled governmental actors.

Lazar (2012) and others have discussed the role of non-state actors such as trade unions in ‘mediated citizenship’. Mediation implies that such actors (which might include criminal organizations, churches, NGOs or social movements in addition to unions) function as brokers between citizens and the state. In the cases described in this article, unions and – even more clearly – criminal organizations moved from being clientelist brokers to becoming state-like governmental actors. As the discussion of colonial and postcolonial elections in Jamaica illustrates, the role of non-state actors has gone beyond mediating people’s relationship to the state as they assume a more direct governmental role, shaping specific forms of political subjectivity and producing specific types of voter-citizens. In the cases described, voting becomes a central part of a citizenship agenda that proscribes a specific type of electoral behavior. In pre-independence Jamaica, trade unionists framed the political norms, values and behavior they deemed necessary for transforming Jamaicans from colonial subjects to independent citizens. In present-day inner-city neighborhoods, ideas about what behavior is appropriate for members of the political community are framed not only by formal rulers but also by party activists, dons and gang members. However, these less formal actors do not operate separately from the Jamaican state. Entangled as violent labor mobilizations and organized crime have been with formal political actors, they enable a form of political community both within and beyond the boundaries of the state.

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Notes
1. This fieldwork was conducted over five years in the period 2008–2012. I carried out ethnographic research in several inner cities throughout Kingston. In addition to this
neighborhood-based research, I conducted focus groups with former gang members from inner-city neighborhoods in West Kingston, and held numerous interviews with politicians, policy-makers, bureaucrats, NGO workers, businessmen, police and a number of smaller dons.

2. These assumptions are also implicit in scholarly definitions of citizenship that hold ‘that political rights are the core and soul of citizenship, because they bestow agency’ (Taylor 2004, 214). Such definitions suggest that political agency follows rather than precedes the technology of voting.

3. See Gay (1998) and Auyero (2001) for related arguments on clientelism in Brazil and Argentina, respectively.

4. These restrictions became even more severe when Jamaica became a Crown Colony in 1865 following the Morant Bay Rebellion.

5. I am grateful to Deborah Thomas for pointing this out.

6. For instance, in the well-known relations in Europe between trade unions and working-class parties (see Ebbinghaus 1995).

7. Like all other names of interviewees in this article, this is a pseudonym.

8. Interview, August 2012.

9. This shift from union leaders to criminal leaders as mediators and co-rulers is connected to a number of processes that took place in the late twentieth century. The Jamaican economy moved away from agriculture and import substitution industrialization and working-class Jamaicans increasingly found employment in the informal and sometimes illegal economy. The informalization of much of the Jamaican workforce contributed to the diminishing clout of organized labor, which coincided with the increasing economic and political influence of criminal organizations engaging in transnational drugs smuggling. The dons who led these criminal organizations came from very different socioeconomic and ethnroracial backgrounds than the union leaders, perhaps reflecting the shifting position of ‘subalterns’ within the political system following independence (see also Gray 2004).

10. For detailed discussions of garrison politics, see Figueroa and Sives (2002) and Gray (2004).


12. The mobilization of women in public support of non-state leaders such as Dudus, but also in support of state leaders such as in the case of the JLP rally described above, may be understood against the background of longer histories of working-class Jamaican women’s political agency. Reflecting on women’s political leadership in urban public space in the nineteenth century, Sheller (2012, 75–76, emphasis added) notes that ‘their special economic and social position as a link between town and country, between markets and fields, and between the state and the families it tried to control, all . . . enabled networks of women to facilitate crucial flows of information and to orchestrate collective action through the female-dominated spaces of the market’. While women’s participation in protests and resistance has continued to be informed by such an intermediary position, this same linking position has also made it attractive for both state and non-state leaders to attempt to harness their public presence in performances of political allegiance.

References


Of ordinariness and citizenship processes
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This paper explores the relations between ordinariness and citizenship processes along two different lines. It first aims at empirically exploring certain uses of ordinariness as a political category. While it is often used as a depoliticisation tool, the two case studies analysed here underline on the contrary its politicising potential. In a second, briefer, part, it proposes a discussion of the gains to be obtained in citizenship studies, from using ordinariness as a category of analysis. Approaching citizenship processes ‘from the ordinary’ is a fruitful perspective from which the political dimensions of usually unseen or unheard practices and sites can be grasped. What connects the two discussions presented here is the complex and paradoxical relationship the two categories of ordinariness and politics entertain, both empirically and analytically.

Keywords: citizenship; ordinariness; infrapolitics; participation; anthropology of citizenship

This paper explores the relations between ordinariness and citizenship processes along two different lines. It first aims at empirically exploring certain uses of ordinariness as a political category. While ordinariness is often used as a depoliticisation tool, the two case studies analysed here underline on the contrary its politicising potential. In a second, briefer, part, it proposes a discussion of the gains to be obtained in citizenship studies, from using ordinariness as a category of analysis. Indeed, while the ‘ordinary’ experience of politics has been a growing topic for social sciences in the last two decades (see among others Gautier and Laugier 2006; Marie, Dujardin, and Balme 2002), the category of ‘ordinary citizens’ is very often used, both by researchers and in a huge variety of participatory or new public management schemes in different sectors of public policies, as a password for ‘non-political’ individuals. Based on two fieldworks in France, the empirical study will thus explore the (expected or not) politicisation effects of two different politics of ordinariness, while the theoretical discussion will explore how ‘working through the ordinary’ can allow us to grasp less conventional reworkings of citizenship, and can widen and enrich our research scope.

The non-political ‘ordinary citizen’ of governance schemes
The development of participatory schemes, in connection to what some authors have described as a ‘deliberative imperative’ (Blondiaux and Sintomer 2002) or even a ‘new spirit of democracy’ (Blondiaux 2008), and the implementation of deep transformations in public policies (see Clarke et al. 2007; Newman and Tonkien 2011) have often been accompanied, at least in Western societies, by the rise of the figure of ‘the ordinary citizen’. As is usually the case with sociopolitical categories (see Neveu 2011), such a term

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refers to different conceptions and can designate a variety of qualities expected from such citizens. In many cases, however, these ‘ordinary citizens’ are thought of as detached individuals not involved in collective action, for instance when local authorities try to attract inhabitants of a neighbourhood who are (or might be) interested in discussing its problems, but who are not already members of voluntary groups. The sources of this conception might be looked for in previous analyses, according to which the ‘ideal citizen’ would precisely be the one who carefully keeps afar from all kind of involvement in public or collective spaces, so as to preserve his or her ability to forge an opinion in his or her innermost being (see for instance Gauchet 1995). These ‘ordinary citizens’ are here seen as more independent and detached than those involved in collective spaces or debates, and their opinions as more genuine, more ‘authentic’ and less biased, since they are not supposed to be structured by the corporate interests or opinions of organised groups or collectives.

This first conception thus valorises a citizen conceived of as at his or her best when detached and preserved from external influence; in a connected way, the ‘ordinary citizen’ can also be defined as more generally preserved from the ‘dirtiness’ of politics:

Ordinary people are seen as a counterbalance to the dangers and ‘dirtiness’ of politics [...] In the context of these concerns about ‘actually existing politics’, ordinary people are valorised because they are not political. They are seen as occupying positions that are above or below politics: below, because they are seen to be concerned with more ‘everyday’ issues; above, because they are not engaged in the venal, corrupt or collusive pursuit of power and self-interest in the manner of politicians. (Clarke 2010, 640–642)

Clarke’s analysis thus connects the two above-mentioned dimensions: distance from politics and/or collective spaces and concern with everyday issues. Indeed, for many authors, the main characteristics of such citizens would be their silence, their absence from the public sphere:

By paying attention to the sole militants or other ‘active’ citizens [...] and generally to the more involved among them, the specialist in political attitudes learns a lot about these public space freaks that are the most mobilised (especially in social movements), but leaves out all the ordinary passers-by, the members of these famous silent majorities. (Mariot 2010, 179–180, italics in the original)

To that extent, it could be considered that the quiet, ‘ordinary’ citizen defined as ‘non political’ is the exact counterpoint of the active, vocal one (for developments on this opposition, see Neveu 2014). The strong implicit assumption of these conceptions is that ordinariness would be non-political and consist of non-involvement. Such an argument is indeed coherent with approaches that consider ‘politics’ a distinct domain, requiring particular competences and attitudes – a conventional view that will be further discussed at the end of this paper, where ordinariness will be discussed as a fruitful lens for citizenship studies.

‘Ordinary citizens’ seem to be a very sought-after brand of citizens today; but while the ‘ordinary’ is often used to describe supposedly non-political, non-involved individuals, it can also be mobilised with a different meaning and aim. It is to such contested politics of ‘ordinariness’ that I will now turn, through a brief presentation of two situations observed in Tours, a middle-sized town in the Loire Valley. One is a ‘participatory scheme’ launched in the mid-2000s by the local council in order for the population to contribute to urban planning, the Conseils de la Vie Locale (CVLs, Councils for Local Life); the other (Débattons dans les rues, or DDLR) is a ‘political festival’ organised during the same period by a group of mostly young people. Two different politics of ordinariness were at
work in these situations, and both effected forms of politicisation, even though in the first case these effects were largely unintended.

As stated above, many (local) institutions work with a representation of ‘ordinary citizens’ as detached and more genuine citizens, spared from dirtiness of politics. Do these citizens take on, adopt and/or resist this framing and how? Indeed, Clarke et al. (2007) clearly demonstrated that public services users in Great Britain hardly complied with the role they were summoned to endorse of citizens-consumers making the ‘better choice’ for themselves, and demonstrated a rich reflexivity towards this role. During our more than a year of fieldwork on CVLs, we also paid particular attention to how ‘inhabitants’ felt about the position they were ascribed, and how they developed alternative practices so as to reframe this position (Bertheleu and Neveu 2005).

As in many such schemes that developed in France after the 2002 law on ‘propinquity democracy’, two bodies were created in Tours’ CVLs: one of voluntary groups’ representatives and one of ‘inhabitants’. The latter were called upon as individuals, representing only themselves. Even though Tours is not renowned for having a history of vibrant social movements, most of these inhabitants were, or had been at some point in their life, involved in different forms of collective action (trade union or school associations, volunteering in charity organisations, etc.). In interviews they all asserted voting in all elections, as a matter of principle and their duty as citizens. Their own expectations towards CVLs were rather vague, some mentioning their desire to have a closer look at a ‘little form of democracy’, while others, especially retired persons, were willing to become more involved in local life. It is thus all the more interesting to understand how and why these inhabitants rather quickly expressed questions as to their role and legitimacy: how could they, as a collection of drawn individuals, ‘represent’ the population of a CVL territory? What was the value of purely individual views on local issues? For elected local councillors, this was a superfluous question; ‘inhabitants’ sat in their own names, on a purely individual basis, and represented nobody but themselves, such qualities being the very foundations of their legitimacy to participate. But this position of pure, detached individuals was experienced as a rather problematic one by these ‘ordinary citizens’:

[according to the first deputy mayor] we only represent ourselves. But then, I cannot see why it should be interesting to have the opinion of Ms Doe who lives there if she only represents herself, because one is necessarily more sensitive to one’s own condition. (Female inhabitant, WT CVL)

In at least two CVLs ‘inhabitants’ then decided, against the advice of elected councillors, to arrange for themselves collective moments during which they would build what they perceived as a more legitimate voice (Bertheleu and Neveu 2005). What inhabitants seemed to cherish most about their collective discussions was that they took place outside the watch of elected councillors: ‘Because sometimes, it’s true, we speak about things and if an elected councillor or a professional is here, he is going to say: “It’s of no use to think about that” and here it is, it ends the discussion’ (Female inhabitant, WT CVL).

Like Virginia Woolf’s female character, having a/some ‘room of one’s own’ indeed seems to be an essential condition for such ‘ordinary citizens’ to gain access to some autonomy and creativity. During interviews, inhabitants clearly expressed a strong attachment towards these spaces of ‘privacy’ (entre-soi), where mutual respect and listening were stronger motivations than sheer sociability. The gain obtained through collective discussion was also a central dimension: ‘[working collectively] one succeeds better in creating something rather than being alone defending something; we are with a
number of people and we can feel differently on a given issue, and it’s more constructive’ (Female inhabitant, WT CVL).

When you want to fight for something, you have to develop arguments, the idea has to be worked upon, you cannot just say ‘I would like that …’. It is only by being with a number of people that you can elaborate ideas, make them tangible … It’s more credible. (Male inhabitant, NT CVL)

Some participants seemed to find in the plural, non-univocal and progressively built ‘collective’ they contributed to more legitimacy to speak, to express themselves as citizens deliberately engaged in the public sphere, with a strong ‘desire for politics’ (Rudolf 2003).

This highlights three main empirical results: first the aspiration of ‘ordinary citizens’ to act and discuss without always being under the gaze of institutions. The strong framing of discussions (in terms of which topics and forms are legitimate) in participatory schemes makes them look for moments when they can discuss without being submitted to this institutional gaze and framing; the need for such ‘partial public spaces’ where meanings can be elaborated with (a relative) autonomy has been noticed in other settings (see Neveu 2003). Indeed, and that is the second result, CVLs members developed, within this setting, a conception of their role as citizens that implied the progressive building of collective proposals and visions, as opposed to the expression of individuals. Following Cefaï, they thus became ‘political’: ‘Something like “the political/politics” emerges as such every time collectives are formed, question or involve themselves around issues where what is at stake is reaching a common/public good or avoiding a common/public evil’ (2011, 546–547). While CVL’s members succeeded in elaborating this collective, non-univocal voice in this particular setting, they were at the same time attached to other forms of experiencing their citizenship in other ones, like acting as individuals when voting. In other words whether citizenship is considered as a collective or individual exercise (or whether ‘being political’ [Isin 2002] is an individual or collective matter) depends on how and when people actually experience it; it is thus the close contextual analysis of such experiences of citizenship that allows us to grasp its meanings and forms, and not a pre-defined abstract framing.

The last result is the highlighting of differential expectations about ‘politics’ in such schemes; in Tours (but other research reaches the same conclusion; see among others Barnes and Prior 2009), many inhabitants thought they would find in CVLs a space for involvement and public debates, a collective space where meanings and visions for the future could be elaborated, and individual and collective voices articulated differently, without necessarily questioning the power and position of elected councillors. But most of the latter assumed that what ‘people needed’ (and were looking for when sitting in CVLs) were actual answers on very practical issues of daily life, and not such debates and elaborations. Elected councillors both referred to and defined ‘ordinary citizens’ as occupying a ‘non-political’ position in a non-political space (the CVLs), while what they actually aspired to was access to spaces for collective discussions that could contribute to decision-making. Framed as non-political by local authorities, these ‘ordinary citizens’ thus managed to sidestep and recreate some sort of politicised moments as citizens.

Reclaiming the political in ordinary situations

Such an aspiration to (re)create and enjoy collective spaces for discussions and debates has also been observed, although under rather different guise, within DDLR. While CVLs are clearly a ‘top-down’ institutional initiative, DDLR is a ‘political festival’ organised by
an informal group of individuals. An extract from the ‘real-fake’ newspaper of the ‘festival’s 20th edition’ gives a rather clear idea of the group’s state of mind:

*Débattons dans les rues* was born in Tours in 2004, from the initiative of a small group of people willing to return speech to a central place, to encourage encounters and exchanges (people were speaking to each other less and less) and to re-appropriate the public space... At that time, the Place Jean Jaurès was mainly reserved for cars, the city was invaded by advertising space... and gathering in the streets required an authorization from public authorities... In 2025, it can be said *Débattons* has reached the ideal it had at its inception, which is no longer utopian now. Advertising has disappeared, and you only see free noticeboards on which anyone can express itself on any topic. People gather regularly on the street to debate daily life issues – they of course created the necessary spaces for encounters (FNAC has been razed to the ground and is now a huge agora open to everybody). (DDLR leaflet, April 2006)

In order to implement these aspirations, a series of events was organised for the 2006 edition of DDLR: a ‘mobile party’ which consists of roaming the city streets with radios tuned to the same local independent radio station; movies projected in the evening on the façades of historical buildings in the old quarter of the city; debates held in squares and gardens; or ‘window concerts’ where musicians played to the public gathered in the street from the windows of private houses, thus practically questioning the supposedly clear-cut separation between private and public space in the city. All these practices had as their main aim to induce among the public a critical gaze on the ‘usual’ spatial arrangement and uses of the public space and to entice that same public to reconquer public space as a political space where people could meet, debate and express themselves:

Where have all the places for exchange, debate and expression gone? Where have we gone? Because politics is about sharing speeches and acts, *Débattons dans les rues* uses the public space as its field of action. The aim is to modify our relation to this space, to enjoy by re-appropriating the street. (DDLR Program, April 2006)

Not surprisingly, DDLR’s approach to the issue of political expression and/in public space included a more critical relationship with institutions. This critical distance has several sources: one flows from previous experiences with various types of ‘institutions’, whether (local) authorities, trade unions or ‘traditional’ associations such as Greenpeace. DDLR members argued that applying for financial support from local authorities creates a link of dependency and tends to distort the initial intentions of their projects. Keeping institutions at bay was thus seen as the surest means to protect their own aspirations and projects from distortion, manipulation or being ‘vacuumed’ of meaning.

The decision to nevertheless apply for public funding in 2006 was thus explained in the Festival’s programme:

In 2005, *Débattons dans les rues* proudly claimed its connection with the No Logo movement; in 2006 we received money from the European Commission through the magic of funding applications. Does this mean we are turncoats? Yes, but no in fact. Because our project was not evaluated and funded on account of its intent or actual program: no questions were asked, nothing was said as to the content of our activities. We were just asked to reproduce the European Youth Programme logo, and, by the way, here it is:
So frankly, why should we hesitate when an institution acts as the usual public relations company, as a basic sponsor only concerned with its brand image? We could indeed have shown the logo ... like this ... or like that ...

But we were afraid to be told off, so we put the real one. As simple as that. Without batting an eye, without saying a word.

And we reassert that it is by pulling out of the sacrosanct rules of profitability, financial balance, allowances, that we will gain in solidarity, encounter, alternative practices, popular education, mobilisation, development of social movement, power and involvement of citizens. (DDLR program, 2006)

An even more important reason for keeping its distance from institutions is that DDLR does not consider them relevant partners. In the preparatory discussions held before the festival, participants constantly repeated that they did not aim at entering into a dialogue with institutions, but with the ‘ordinary passer-by’, the general public walking the streets of the city. Since French law forbids any unauthorized gathering of more than three persons, even as simple an act as organising a street closure for a neighbourhood dinner\(^\text{21}\) requires an authorisation from local authorities. In 2005, DDLR organizers applied for such authorisation, which was denied the very day the festival was to begin (the planned events nevertheless took place). In 2006, they held long discussions on the issue, and decided not to apply for official permission. Some justified it by arguing that transgression was at the heart of their involvement. However, the main argument was that such a choice had a pedagogical dimension: it showed people that apparently ‘simple’, ‘ordinary’ acts such as having a collective discussion in a group on the street were legally prohibited. By not applying for authorisation, DDLR members thus adopted a strategy coherent with their objectives (to re-appropriate the public space), and wanted to open up new opportunities of discussion with passers-by, if the police was to try and forbid their actions.\(^\text{22}\)

If members of DDLR aimed at inviting a larger audience to debate on the streets during their festival, they also adopted practices from the Festival into their own daily, individual routines.

My first idea [when joining the festival team] was not to do politics, it was having fun and being with friends. ... it was the beginning of something ... things changed in my daily life; I now speak with people more easily. Before [participating in DDLR] I would never do it, now I tend to dare to do it. (Interview female participant)

Referring to a participant in Vélorution,\(^\text{23}\) another member of DDLR mentioned that ‘since he participated [in the Vélorution], he discusses more with people, because he has the...
feeling there are many of us, and that makes him stronger in his life as an individual, to do things in his daily life’ (notes of DDLR preparatory meeting).

For DDLR members, the mundane spaces of daily sociability are thus politicised through a collective process that turns them into spaces of potential, where subject positions can be experimented with and relations transformed. Holston also observes similar, although not intentionally organised, processes in Brazil. He thus analysed how the public challenge of established ‘citizenship privileges’ by a poor woman queuing at a bank counter allowed her to voice, in a mundane public space (a local branch of a bank), her equal right and citizenship. Holston then states that:

trafficking in public space is a realm of modern society in which city residents most frequently and predictably experience the state of their citizenship. The quality of such mundane interaction may in fact be more significant to people’s sense of themselves in society than the occasional heroic experiences of citizenship like soldiering and demonstrating or the emblematic ones like voting and jury duty. (Holston 2008, 15)

DDLR’s ‘public’ thus does not consist of institutions: its organisers do not want to influence institutional practices and representations. Its ‘public’ is the general population, or even the organisers themselves. Discussions about the intended audience in DDLR were characterised by an assumed lack of concern about the size, and sometimes the very presence, of it. The idea that members of the organising collective were their own public did not reflect a self-sufficient attitude, but the strong conviction that ‘acting’, ‘participating’ or ‘watching’ were (equivalent) positions that should all be based on a common willingness and desire to get involved, share moments of discussion and pleasure. By blurring the usual dividing lines between organisers, participants and audience, members of DDLR both saw themselves as their own public and their audience as other selves. Willingness to change relationships in the public space by experimenting with debates and other practices was seen as the relevant force to be created, instead of rallying behind a cause, mobilising as a member of an organised structure or just listening and subscribing to univocal and stabilised opinions and discourses.

DDLR leads its life in a world where institutions are largely out of the frame and are not perceived as capable of transforming themselves through interaction with social movements or individual citizens. The political space DDLR wants to occupy is not that of institutions, but those spaces and places used by people on a routine, daily basis: buses, laundromats and of course streets and squares; they want such ‘ordinary’ spaces to be used politically by people.

What this discussion of two politics of ‘ordinariness’ points at is that this notion is mobilised to designate or qualify different things and issues in CVLs and DDLR. In the first case, it is citizens who are framed by local authorities as depoliticised ‘ordinary’ ones, endowed with specific qualities; and these citizens resist the role they are assigned to by trying to create their own spaces for collective discussions, thus in a way ‘being political’ (Isin 2002). But this does not imply that creating such spaces is their only way to experience their citizenship. CVL members explained in interviews that they experimented with citizenship as individuals when voting for instance. In DDLR, the ordinariness is not that of those ‘passers-by’ with whom participants want to meet and discuss, but that of sites and moments. In other words, what the collective aims at is to incite people to make political spaces of every street, square or bus they use on a daily basis. They do not doubt the fact that people are political subjects, but feel on the one hand that they lack the spaces to express this quality, and on the other that politics is not to be reserved for certain times and places but should be part and parcel of daily, ‘ordinary’ situations, encounters and spaces.
Working ‘through the ordinary’

If one works with a static and *a priori* delimitation of citizenship, CVL members and DDLR organisers would no doubt be considered ‘active’ and not ‘ordinary’ (i.e. non-political) citizens, but such an approach is more than problematic (see Neveu 2013), especially since it considers that citizenship exists *in abstracto*, as an essence, instead of conceiving it as a process, as always ‘in the making’ and ‘imparfaite’ (Balibar 2001). In contrast, working with a processual and relational conception of citizenship allows us to grasp how the experiences of CVL members and DDLR participants, each in their own way, allowed politicisation to occur, as well as to understand the ‘politics of ordinariness’ at work in specific contexts and projects, i.e. how ‘the ordinary’ as a political category is used and endowed with a variety of meanings.

Before concluding, I want to briefly discuss ordinariness (in its relation to citizenship) from a different point of view, namely its fruitfulness as an analytical category (Carrel and Neveu 2014). ‘Working through the ordinary’, that is using it as a particular perspective when exploring citizenship processes and politics, refers of course to the idea that as with citizenship,27 ‘ordinariness’ cannot be defined per se, or *in abstracto*. In other words, no situation, site, practice or individual is ‘ordinary’ in itself. It is, then, the political work required to endow the term with specific meanings that has to be empirically analysed, as in the case of CVLs and DDLR. ‘Working through the ordinary’ as an approach enables a new perspective, which renders visible processes (practices, sites, moments) that are rendered invisible in mainstream political discourse and research (GRAC 2014); it allows us to open up the analysis to sites, moments and practices usually considered as ‘non-political’, or as ‘infrapolitical’, and to include them in the frame.

Indeed, according to Hatzfeld, ‘ordinariness’ is first of all a specific way of looking at people and things, an ‘analyser’ that renders often unseen processes visible: ‘this way of seeing pays attention to the daily, the banal, in what breaks its continuity, its un-thought of or its untold’ (2011, 23). Considering the ordinary allows one to take a critical distance from approaches that consider politics as an abstract and specialised sphere, disconnected from the social and that can only be grasped in a pre-defined series of moments and types of practices. It allows us to ‘forsake[s] a discontinuous perspective that stresses breaks, and opt[s] for an understanding of the processes through which actors possibly open up to politics, without privileging explicit moments and instances of politicisation’ (Marie, Dujardin, and Balme 2002, 26).

Such processes have been highlighted by Boudreau, Boucher, and Liguori (2009) in their analysis of the engagement of Latina women in marches against immigration reform in the USA. The authors suggest that in ‘a condition of urbanity … there is much continuity between everyday life and political events’:

> the long commutes these women make daily has provided them with various skills. On busses, they meet other women, they share information, they co-construct situations they experience as unjust, they compare various neighbourhoods and personal and work situations, in other words: they shape their political subjectivity. … Some women explicitly linked their ability to cope with everyday struggles (‘las luchas’) with their view of a larger collective struggle. They expressed how they were used to fighting and they knew how to look forward, and to do so collectively was attractive to them. (Boudreau, Boucher, and Liguori 2009, 341)

All of this bears strong connections with Scott’s notion of infrapolitics; he also underlines that it allows rendering visible ‘the circumspect struggle waged daily by subordinate groups [which] is, like infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum’ (Scott 1990, 183). But according to him, infrapolitics is also an appropriate term in another way:
in the same fashion [as infrastructures for commerce are facilities that make it possible] I mean to suggest that the infrapolitics we have examined provides much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has generally been focused. (Scott 1990)

It might be here that the notion of ‘ordinariness’ may present a slight difference with that of infrapolitics. Indeed, it avoids reproducing a ‘vertical topography of power’ (Ferguson 1994). As Abélès (2014, 74) argues:

> the very idea of infrapolitics is problematic: indeed, one can only agree with Scott to give all their political dimension back to a set of processes that are usually ignored or only considered as daily interactions. At the same time, the notion of infrapolitics can be confusing since it implies, whether one wants it or not, the idea of a hierarchy of levels between political practices.

Considering daily acts and practices such as those analysed by Boudreau et al. as infrapolitics (a cultural and structural underpinning), indeed, still locates ‘politics’ in the usually observed domain of more visible political action.

‘Working through the ordinary’ might prove useful so as to avoid reproducing such an implicitly hierarchical conception. Many of the practices and competences highlighted by Overney (2011) in her research in Lyon might at first sight be considered as similar to those described by Scott or Boudreau et al. She analyses how walking the streets of the neighbourhood daily endows inhabitants with critical knowledge about its problems, a knowledge they can then use when discussing planning projects with local institutions. But she does not consider these skills as the underpinning of ‘actual’ politics:

> In the GTI [the neighbourhood organization], inhabitants devote themselves to an *eminently political work*: defining what matters, those who matter, these co-residents and those issues to which attention must be paid. (Overney 2014, italics added)

In other words, what she calls ‘watchfulness’, this daily care and attention to what and who matter28 is not infrapolitics, a substratum of more classically defined politics. It is political work, the work of what Overney defines after Laplantine as ‘*petite politique*’ (small politics).29 To that extent, it is rather different from Scott’s attention to the gradual political effects of the non-strategic accumulation of uncoordinated everyday acts.

‘Working through the ordinary’ would thus better allow including within the same frame of analysis spheres that are often considered to be different; it emphasises the many different shapes and spaces of politics without ordering them hierarchically, even implicitly. Instead of contrasting supposedly mundane, ‘infrapolitical’ practices and acts, and more ‘heroic’ ones (or society’s resistances and institutions’ policies), working through the ordinary allows one to opt for an approach that pays attention to passages, thresholds and circulations, to changes, drawbacks and transformations. This is all the more useful since people’s own experiences and practices of citizenship are not (only) made of clear breaks, of clear-cut tipping points, but more often of more or less chaotic connections between daily, routine practices and more vocal or public acts.

In line with the introduction to this issue (de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster, 2015), working ‘through the ordinary’ is thus a way to open up the analysis of citizenship processes to a richer variety of experiences and practices, to unbalance established hierarchies, distinctions and positions that too often go unquestioned in many research, and to explore continuities and circulations instead of relying on dyadic conceptions favouring breaks and discontinuities (Clarke and Newman 2009).

I will close this brief discussion stressing another important aspect of such an approach. What is ‘rendered visible’ using the notion of the ordinary is not only daily,
hardly visible resistances. It is also an established configurations and representations that often frame our gaze and forbid us, as researchers, to critically explore them:

considering ordinariness does not mean banishing the institutions’ ways of doing or thinking but tracking down what challenges their foundations, their normality. . . . The ordinary here aims at exploring transformations or transgressions of categories, questioning fixed schematisations of the legitimate and illegitimate, highlighting certain reconfigurations in the relationship to institutions and to politics. (Hatzfeld 2011, 23–2430)

Thus, analysing participants’ competing interpretations of the purpose of a participatory scheme in Great Britain, Sullivan mentions different alternatives used by ‘disgruntled members’ of the public (not observing the rules of ‘question time’ by making a speech instead of asking a question, or asking more than one question, or decrease their commitment). These strategies and tactics were not necessarily popular with many participants, nor did they seem to have any positive effect in terms of achieving change on substantive issues: ‘it was not entirely clear that members of the public using these tactics had ambitions beyond disrupting what they perceived to be an inflexible and inappropriate means of engaging with them’ (Sullivan 2009, 63). Like CVL members who managed to create specific moments for themselves, Sullivan’s participants did not necessarily explicitly challenge power positions, but wanted to render visible their disagreement about the one they were given, by critically engaging with institutions and developing different practices. Clarke and Newman concur with such analysis, echoing Hatzfeld’s analysis of ‘ordinary legitimacies’31:

subversion may not be a process of changing or challenging specific policies, regulations or statutory positions. Rather, it may be the process of bringing into view – rendering visible and uncomfortable – the network of assumptions that sustains and supports the existing field of distinctions, regulations and practices. (Clarke and Newman 2009, 76, italics added)

Conclusion

As is true for many other words we use as social scientists, ‘the ordinary’ can be both a political and analytical category. Contrasting the experiences of CVL members and DDLR participants illustrates the politics of ordinariness at work in practices aimed at supporting people’s participation, even as they worked with opposed conceptions of participation. Governance schemes such as the CVLs in Tours call upon ‘ordinary citizens’ to participate, defining them as non-political and non-engaged, two qualities that would paradoxically make of them ‘ideal citizens’. Such a vision has to be re-inscribed in a wider frame of thought that defines citizenship as a purely individual and decontextualised exercise practised at its best when based in the individual’s innermost being. While in the CVLs, it was citizens who were deemed to be ‘ordinary’, participants in DDLR Festival aimed at reasserting the political role and status of ‘ordinary situations’. In their view, the passers-by they wanted to discuss with and incite to use the city streets as political spaces were essentially political subjects. At stake was the possibility to recreate the practical conditions for this quality to express itself, i.e. by making of every space they daily use spaces where politics could take place.

But if ‘the ordinary’ has to be critically engaged with as a political category that is used by a variety of actors, including researchers, and is endowed with very different meanings, this paper also points to the potential benefits to be obtained in citizenship studies by using ordinariness as an analytical lens. Approaching citizenship processes ‘from the ordinary’ is a fruitful perspective from which the political dimensions of usually unseen or unheard practices and sites can be grasped, and unruly practices be treated not as inadequate or
mismatched ones. Indeed, what is centrally at stake is the issue of *visibility*, or more exactly of *rendering visible* things (people, practices, processes) that often go unseen or unheard (Boullier 2009). Adopting a viewpoint ‘from the ordinary’ allows us to explore the eminently political dimensions of practices, spaces and times that are at the worst dismissed as ‘non-political’ according to the dominant regime of legitimacy hierarchies (Hatzfeld 2011; Overney 2011) or at best considered as infrapolitical. What connects the two discussions presented here is the complex and paradoxical relationship the two categories of ordinariness and politics entertain, both empirically and analytically.

**Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

**Notes**

1. Such distance would provide yet another valued quality they are endowed with: the fact they would ‘represent’ nobody but themselves.
2. Indeed, the legitimacy of ‘ordinary citizens’ to participate is often seen as flowing from their direct knowledge of local issues, what is usually described in France as *expertise d’usage* (user expertise).
3. Mariot uses the English word ‘freaks’ in the original French text. All translations from the French are by the author.
4. Clarke (2010) stresses the extent to which calling upon ‘ordinary citizens’ can be a powerful depoliticisation device.
5. Both fieldworks used in this paper were realised in Tours (a city of circa 140,000 inhabitants in the Loire Valley) between 2003 and 2006. In both cases, long-term participant observation of meetings and events was used, as well as interviews with CVL members and DDLR participants; fieldwork on the CVLs was done in cooperation with H. Bertheleu (University François Rabelais, Tours).
6. Together with those of professionals and of elected councillors.
7. A paradoxical observation when one considers these ‘ordinary citizens’ are called upon precisely because they are not supposed to be involved in such groups.
8. To that extent, they are thus close to yet another figure of the ‘ordinary citizen’: that of the ‘good one’, who complies with its expected duties (see Neveu 2013).
9. ‘Inhabitants’ were selected by a draft among individuals having explicitly expressed their willingness to participate in CVLs.
10. WT: West Tours; the four CVLs were named after their geographic position: West, East, North and South.
11. Other dimensions of CVL members’ representations confirm the need for such a contextualised approach of experiences; they thus admitted elected councillors could entertain a patronage relation with their constituency, but not within the (supposedly) participatory scene of CVLs (see Bertheleu and Neveu 2005).
12. For instance, one participant in DDLR, a movement discussed below, stressed that: ‘in a movement, I need to be recognised as a person, as an interesting person. In [other] movements, I’m not recognised as such /…/ DDLR is a form of claiming that is not directed towards elected representatives, or the power, but from oneself to oneself (de soi sur soi-même)’ (Female participant, notes of DDLR preparatory meeting).
13. Yet, another way to define ‘the ordinary’ and thus the supposedly ‘non-political’.
14. This discrepancy in expectations produced different reactions, among which defection and irony were not the less used.
15. Literally ‘Let’s debate on the streets’, but in French this name has strong assonances with the expression ‘des bâtons dans les roues’ which means ‘putting sticks in wheels (spokes)’, i.e. disrupting a process.
16. After a first edition in 2005 organised by STAJ (an association mainly involved in youth workers’ training), the 2006 edition’s planning and conception gathered a diversity of individuals, mostly youth in their twenties or early thirties, from a diversity of backgrounds (in
most cases with some kind of higher education experience, not necessarily completed) but sharing precarious job positions or unemployment.

17. FNAC is a national brand of ‘cultural supermarket’ whose shops usually include a ‘forum’, i.e. a space where authors can meet their public. Reclaiming this (private commercial) space as an actual forum (public space for discussion) was a strong objective for DDLR’s organisers. Such an attention paid to reclaiming the political meaning of words is a constant characteristic of movements belonging to the tradition of éducation populaire.

18. Such a will to re-occupy the urban space as a space for encounters and debates was not only enacted during the Festival itself; when weather allowed, participants were also organising the planning meetings outside, in parks or on buildings’ staircases.

19. A public space that is not just a metaphoric one, but is conceived of as an actual space, made of streets and squares. Another DDLR project was to mark with painting the ‘privatised’ parts of what looked like public spaces. For more details about the centrality of spatial dimensions of citizenship, see Staeheli et al. (2012) and Clarke et al. (2013).

20. The very functioning of such institutions would make it impossible to reconcile their requirements and conceptions with those of collective movements. Complying with the framing of issues and stakes by funding bodies (even in a critical and instrumental manner) would have deep effects on projects and their political meanings; for more examples of such processes, see Neveu (1999, 2003). As for trade unions and other ‘institutionalised’ groups, they are seen as trapped in rigid certainties that forbid them to actually adopt a position of true debate, to listen and question themselves.

21. Generally organised on a voluntary basis by local inhabitants, these dinners gather neighbours for a shared meal that takes place in the street; these informal dinners can, or not, be organised on the ‘official’ neighbours day.

22. All encounters with the police, described as ‘intercultural encounters’, went smoothly.

23. Vélorutions take place in a growing number of cities; they are ‘demonstrations’ on bikes claiming for a new model of urban circulation and life. See, for instance, http://www.velorution.org

24. Such conceptions are part of a wider mode of political action particularly developed in anti-globalisation groups (as well as more recent ‘new new social movements’ such as Occupy or Indignados) resorting to different forms of public actions and demonstrations. While not explicitly claiming their connection with such movements, some DDLR members referred on several occasions to them. But it should be observed that such practices in France have even more ‘ancient’ roots in the empowering project of mouvements d’éducation populaire (Pujol 2005), in which many DDLR organisers were trained.

25. DDLR members organised several apéritifs in laundromats: ‘I think these projects stood out for people, who thought “it’s amazing what you can do in simplicity”; what we bring is simplicity, that is, if you feel like talking with your neighbours, you can, and that’s a very simple project’ (notes of DDLR preparatory meeting).

26. As mentioned earlier, the roots of such an approach are mainly to be found in mouvements d’éducation populaire, where some of the more active members of DDLR were trained themselves. Some of its more radical forms tend to re-emerge today, alongside community organising or empowerment practices, for instance among community centres (Neveu 2014). On the history of éducation populaire, see among others Pujol (2005) and Lebon (2005).

27. Entering into a detailed discussion of the situational, contextual, relational and processual character of citizenship is beyond the scope of this paper (for developments, see Clarke et al. 2013; Isin 2009; Neveu 2013).

28. Overney’s approach is consistent with Rancière’s definition of politics (see Rancière 1995).

29. ‘Taking up the definition of the “small” by Laplantine, small politics is not the opposite of the far away but of the haughty in its etymological sense: a judgment from afar, from above, towering (Laplantine, 2003)’ (Overney 2014).

30. CVL members and DDLR participants both in their own way questioned such established legitimacies. In the first case, the ascribed legitimacy of (and injunction to act as) ‘non-political’ individuals, and, in the second, the legally defined legitimate uses of public space.

31. Such ‘ordinary legitimacies’ are those that lie ‘outside the realms of the usually agreed legitimacy – those of power or competences’. This proposal could in a way be connected to Rancière’s (1995) analysis of ‘la part des sans-part’, the share of those who have no share because they do not have money, knowledge or rank (1995).
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Muslim sound, public space, and citizenship agendas in an American City
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Based on fieldwork in a small Michigan city, this study examines a contestation over the right for Muslims to broadcast the Islamic call to prayer, or adhan, into the streets. At stake in such contestations over public space is a struggle over conflicting citizenship agendas, or ideological formations seeking to advance particular models for good citizenship and the acceptable integration of minorities. Some Hamtramck citizens who identified themselves as interfaith actors advocated a citizenship agenda to support the call to prayer based on a material and spatial conception of shared civic culture that challenged assumptions about political differences between religious communities. To forward these aims, interfaith actors organized public ritual events that offered opportunities for visceral and experiential investments into the sights, sounds, and ceremonies of Hamtramck’s religiously diverse public arena. This strategy encouraged people to cross boundaries into previously exclusive religious spaces and presented opportunities to expand the cultural boundaries of municipal belonging.

Keywords: Islam; America; citizenship; anthropology of the senses; urban space

In a public hearing at City Hall in Hamtramck, Michigan, the room was filled to capacity with residents from a wide variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. This included Bangladeshi, Yemeni, Bosnian, and African-American Muslims, as well as Polish Catholics and African-American Baptists. The secretary of a small Hamtramck mosque approached the podium to speak:

Salama Aleikum councilmen and distinguished public, my name is Khatib Hassan, and I live on 4423 Whalen Street, Hamtramck.1 We are all here as immigrants, everybody comes from other countries . . . . We must live together. We must look after each other’s problems and try to solve them. That’s how a city becomes great. With respect to that, I am a Muslim and I practice my prayer five times a day, it’s part of our religion . . . My request is simply to allow the call to prayer. (City Council 2004c)

In spring 2004, officials from a small Bangladeshi-American mosque in Hamtramck, Michigan, asked the municipality to recognize their right to publicly broadcast the call to prayer (adhan) into the streets. In this historically Polish-Catholic city, the idea of an officially recognized adhan was met with fear, anger, and resistance on the part of some local residents, but was embraced as a civil rights issue by others. Over the spring and summer months of 2004, public debate about the adhan rose steadily in pitch as the city council and residents engaged in a referendum debate over a noise ordinance amendment that would permit and control the right to produce sounds that many believed were already constitutionally legal. Local, national, and international media channels reported on the issue in a way that foregrounded social discord, prejudice, and confusion, casting the city

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into an uncomfortable national and international spotlight. Yet, the debate over the adhan and the extended legislative process that accompanied it also brought about a productive caesura or impasse that afforded room for a creative sounding out of the city’s relationship to its growing Muslim populations, which in 2004 were estimated to comprise approximately 30% of Hamtramck’s numbers. The debates, activism, and events organized to support and educate about the call to prayer led to a public reconsideration of what kinds of sounds belong in the city and who has the right to make them.

Some Hamtramck citizens from religious and interfaith civil institutions based their support for the Muslim call to prayer on a material and spatial conception of shared civic culture that challenged assumptions about political differences between religious communities. In effect, Hamtramck locals advanced an interfaith ‘citizenship agenda’ by staging a series of public ritual events that provided Hamtramck residents access to experiential dimensions of alternative forms of religiosity within the shared space of the city. Citizenship agendas are ideological formulations seeking to advance particular models for incorporation into the political community (de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster 2015). Instead of staking claims to rights based on ‘tolerated difference’ (Connolly 2000; Brown 2008), an agenda based on sensory engagements with public religiosity created opportunities for visceral and experiential investments into the sights, sounds, and rituals of Hamtramck’s public arena. This strategy of inclusion encouraged diverse people to cross boundaries into previously exclusive religious spaces and presented opportunities to expand the cultural boundaries of municipal belonging.

The idea of the ‘urban sensorium’ offers a productive way to make sense of connections between the sensory and social dimensions of this civic movement to support sound. Drawing upon Hirschkind’s idea of ‘human sensorium,’ which refers to ‘the affects, sensibilities and perceptual habits’ of particular ‘discreet listening publics’ (2006, 9), I offer up the concept of the ‘urban sensorium’ as a way to transpose Hirschkind’s listening public to fit the scale of the city. The urban sensorium concept points to the production of shared and collective sensual life and the interpretive repertoires put into place that invest these sensory experiences with meanings based on reference to a history of interactions within a particular municipality. In effect, the urban sensorium becomes a way to engage the subtle material level of local politics and dominant-minority social relations outside of the constrained and contentious ordinance debates.

Efforts to capitalize on the political utility of multisensory modes of sociability take place in an uneven field of power relations. For that reason, even in citizenship agendas’ material or sensory articulation, social actors may end up recapitulating hierarchies through selective recognition of difference; however, much their activism intends to blur or reconfigure the dominant schema for categorizing those differences. As discussed below, in Hamtramck, this tendency was expressed in a propensity for interfaith actors to emphasize aspects of public Islam associated with the call to prayer that were already deemed compatible with familiar expressive forms of the dominant Polish Catholicism, while leaving aside other aspects of public Islam that were not as easy to reconcile (Perkins 2010). However, the majority’s hold on civic culture is not absolute. The interfaith movement’s efforts to craft public ritual events for shared multisensory engagements with difference created opportunities to exceed limiting forms of identity politics in a way that unsettled some of the previous boundaries drawn around ‘good citizenship’ and belonging in Hamtramck.

My work on public religiosity in Hamtramck is based on 18 months of ethnographic research carried out in the city. During 2007–2009, I maintained continuous residence in Hamtramck, living just a few blocks away from al-Islah mosque and squarely within
earshot of its adhan. While in Hamtramck, I completed interviews with over 90 individuals including neighbors, city council representatives, mosque board members, and community activists on the adhan, as well a range of issues concerning Islam and public space, which are treated in other studies (Perkins 2010, 2012). The interviews helped me frame the current article, which focuses mainly on public representations of the adhan debate appearing in newspaper articles and in videotaped political and interfaith meetings. Dozens of articles, opinion letters, and city hall archival documents were included in my analysis, especially material drawn from local papers such as the Hamtramck Citizen, the Detroit Free Press, The New York Times, and al-Jazeera.net.

Islam in the urban sensorium

The call to prayer issue arose in Hamtramck in the midst of significant demographic changes taking place in this densely populated, 2.3 square mile city. Although Hamtramck had for many years boasted a strong Polish-Catholic majority, in more recent years the city had also become well known for its significant number of Muslim Americans from Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Eastern European origins (Kowalski 2005). Due in part to these Muslim newcomers, Hamtramck’s total population has either risen or remained fairly steady over the past few decades. In the context of the deindustrialization, urban blight, and state disinvestiture plaguing the region, Hamtramck’s Muslim newcomers bring welcome benefits to the city by buying up homes, developing new businesses, innovating new kinds of public education, and revitalizing the city in other ways.

The changes that the growing Muslim population brings to Hamtramck coincide with the waning of some cherished signs and markers of its Polish-Catholic presence that leads to a feeling of loss for some Hamtramck residents. For example, in the years around the 2004 call to prayer debate, the decline of the Polish population in the area brought on the complete absorption of a Detroit parish into a Hamtramck parish and forced the closing of three once-prominent Catholic schools in Hamtramck and its immediate vicinity. Now Muslim congregations and Muslim-majority private or charter schools occupy some of these spaces (Howell 2010). During the call to prayer contestations of 2004, the Muslim Americans of Hamtramck were also starting to gain a foothold in the city’s political arena that had traditionally been dominated by Polish Catholics. Notably, the call to prayer contestation of 2004 came to City Hall at precisely the same moment that Hamtramck’s first Bangladeshi (and first Muslim) city council member sat for his first session.

In the midst of these overarching demographic, political, and cultural changes, some residents saw the advent of the adhan in Hamtramck as promoting a successful form of integration, in that it fostered intensified exposure to heterogeneous groups living in close proximity. Yet, for others, the acceptance of the adhan broadcast came to symbolize a deeply troubling sign of an encroaching Muslim ‘takeover’ of the city. Those views resonated with various forms of rhetoric prevalent in the post-9/11 climate that conflate anxieties about Islam as political threat with the stigmatization of cultural forms that mark the everyday lives of Muslims in both Muslim-majority countries and those in diaspora (Mamdani 2004, 54; Bhandar 2010, 338).

In Hamtramck, it was not merely the sounds themselves that drew concern but also the forging of legislation to officially regulate this Muslim ‘right to the city’ that raised intensive anxieties. For Lefebvre, the right to the city affords urban minorities ‘to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in the urban area ... and the right to use the center, a privileged place, instead of just being dispersed or stuck into ghettos’ (1996, 34). In the modern city, the center continues to stand as a site of power and
privilege, and therefore any move to make the city more democratic must involve a re-coding of this central space (Lefebvre 1996, 169).

Al-Islah board members in Hamtramck requested permission to broadcast the call to prayer from loudspeakers affixed to the roof of its modest two-story mosque located in the center of the city. This two-minute-long melodic summons in Arabic is issued to remind Muslims of the obligatory prayer times. Within it is the shahada, or Islamic creed: a declaration of faith to a single God, and an affirmation that Mohammad is the Prophet of God. The call to prayer, which is always sounded in Arabic, can be translated as follows: ‘God is the greatest/I witness that there is no god but God/I witness that Muhammad is the messenger of God/Come to prayer/Come to prosperity/God is the greatest/There is no god but God’ (Esposito 2003, 7).

In a city without minarets, in low-pitched tones, punctuated by sustained silences between its phrases, the adhan’s elongated vowels flow evenly in all directions. The sound blurs preconceived boundary lines between dominant and marginal space, between ritual and common ground, and between public and private realms. Through the amplification of sound in the center of the city, minority communities lay claim to city space in a frank and unapologetic manner. The diasporic soundmarks8 that immigrant groups bring with them uniquely test and challenge a city’s ethic of ‘tolerance’ for minority difference. Sound issued from the center of the city flows without regard to the racial and social hierarchies of place. The uncontainable nature of sound echoes fears about immigrants themselves, who are also sometimes perceived as liquid and advancing in a ‘flood’ threatening to drown out the recognizable nation in its wake (Conquergood 1992, 138). Individuals can turn their gaze away from visible manifestations of urban difference, yet sound infiltrates consciousness in a way that cannot easily be evaded (Schafer 1994).

New sounds markers such as the call to prayer in Hamtramck may bring divisiveness to a city, but the range of effects brought about by the novelties of a heterogeneous soundscape is more complex. For theorists such as Berlant, there are certain qualities related to the act of ‘collective audition’ that may bind listeners together into a sense of ‘political and social mutuality’ (2010, see also Hirschkind 2006). With reference to Hirschkind’s (2006) work, Berlant asserts that a ‘frisson,’ or strong and sudden thrill of excitement, may accompany acts of ‘listening together’ which, she continues, ‘can involve, like love or any attachment, the surprise of discovering that one has already entered into an intimate relation whether or not one remembers intending [to do so]’ (2010, 341). In Hamtramck, the call to prayer was performed, described, and repeated many times in full or in part during staged and spontaneous rehearsals including those in city hall debates, in televised news reports, and in public ritual events such as an ‘Adhan Ceremony’ discussed below. Besides the lines of opposition that were reinscribed between Muslims and non-Muslims in the arguments about the sound, there was also a kind of sensuous incorporation of Muslim difference as the city engaged in shared listening practices to evaluate, consider, and grow more familiar with the call to prayer.

It is our right anyway

Five times a day, seven days a week, the adhan calls Muslims to prayer. It also divides the day according to a logic based on the Islamic calendar. The timing of prayers varies over seasons, following the stages of the day rather than particular hours. In Europe and North America, the right for Muslims to externally broadcast the adhan is often contested on local and national levels (Allievi 2009, 48–49), and in many cases is either officially denied to Muslims or made so difficult to achieve via-red-tape restrictions that it is de facto
denied to them. In contrast, the adhan has been sounded in US cities at least as far back as the 1980s (Abraham and Abraham 1983), but before the Hamtramck case, it had itself had never been specifically named and described within a US city’s legislation. Typically, the adhan attracts municipal attention only when residents living near a mosque bring complaints to City Hall and it is then dealt with under general noise restrictions applying to all sounds. On a national level, then, the call to prayer issue in Hamtramck was important because it represented the first time in US history that a municipality deliberated the passing of legislation to specifically regulate the call to prayer.

In the USA, the call to prayer, like other religious sounds, is afforded the highest level of protection under the first amendment as free speech. ‘Except where serious issues of individual safety or public order’ are in question, it is generally assumed that religious symbols will be ‘granted free reign in the public sphere both by legislation and by the courts’ (Barnett 2008, 8). This stands in contrast to the state of affairs in nations like France where the reigning model of secularism, laïcité, is proposed to work by safeguarding public institutions against impinging forms of religious expression (Isin and Turner 2007, 6; Gole 2010). In contrast, US secularism is supposed to work by accommodating and regulating religious expression in a neutral manner to the greatest extent possible (Barnett 2008, 8), regardless of whether or not such an ideal could ever fully be achieved.

When it comes to questions concerning the details and technicalities of sounds, municipalities have the right to set limits on the type, duration, and volume (quantitatively or qualitatively interpreted) of public expressions through local noise ordinances as long as they do so ‘with neutrality’ and ‘within reason’ (Barnett 2008, 8). Within the debate over the call to prayer in Hamtramck, references to the First Amendment ‘neutrality clause’ played a key role. Al-Islah mosque is located directly across the street from an old, large Catholic church that rings the hours. Hamtramck is a city of many such churches, and sometimes their bells ring out during very late or early hours. Mass or music is also sometimes amplified from the churches and through the streets on holidays, yet as far as my search into public record could tell, no attempt was ever made to regulate these sounds.9 Because of the neutrality argument, and the proximity between mosque and church, Hamtramck’s church bells became a major point of focus during the debates.

Besides wishing to gain public legitimacy for the adhan, mosque leaders also made their request because they were concerned about a problematic ordinance that might be used against them if they proceeded to sound the adhan without official approval. Ordinance 434 imposed a blanket restriction on the amplification of any and all sounds in the streets of Hamtramck along with a wide range of other ‘noises.’ According to some critics, Ordinance 434 was highly flawed and probably unconstitutional due to its void-for-vagueness qualities. Despite its existence, the festival-rich city of Hamtramck was often filled with unchallenged amplified sounds. In justifying their decision to amend the ordinance, council members reasoned that the changes would also protect the church bells and the sounds of these lucrative city events.

In May 2004, a few months after the mosque leaders submitted their written request to City Hall, the city responded favorably to the mosque’s request by drafting Ordinance 503 to amend the original noise ordinance. In this ordinance, the city granted permission for the call to prayer, church bells, and ‘other reasonable means of announcing religious meetings’ to be broadcast between 6 am and 10 pm for five minutes or less at each sounding (Hamtramck, MI, Municipal Ordinance No. 503, 2004). This amendment freed religious sounds like the call to prayer from the unconstitutional blanket restriction imposed by the earlier ordinance, while at the same time subjecting the call to prayer and

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other religious sounds to specific and strict municipal regulation and discretion. It also
gave the city full powers to determine what counted as ‘reasonable’ noise and to arbitrate
any complaints and issue decisions about the resolution.\textsuperscript{10} This included the ability to
altogether prohibit the adhan in the city, which was a novel and significant power that had
never before been proposed in Hamtramck nor in any municipality in the nation.
Therefore, at the same time that this amendment put Hamtramck on the map as the first
city in the nation to formulate legislation that specifically allowed the adhan, it is also
made it the first and only city that gave the municipality specific powers to terminate the
adhan.

The passing of the ordinance, which was generally interpreted as empowering to
Muslims who wanted to broadcast the adhan, led to a feeling of outrage on behalf of some
residents. A couple of weeks after the amendment passed, a group called the ‘Concerned
Citizens of Hamtramck’ gathered enough signatures on their petition to force the council
to rescind the ordinance and put the issue the ballot for a public referendum vote that
would take place in July of that year.

\textbf{Jesus is quiet}

While some non-Muslims in Hamtramck supported the noise ordinance amendment and
expressed solidarity with its Muslim proponents, others sorely regretted the Muslim bid
for an amplified presence within the urban sensorium. Some individuals expressed their
thoughts about the debate in letters to the editor of local and national papers, and within
interviews with the press. In some of these narratives, Muslims and non-Muslims in
Hamtramck were imagined as having enjoyed good relations until the Muslims requested
the call to prayer. Despite the fact that the adhan was to be broadcast no longer or louder
than the church bells, in the press, opponents represented the call to prayer as innately
disturbing and disagreeable, using terms such as ‘grating,’ ‘blaring,’ ‘crushing,’
invasive,’ ‘inescapable,’ ‘intrusive,’ an ‘assault,’ a ‘bombardment,’ and an ‘imposition’
to describe an auditory sensation that would ‘irk’ them beyond toleration. These narratives
took rhetorical force from the way they echoed the association between Muslim cultural
expressions and violence that has been a major feature of media and popular culture,
especially since 9/11. One opponent expressed the following in a letter to the editor: ‘How
sad, another thing to remind of us of 9/11. The thought of a broadcast over loudspeakers of
calling Muslims to prayer five times a day will only make me think five times a day of
9/11’ (Detroit Free Press, April 22, 2004).

The schedule of the adhan’s release was represented as threateningly unpredictable
and illogical in contrast to church bells that chime in perfect sync with the hours, in the
Gregorian, Christian, publicly sanctioned form of keeping time in the city that is
synonymous with the western secular calendar. In these narratives, the church bells are
naturalized, as in the following: ‘I do not impose Jesus on them because He’s quiet. . . .
Jesus calls in a quiet, gentle voice – He doesn’t have to blare over a PA system to call His
followers’ (Agape Press, April 29, 2004). Another asserted: ‘This country was founded on
Judeo-Christian principles. We are not a Muslim-based nation. . . . And never in my life
did I think that mosques would outnumber churches’ (City Council 2004a).

In these assertions, a frank argument is made that America should be considered a
Christian country, whose public spaces should be open to Christian symbols exclusively.
The argument hinges on the idea that public religiosity, but only certain forms of it, are
acceptably American. For example, every December in Hamtramck, the streets are
festooned with municipal Christmas decorations and, in addition to the usual church and
mass bells, Christmas music plays in public buildings. There is regular observance of Christian religious holidays in schools. The city regularly supports Catholic symbolism in its public spaces by subsidizing the Polish Day Parade, and the Paczki Day (Polish Mardi Gras) festivals, and maintaining a large statue and park named after Pope John Paul II commemorating his visits to the city. The idea that ‘Jesus is quiet’ in Hamtramck demonstrates the way the city developed around a sense of normativity based on commonsense notions of a neutral public that already had Christianity firmly encoded within it.

**Religious noise, interfaith sound**

In response to the proliferating negative interpretations of the call to prayer, adhan proponents in Hamtramck began an effort to redefine its meaning, as well as to reframe the significance of the community’s request for it. As mosque secretary Khatib Hassan explained:

> We could have done this without permission as some of the other mosques are doing, but as good citizens of Hamtramck we tried our best to work with the community, to be legible and do the right thing for the city of Hamtramck. (City Council 2004b)

Along these same lines, al-Islah President Nabeel Akhtar wrote in his letter to City Hall: ‘As a very culturally diverse community, by permitting this action it will build our city to become more unified and familiar with each other’s religion’ (Al-Islah Islamic Center 2003).

The arguments for the call to prayer articulated by Hassan and Akhtar above root themselves in multiculturalist logics, whereby Muslim leaders of Hamtramck claim good citizenship status through their action of working through the appropriate channels to gain recognition of and protection for their own firmly bounded cultural and religious differences in a way that would foster mutual respect. In contrast to this multiculturalist interfaith agenda based on respect for differences, other proponents of the noise ordinance amendment set forth an interfaith citizenship agenda blurring the lines between Muslim faith, Christian religiosity, and humanitarianism to argue for the call to prayer on the grounds that it would also have a specific use, benefit, and meaning for non-Muslims in the city. Chief among these new meanings was the idea that the adhan in Hamtramck would function as an ‘interfaith call to prayer,’ reminding the citizens of Hamtramck of their connection to a shared divinity. Another related new meaning was the adhan as a ‘call to dialogue’ that would remind residents of Hamtramck of their shared bond and obligations to one another as followers of the same Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. Some speakers linked the acceptance of the Muslim call to prayer by Christians with the idea that Christians and Muslims share a common spiritual ancestor in the prophet Abraham, using the Qur’anic formula ‘people of the book’ (Arabic ahl al-kitab) to rhetorically link the two communities. Addressing a contentious and angry crowd at City Hall, one elder Bangladeshi activist said:

> I want to remind the Christians here, that Jesus, peace be upon him, in many passages in the Bible, he used to say let me go pray in the woods, pray to my God, and we Muslims pray to that same God that Jesus referred to, that is Allah. (City Council 2004b)

The idea articulated above, and also by other Muslims and Christians at City Hall that Christians should accept the call to prayer because it was ultimately calling all municipal residents to ‘pray to the same God,’ was deeply offensive to some non-Muslims in the city, one of whom called the idea a ‘sacrilege’ (Detroit News, May 1, 2004). Others tied this.
blurring of boundaries to various forms of un-Americanism and anti-Christianity. In a letter to City Hall, one Detroit resident called into question American Muslims’ loyalty to the nation and the sincerity of their interfaith strivings. He cautioned that ‘their prayer could be against the U.S., our laws, our military. If the community agrees to accept their call to prayer they agree to accept the god they pray to and their laws’ (Concerned Citizen 2004).

Despite these negative responses, diverse call to prayer proponents continued to articulate an interfaith defense of the call to prayer based on recognition of commonalities. In an editorial, the prominent Polish-Catholic elder community leader Joseph Sendler wrote:

> Let us be clear on the matter: the ringing of Catholic Church bells is a call to prayer . . . . The first step for both sides, who have begun only a few short years ago to live together, is to recognize that they do share a common belief with each other and their Jewish ‘elder brothers in the faith’ in the God of Abraham. (The Arab American News, May 15, 2004)

Within the debates, Sendler and others also emphasize the position of the Polish Pope on the question of Islam. In addresses and encyclicals written throughout his long career (1978–2005), Pope John Paul II referred to Islam as ‘foremost among the religions’ in terms of their potential as effective interfaith partners for Catholics, and continually commended Muslims for their piety and good works (PCID 1994). Alluding to this, Sendler said in an interview: ‘The thought of the Pope himself is rooted in the best and most generous part of the Polish tradition, so [the goal of my work] is to use the authority of the Pope to bring unity into the community’ (Polish Weekly, July 14, 2004).

### The mosque and Pope Park

Sendler continued his efforts to demonstrate Muslim and Catholic solidarity by helping to organize a fundraising rally in Pope Park, underneath the city’s towering municipally owned Pope John Paul II statue. Commissioned in 1978 on the occasion of Karol Józef Wojtyła’s election to the papacy, and spanning 12 feet in height, the statue is set on a towering dais about 26 feet above the park. This statue in itself serves as an object lesson for the way Catholic spatial markers are elevated, sanctioned, and supported by the city. Yet, by 2004, the Pope statue had begun to suffer signs of wear and tear and the municipality could not afford the needed repairs. Sendler successfully sought out Muslim support and participation in fundraising to repair the statue. He then called together prominent Muslim and Catholic leaders from Hamtramck and the surrounding areas for a ceremonial event in Pope Park to recognize and honor the joint effort of the two communities that would take place on 12 May 2004 (Polish Weekly, July 15, 2004). In the context of the call to prayer debates, the expression of Muslim support for the statue of a Polish Pope who had himself famously prayed inside a mosque complicated the lines that were being drawn by some Hamtramck residents between Muslims and Catholics in the city.

Although Ordinance 503 to authorize the call to prayer had been suspended immediately after it was passed, the mosque leaders at al-Islah nevertheless decided to begin broadcasting the adhan, stressing that it was ‘their right anyway.’ They chose to start on 28 May 2004, the first Friday after Ordinance 503 authorizing the sound would have gone into effect had it not been rescinded. Over a dozen of the city’s political and religious leaders gathered together, in a group that later came to be known as ‘Hamtramck Interfaith Partners’ to organize an ‘Adhan Ceremony’ at the mosque on that day so that the mosque would be full of supporters at the time of the controversial broadcast.
Hamtramck Interfaith Partners (later called ‘Children of Abraham’) consisted of an ethnically diverse group of the city’s political and religious leaders, including an African-American and an Anglo-American Baptist reverend, a Polish-Catholic priest, Bangladeshi and Yemeni members of the mosque board, city council representatives, and others. Several of the Hamtramck Interfaith Partners made speeches during the Adhan Ceremony referencing interfaith principles of mutual respect, the recognition of commonalities across differences, and the shared basis of Christian and Muslim beliefs. The director of a local Islamic association spoke:

If this issue had not been brought up, we would not have been here today, creating a deep understanding and the sharing of both religions. Now there is a feeling of love we are receiving from the other end. (Al-Islah Islamic Center 2004)

After the conclusion of the speeches, the Bangladeshi mu’adhin approached the microphone connected to the loudspeaker box in one corner of the mosque interior. He arranged his hands around his ears, fingers partially fanned out, in the characteristic gesture of calling the prayer. Those inside the mosque, including Muslims and non-Muslims, males and females, of many ethnicities, crowded around him in a circle. Visiting non-Muslims pressed in close against the men in kurta pajama and topis who were among the mosque’s regular daily attendants. The mu’adhin took a deep breath and began: ‘Allahu akbar …’ (God is the greatest). The Muslims around him murmured the ritual response formula. The slow and rhythmic call and response were punctuated by the quick staccato of many camera shutters as members of the press crowded in close as well. The faces of those gathered around the mu’adhin were serious and concentrated, as the Arabic words made their way through the amplification system and into the waiting city beyond.

In Hamtramck, the ritualized adhan listening exercise represented the first occasion for a large-scale opening of the mosque to diverse groups of non-Muslim visitors and the press. The fact that the many mosques in Hamtramck and its contiguous areas with Detroit had not yet fully developed the kind of public relations function that included these kinds of open houses until that point may be due in part to the fact that Hamtramck is a working-class city, and its mosques are mainly led by first-generation immigrants who are still often learning the language, establishing themselves within the city, and providing basic functions for their congregations.

The issue of Muslim sound in Hamtramck had the effect of making al-Islah, a mainly single ethnicity, Bengali-language medium, and first-generation immigrant mosque, into a space that was more permeable to outsiders, at least temporarily, by exerting pressure on the mosque to quickly compose a public face with which to deal with the onslaught of local, national, and international reporters that the broadcast of sound brought to their doors. Thus, the interfaith activists guaranteed that the main prayer space of al-Islah that until that point had functioned as a basically ethnically and religiously uniform and certainly all-male area was temporarily transformed into a kind of novel, multicultural, and gender-integrated space of congregation. Other area mosques quickly followed suit for their own open-house days. Thus, the city’s reaction to Muslim sound served as the catalyst for Hamtramck mosque leaders and their interfaith advisers to begin opening up their spaces, creating programs, and organizing meetings within the mosque involving a specific self-conscious, mainstreaming, and integrationist presentation of the mosque to outsiders (Shryock 2004).

Perhaps due in part to the interfaith efforts and positive press it circulated, on 20 July 2004, Hamtramck residents voted to decide the noise ordinance amendment issue in favor of the mosque by a margin of about 250 out of about 2500 votes. Local papers described a
joyous scene outside of Hamtramck City Hall, where Muslim and non-Muslims of Hamtramck cheered and held up copies of the election results. About a month after the noise ordinance amendment vote took place in the city, the Hamtramck Interfaith Partners held a second dinner ‘in celebration of the Hamtramck Call to Prayer.’ The dinner, held in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Association Hall, was billed as ‘A Celebration . . . Moving on to a Call for Dialogue and New Community.’ Speeches by prominent Muslim and Catholic leaders rhetorically linked the ‘Islamic call to prayer’ with a new ‘call to dialogue’ now at work in the city to remind Muslims and non-Muslims of Hamtramck of their unity as one community forged in faith, peace, and respect.

Rights and permissions

As a central part of the Adhan Ceremony, the secretary of al-Islah mosque called City Council President Anna Dembrowski, a Polish-Catholic woman who had donned a hijab for the occasion, to the podium:

In front of the audience, I would like to offer this key. We have our amplification system locked up. I will offer this key to our President of the Council Anna Dembrowski to come to the podium and accept this key. She will say, ‘make it loud,’ we’ll make it loud. She’s gonna say, ‘make it low,’ we’ll make it low. So please accept this key. (Al-Islah Islamic Center 2004)

Carefully adjusting her white scarf around her head, Dembrowski approached the podium laughing and accepted the key, pausing briefly so that the moment could be caught on camera. The transfer of the key, and the municipal regulation of the call to prayer in general, can be interpreted as symbolic and actualized exchanges of power, in which the Muslims had to give up some of their abstractly guaranteed autonomy over sound in exchange for the city’s official approval of it. In creating a noise ordinance amendment to give the city control to legislate or even prohibit the adhan, when it did not have this power before, and then using this new power to grant the mosque permission to exercise constitutional rights that they technically already had anyway, the noise ordinance amendment movement ended up further solidifying control over sound in the hands of the dominant majority rather than affording minorities any new rights. Indeed, the new legislation may have made the adhan more vulnerable, in the long term, than it had been before. In his translation and elaboration of Jean Claude Milner’s work, Zizek writes:

Those who hold power know very well the difference between a right and a permission . . . A right in a strict sense of the term gives access to the exercise of a power, at the expense of another power. A permission doesn’t diminish the power of the one who gives it; it doesn’t augment the power of the one who gets it. It makes his life easier, which is not nothing. (see Milner 2009; Zizek 2009, 59–60)

Even if the noise ordinance amendment was merely an instrument for granting permission, rather than for securing the rights of the Muslim minority community, it is important to understand what this permission might mean for Muslim minorities and others who face marginalization. The gap between rights and permissions parallels the breach between citizenship as understood in an abstract sense, where all members of a nation are considered to be equal, and citizenship as lived experience, in which freedoms that are technically granted to all are for some out of reach. In this sense, the request for municipal legislation is reflective of the complex processes of cultural translation and accommodation by which members of minority communities establish a sense of belonging and collective representation out of de facto states of marginalization, disenfranchisement, and stigmatization.
The opening of the mosque to interfaith use and meaning in Hamtramck reflects a growing tendency for Muslim leaders in North America and Europe to host a wide range of educational, social, cultural, political, and interreligious functions in their mosques (Poston 1992; Schmidt 2004, 138; Allievi 2009, 372) in what might be thought of as a partial secularization of mosque space. Of the various extra-mosque functions that Islamic community centers have come to take on, the ‘interfaith’ or ‘multi-faith’ use seems to carry a particularly heavy weight. For example, interfaith functions played a profoundly important role in public debates over the proposed Cordoba House Islamic center in New York that inspired great, nation-wide controversy beginning in 2010. Opponents of the Cordoba House Initiative, calling it the ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ or the ‘Victory Mosque,’ claimed that it was somehow wrong for Muslims to establish a center so close to the ‘hallowed ground’ where the Twin Towers had stood. Proponents of the Cordoba House project tried to deflect this criticism by continually emphasizing the fact that the building would be used for a host of purposes in excess of Muslim worship, especially emphasizing its proposed uses as an interfaith gathering place and a 9/11 memorial (The New York Times, October 2, 2010). One Cordoba House representative pointedly reassured the press that the ‘designated Muslim prayer space’ would take up only 8% of the total space (United Press International, August 31, 2010).

After the space changed hands to another organization calling itself ‘Park51,’ plans for the space took a new direction. As of 27 June 2014, the current Park51 center proposing to stand where Cordoba House would have been presents itself on its website as a space that will be ‘a vibrant and inclusive community center, reflecting the diverse spectrum of cultures and traditions, and serving New York City with programs in education, arts, culture and recreation.’ The mosque within it has completely disappeared.

Although the Park51 example describes a more extreme modification of mosque space than the one that took place in Hamtramck, similar pressures to adapt Muslim space to accommodate an interfaith paradigm tie the cases together. The additional interfaith emphasis that sometimes comes when Muslim religious centers expand to incorporate additional functions for non-Muslim populations can be seen, on one hand as productive means of widening, translating, and expanding Muslim space. On the other hand, this almost mandatory and perhaps encroaching overlap between Muslim and such interfaith proposals may also be critiqued for having some problematic aspects (Allievi 2003, 372). These expansions and multiple uses might conflict with the preservation, maintenance, status, and prominence of spaces devoted to certain other styles of Muslim pious practice and devotion. In addition, it may be unsatisfying that the mosque cannot be accepted simply as Muslim space, just as in Hamtramck, the call to prayer was not simply accepted as Muslim sound. A host of limitations and liabilities attend the use of an interfaith frame for asserting the rights and claims of Muslims minorities. Nevertheless, during the Hamtramck adhan debates, these concerns were outweighed by the highly productive ways in which the interfaith actors successfully encouraged engagement with material and spatial forms of alterity in gatherings to support a collective listening to the adhan.

**Sounding out alterity**

In the post-9/11 era, aspects of Muslim cultural expression including dress, speech, comportment, and sociability are stigmatized in mainstream media and popular culture and re-signified by outsiders in largely negative terms. During the noise ordinance debates in Hamtramck, the legislated call to prayer became a polysemic, politicized, and highly
charged signifier. In the face of fractious political wrangling, Hamtramck interfaith actors intervened in the call to prayer debates by advancing a citizenship agenda based on a recognition of commonalities across religious difference articulated in sensory registers. Listening to the call to prayer together inside the mosque and standing together in solidarity under the city’s towering statute of Pope John Paul II provided Hamtramck’s citizens opportunities for multisensory forms of sociability through engagement with different religious spaces, symbols, and practices. A study of this movement offers us a way to understand how social actors use materially and spatially based kinds of cultural work to create openings for expressions of alterity that interrupt hegemonic constructions of difference.

Interfaith activism has already played a significant role in negotiating Muslim claims to space in post-9/11 North American and European contexts, but it remains to be seen how various strategies derived from this framework will condition the advancement and/or limitation of Muslim minority visibility. The interfaith model for incorporation will be most productive to Muslim claims making to the extent that interfaith proponents develop an awareness of the selective recognition of difference that may underlie their strategies of representation. Although partial and incomplete, the movement to accept Muslim difference in Hamtramck through collective listening to the adhan carried positive assertions of religious alterity in the public realm.

In Marseille, after many years and a great deal of struggle, Muslim leaders were able to establish a large and imposing mosque in the center of the city (The New York Times, December 28, 2009). Yet, instead of demanding the right to issue an audible adhan, the French mosque leaders decided to indicate the call with a flashing light, wishing to choose their battles over public space wisely. Because white and green lights were already in use for other official municipal functions, mosque leaders decided to use a purple flashing light to indicate the adhan, in what could only be an unexpected international precedent for calling the prayer. In Marseille, the substitution of an arbitrary visual cue for a highly particular sound evades some of the difficult feelings about trespass and invasion that were discussed here. In Hamtramck, the adhan’s worded message in Arabic announcing the advancing stages of the Muslim day inducts listeners willingly or uneasily into linguistic and temporal modes of alterity. Yet, in the struggle to legitimate this, the adhan’s supporters invested the adhan with an additional set of meanings, so that it became not only a highly specific Islamic call to prayer but also a ‘call for dialogue’ hailing the entire city. Even with novel kinds of polyphony added to the Hamtramck call to prayer, its Arab and Muslim sounds nevertheless alter Hamtramck’s urban sensorium in a way that is more frank, intimate, and unavoidable than Marseille’s flashing light could do.

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Notes
1. All references to names and personal street addresses have been changed to protect identities of speakers.
2. I use ‘impasse’ in Berlant’s sense of the term to capture the intensified feelings of Hamtramck residents who, during the debates, were seeking to work out ‘what seems to be possible and blocked in personal/collective life’ while participating in an uncertain and ‘unfolding’ political present (2010, 3).
3. ‘Interfaith’ as it is generally understood describes movements that encourage interaction between two or more faith communities in which all participants recognize one another as belonging to different, but legitimate, alternative belief systems with the goal of promoting dialogue, mutual understanding, and mutual aid (Smith 2004).
4. ‘Public ritual events’ are described by Sanjek as those which mark special occasions or purposes, occur in central or symbolically transformed locations, and break the flow of ordinary events with formal behavior including invocations, speeches, music, processions, dance, and the sharing of food (1998, 8).
5. This strategy reflects Bhandar’s concept of ‘cosmopolitan cultural citizenship,’ in which ‘cosmopolitanism’ refers to a strategy of inclusion based on a ‘politics of hybridity [that] challenges the rigid borders between cultural communities’ (2010, 340). Bhandar argues for a dynamic, material-spatial and practice-based understanding of ‘the cultural’ that emphasizes the importance of ‘shifting cultural forms that arise through disaporic experiences’ (2010, 332).
6. The potentials and constraints of the 2004 movement to support the adhan have also been discussed in Weiner’s (2014) study of religious sounds, public space, and American pluralism.
7. In an earlier publication, I discuss how the alliances formed within the call to prayer movement were tested in a public debate on a human rights ordinance giving equal protection for LGBTQ minorities (Perkins 2010).
8. Schafer explains: ‘The term “soundmark” is derived from landmark and refers to a community sound which is unique or possesses qualities that make it specially regarded or noticed by people in that community’ (1994, 10).
9. Yet, this is not always the case. Weiner’s study sets his analysis of the call to prayer debate in Hamtramck within a wider discussion of the ways in which church bells have also been subject to heated municipal debate in various times and places throughout American history (2014).
10. Ordinance 503 may also be critiqued as unconstitutional for giving preferential treatment to the sounds of organized religious groups over those of any other individuals or groups to amend Ordinance 434.

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Post-conflict reconstruction and citizenship agendas: lessons from Beirut

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How does post-conflict reconstruction embody citizenship agendas? By emphasizing the intersections between urban planning, architecture and political community in Hizballah’s reconstruction discourse following the 2006 war, this article explores the articulation of such agendas in the historical production of urban space. The first section explores the denial of urban space and membership in the political community to Lebanon’s Shi’a in the reconstruction of Beirut following the 1975–1990 civil war. The second section introduces Harat Hreik and the struggle over its reconstruction as resistance, on the part of Hizballah and its cadres, to this exclusion. The party’s approach, anchored in an innovative not-for-profit NGO, ‘The Solemn Promise Project’ (Mashru’ Wa’ad al-Sadiq), asserted the claims of its constituency to a place in both the city and the nation over considerations of profit. This citizenship agenda, inclusionary in sectarian terms, however, entailed its own set decidedly class-based inclusions and exclusions.

Keywords: citizenship; neoliberalism; post-conflict reconstruction; Lebanon; Beirut

Harat Hreik today is a vibrant middle-class neighborhood at the heart of Beirut’s Southern Suburbs. On any given day, it bubbles with activity, as people who live and work there rush to jobs, appointments, shop and run errands amidst the slow moving or altogether jammed traffic that has become a hallmark of life throughout the Lebanese capital. As the shops close in the evening, people return home for supper and the rounds of visiting that animate so much of social life across the country. As night falls, dozens of cafes, clubs and restaurants do a brisk business providing social venues appropriate to the neighborhoods’ growing middle class, a class for which both public piety and proper forms of consumption are increasingly markers of social distinction (Deeb 2006; Deeb and Harb 2013).

Today’s vitality stands in stark contrast to the Harat Hreik of August 2006. After suffering 33 days of Israeli bombardment from land, air and sea the neighborhood was a shattered ruin. The capture of two Israeli soldiers and killing of several others by Hizballah (The Party of God) on the southern border precipitated the war. According to Human Rights Watch (2007), more than 1100 Lebanese, mostly civilians, were killed and 4399 were wounded. The Lebanese government registered 262,174 civilians permanently displaced from their homes, and a more than a million, roughly a third of the Lebanese population, temporarily so. More than 125,000 housing units and 850 businesses were destroyed, as were 612 schools and 97 bridges in addition to the damage done to roads, airports, seaports and fuel storage facilities and refineries (Fattouh and Kolb cited in Al-Harithy 2010, 3). When combined with lost economic activity, estimates of the cost of the conflict to Lebanon range between 7 and 15 billion dollars (Dibeh cited in Al-Harithy 2010, 3).

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Party leadership represented the reconstruction of Harat Hreik as an extension of the *Muqawama Islamiyya*, the Islamic Resistance against what it calls ‘the Zionist entity.’ Indeed, for party faithful, the reconstruction of villages and neighborhoods razed by the Israeli army would represent the ‘steadfastness’ (*soumoud*) of the resistance in the face not only of one of the world’s most powerful militaries, but in the face of the US–Israeli agenda for a ‘new Middle East.’ Reconstruction would be proof positive of victory. For many Lebanese Shi’a, however, Harat Hreik’s rebirth represents more. Regardless of whether they lived within or outside of the neighborhood, or whether they were pious supporters of Hizballah, followers of the more secular Amal Movement or even the Communist Party, the reconstruction is a source of particular pride; an embodiment of communal self-sufficiency and sophisticated urbanity. For those who lived, worked, played and prayed there the new Harat Hreik is a claim fulfilled: a claim not only to a right to the city but also to full participation as Shi’i citizens in the modern Lebanese body politic.

In what follows, I explore the discourse of urban reconstruction as articulated by Hizballah institutions, partisans and allies as a ‘citizenship agenda.’ While states continue to represent themselves as the arbiter of citizenship (Nuijten 2013), increasingly, citizenship claims are assembled from outside formal state domains and draw from, and are reproduced in, multiple cultural, political, legal, economic and spatial discourses (Holston 2008; Stack 2013). Scholars are increasingly interested in how citizenship claims are animated by dynamics that operate above, below or shoot through the state and its legal, administrative and ideological apparatuses (Holston 2008; Isin 2007; Lake and Newman 2002) and link to class (Guano 2008), or other sub- or supranational projects (Inda 2008; Isin 2012; Rosaldo 1994).

To make sense of this complex terrain, contributors here examine what de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster (2015) call ‘citizenship agendas.’ In their usage, the term refers to the ‘framings of citizenship’: who is to be included, excluded or marginalized from an imagined political community? What beliefs and behaviors, or forms of propriety, mark one as deserving? Always in competition, such agendas legitimize political actors and institutions, consecrate identities and delineate the relations between them. These struggles, in turn link to ‘larger structures of rule and belonging,’ formal and informal, that shape the body politic.¹ Cities, especially national capitals, are central to such conflicts over citizenship and belonging (Bender and Cinar 2007). Never static, the city is taken up within, produced and reproduced, by them. As such, urban forms, functions and fragments constitute a living archive of discursive traditions that effectively link understandings of the past, present and possible futures (Asad 1986).

I argue that the reconstruction of Harat Hreik, overseen by Hizballah-related institutions, links urban place-making to decidedly modernist claims by Lebanon’s long-marginalized Shi’i communities for equal participation in Lebanon’s multi-confessional political order. How does post-conflict reconstruction highlight citizenship agendas? By emphasizing the intersections between urban planning, architecture and political community, this article explores how such agendas emerge in and through the production of urban space. The first section explores the denial of urban space and membership in the political community to Lebanon’s Shi’a within an earlier instance of post-conflict reconstruction: the market-driven redevelopment of the Beirut Central *Suq* (market) district by Solidere, a private real estate holding company. This section discusses how reconstruction marked the Shi’a as external to the post-civil war political community. The second section introduces Harat Hreik and the struggle over its reconstruction. This struggle pitted the US-backed government of Fouad Siniora against Hizballah, as each
attempted to turn reconstruction to its own interests. Informed by past experience of exclusion and the dangers of market-driven urbanism, Hizballah pursued its own path. This approach, anchored in a not-for-profit NGO known as ‘The Solemn Promise Project’ (Mashru’ Wa’ad al-Sadiq, or simply Wa’ad), claimed to place the claims of its constituency to a place in both the city and the nation over considerations of profit. This inclusionary citizenship agenda, however, entailed its own set of inclusions and exclusions.

Solidere: narrating the cosmopolitan nation

The reconstruction of Harat Hreik as a citizenship agenda cannot be understood without situating it within a larger historically produced urban context. It is a context itself produced by claims and counter-claims to membership in the capital city and the nation. Indeed, the reconstruction of Harat Hreik is in part the product of these earlier struggles, the most important of which was an earlier episode of post-conflict reconstruction that made explicit linkages between urban space and national belonging: the reconstruction of the Beirut city center, in the wake of the 1975–1990 civil war.

Solidere was the brainchild of the post-war Prime Minister, the late Rafiq al-Hariri, whose family remains among the company’s largest shareholders. Backers presented the project, still ongoing 25 year later, as radical experiment in market-driven urban redevelopment that would drive Lebanon’s integration with processes of market globalization. While a universalizing economic discourse underpinned the institutional and legal dimensions of the reconstruction, supporters presented the project as a powerful symbol of the rebirth of Lebanon’s entrepreneurial and cosmopolitan nation in the wake of sectarian war. What type of citizenship agenda was evident in the reconstruction of the Beirut City center, and who was excluded from the imagined political community that it represented?

Adjacent to the Ottoman-era port and home to Beirut’s oldest suq (market district), the pre-war city center was for supporters in government, the business community and allied academics the urban embodiment of a cosmopolitan ‘Merchant Republic.’ The old suq district was, as the editors of the prominent business magazine al-Iqtisad wal-‘Amal put it, ‘the heart of the capital, and ... the heart of all Lebanon.’ It was ‘the lung through which Beirut and Lebanon breath economic activity,’ and so was ‘the heart that beats day and night, pumping through the veins of the nation the vital flow of constant interaction’ (The Real Estate Agency 1992, 42). In restoring this cosmopolitan center to a city violently divided into sectarian enclaves, reconstruction would, they argued, call forth the cosmopolitan nation from the ashes of war and return it to an imagined universal modernity.

Solidere was meant to be both the symbol and engine of this national renaissance. Project planners and architects made ample use of this discourse of the cosmopolitan nation. ‘At stake is the rebirth of the center of a capital city,’ they wrote, and so the reconstruction ‘must inform the future and cherish the past. It must provide a social arena and a means to reconnect a once-divided city. In the quality and example that it sets, and in the value placed on the city’s heritage and its archeological treasures, it must ... instill a renewed sense of national pride and identity’ (Gavin and Maluf 1996, 13).

The new city center, planned as an urban enclave separated from the surrounding city by large boulevards and gateway structures, lent itself to ‘urban imaging’ (Lynch 1960). Architectural landmarks such as the United Nations building, home to UN, World Bank and IMF offices marked the southern ‘gateway’ into the city center. An enormous new marina and glistening hotels serve as western coastal gateway. The 30-story Murr Tower,
among the most feared sniper positions of the civil war, guards the southwestern entrance. The heritage architecture of the residential Saifi Village, occupies the southeastern corner, and a three-high-rise-tower-and-shopping-mall complex, the incongruously named ‘Phoenician Village,’ marks the eastern coastal approach.\(^2\)

The enframing of the space with boulevards and gateways not only sets the enclave apart from the city. It sets it up to function as a representation of a deeper truth (Mitchell 1991). It is within this representational space that Solidere’s discourse of the urban, through planning, design and architecture weaves together an image of the nation and a narrative of its historical development through unilinear empty time (Anderson 1991). The idea of a consociational, liberal and indeed global Lebanon is cast back in time to transform archaeological and architectural elements as representations of the ancient roots of the modern nation. The preservation of Byzantine, Phoenician and Roman ruins in archaeological parks, for example, or their incorporation as design features in new developments, proclaim Beirut’s history as a center of Mediterranean trade. The imagined progression continues with the restoration of ‘heritage architecture’ such as the Ottoman Municipal Building and Grand Serail. The rise of the modern ‘Merchant Republic’ (Gates 1998) is represented through the preservation of twentieth century French colonial urban spaces such as the Place d’Étoile, replete with French contrived ‘arabisance’ architecture.

The plan emphasizes Lebanon’s sectarian identities, which have, since the post-WWI foundation of modern Lebanon by the French, constituted the primary means through which citizens are interpellated by the state.\(^3\) Through the demolition of the dense urban fabric that once abutted and surrounded them, mosques, churches and shrines are set apart with landscaped gardens. Thrown into relief and given pride of place within the new city, they become symbols of ostensibly ancient, foundational identities, even as they are overcome within the larger narrative of a modern cosmopolitan nation.\(^4\) While the archeological sites, heritage architectures and religious buildings are connected by a 2.5 km ‘heritage trail’ that ‘reveals the story of 5000 years of history,’\(^5\) the remainder of the district, to be built anew by private investors, boasts luxury hotels, apartment blocks and glass towers that proclaim Beirut’s arrival into a universal capitalist modernity. ‘Beirut,’ according to Solidere’s motto of the 1990s, would be reborn as ‘an Ancient City for the Future.’

Despite the totalizing ambition of the planned city/nation (see Holston 1989), such nationalist projects can never achieve the closure to which they aspire. They require what Mitchell (2002) calls a ‘constitutive outside,’ an ‘other’ or ‘others,’ internal and external, against which the nation defines itself. In the discourse of Solidere and its backers this othering-associated violence, sectarianism and the chaos of war with ‘traditional Lebanese’ such as those who had lived, worked and owned shops and workshops in the city center. More dangerous were the poor and those made refugees by the war. It was through these interchangeable ‘traditionalities’ that the noncosmopolitan threat, those populations against which Lebanon’s renaissance had to be protected, was produced (Hourani 2008).

First among those to be excluded were the pre-war property rights holders – some 40,000 owners (malikeen), tenants (musta’jareen) and investors (mustathmareen) – who lived, worked and played in the pre-war city center. Indeed, for Henri Edde, author of the initial plan for reconstruction, the pre-war rights holders, even before the war, were responsible for the ‘decline’ of the central suq. As elite-oriented businesses such as cinemas and upscale boutiques moved to newer wealthier neighborhoods in the 1960s, he lamented, the popular classes overran the district (Dar al-Handassah 1991, 1). Without their expropriation, Solidere’s public relations team argued before potential investors, the heart of the city/nation would become ‘a ghetto’ (al-Nahar, 8 February 1993).
This classed/cultural othering intersected with the larger technocratic discourse of neoliberal urban redevelopment. The pre-war right-holders were represented as economically irrational. The erasure of such irrationality in favor of the universal market logic was the precondition for efficient private-sector-led redevelopment. For example, Solidere backers charged that the ‘pre-modern’ conceptions of property and associated economic practices in the suq prevented modernization of the city. Laws governing inheritance, relations between owners and tenants, and investment they claimed, fragmented ownership. Furthermore, informal arrangements between owners, tenants, subtenants, family and friends rendered the area an impenetrable tangle of relations inimical to modern financial and real estate practice. Accordingly, there was no choice but to expropriate the property rights of the 40,000 and reduce them to a uniform and fixed economic measure: dollars and cents. With the December 1991 passage of Law # 117, the government legalized the expropriation of private property in the suq for the benefit of a private real estate holding company. This involved the erasure of right-holders’ claims to 5043 homes and apartments, 7092 shops and businesses, 5597 offices and 1368 workshops and 702 warehouses, 343 hotels, 361 restaurants and 45 bars that had animated the pre-war suq (al-Nahar, 17 December 1990). The neoliberal drive to rebuild the ‘heart of the nation’ systematically removed the people.

Pre-war right-holders were not the only ‘other’ to the new cosmopolitan nation. The ‘Mutawli’ (as Beirutis disdainfully refer to the Shi’a) have long been marginalized within the Lebanese social order. As Norton (1987) has detailed, as Lebanon’s economy became evermore dependent upon finance and trade, agriculture withered, and increasing numbers of poor Shi’is moved to the informal settlements – the misery belt – that began to ring Beirut in the 1960s. The inflow of Shi’i migrants became a flood with the onset of the Lebanese civil war. Christian militias displaced thousands from what became ‘Christian East Beirut’ between 1975 and 1977. The Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 and subsequent occupation displaced thousands more from the South. Many were displaced again during fighting between rival Shi’i militias in the Southern Suburbs as the war ended. As a result, the Shi’a constituted the largest single group of refugees at war’s end and the single largest group to occupy the bombed-out houses, hotels and office blocks in the old suq.

Within the urban discourse of Solidere, its elite backers and associated scholars, there was little sympathy with the wartime displaced, especially with Shi’i refugees (Sawalha 2010). Unlike the representation of the right-holders as a threat to reconstruction, Shi’a refugees were depicted as a threat to urbanity, itself. The Shi’a, as one government official put it, are the ‘anti-urban.’ They are ‘limited socially and educationally. And culturally? They have no culture.’ In my discussions with government and Solidere officials, they were not represented as victims of war at all, but rather as the carriers of a pre-modern ignorance and fanaticism that destroyed the cosmopolitan nation in the first place. They were described not as refugees (muhajjareen), but rather as invaders or occupiers (muhtaleen) of others’ property, and of cosmopolitan Beirut. Their claims upon the law or government therefore were illegitimate.

During an interview with one high-ranking official at the Fund for the Displaced, a government body responsible for evacuating refugees and returning them to their places of origin, my interlocutor took me to a map of the city. ‘The attack, and I am using the word “attack” deliberately, came from the South.’ Pointing to wealthy neighborhoods he continued, ‘The attack was on these areas; the best areas of Beirut, including Ayn a-Tine, Verdun, Hamra, the best areas of Ayn al-Mraysi and Rouchi were attacked by these people.’ With some pride in his work, he concluded, ‘There were thousands living in these places. Now they are clean.’
As Sawalha (2010) has shown, the lack of sympathy was in part due to the very real and organized efforts of militia-related individuals and families (muhizbeen, or party-related) to lay claim to others’ properties in hopes of receiving payments (khiluw) from property owners or government assistance upon evacuation. Several militias organized such efforts when it became clear that Solidere, bankrolled by wealthy Lebanese and Saudi businessmen connected to the prime minister, would become a reality. According to a colleague familiar with such efforts, parties such as the Shi‘i Amal, whose leader was, himself, the Speaker of Parliament, kept meticulous records of partisans in occupation of properties and of the public and private compensation to which they were entitled upon evacuation. The party, operating within and alongside the state, would then pressure the bureaucracy to ensure that compensation was paid, and that party leadership received its cut.

The effort to exclude the Shi‘a from the city drew upon larger stereotypes within which the Shi‘a as a group are represented as the epitome of the rural, backward looking, fanatical, irrational and untrustworthy anticosmopolitan other to the Sunni or Christian Beirut. Their very presence, for some, endangered both city and nation. Academics provided scholarly cover. Khalaf (1993, 41), for example, writes despairingly: ‘While the countryside is being urbanized, the cities and sprawling suburbs are being ruralized. Both are perverse.’ These ‘dislocated groups that converge on squatted settlements in the city center and urban fringe, are generally strangers to city life,’ he writes. They are a source of danger. ‘Traumatized by fear and raging with feelings of bitterness and betrayal’ they are a source of danger. ‘They are, so to speak in but not of, the city. Hence they have no attachments to or appreciations (sic) of the areas they found themselves in, and are not likely to display any interest in safeguarding or enriching its character.’

The performance of the nation through urban redevelopment in the post-civil war city center involved calling a particular national imaginary into being. Such projects, however, require an ‘internal other’ against whom to frame citizenship agendas. Accordingly, violence, sectarianism and the chaos of war were associated with the backward, the traditional, the rural and the poor, each interchangeable with the other. The representation of Shi‘i Lebanese as epitomizing an anticosmopolitan threat legitimized their expulsion from the suq, and from Beirut as well, swelling the Southern Suburbs with those marginalized from the nation and its capital.

Hizballah and the reconstruction of Harat Hreik

It was, in part, against Solidere’s neoliberal model and the displacements it entailed that Hizballah developed its approach to reconstruction in the wake of the 2006 war. Just as the Solidere project before it, the reconstruction of Harat Hreik is the expression of a citizenship agenda. It links a claim to a place in the capital city to a claim for equal participation for Lebanon’s Shi‘i communities in Lebanon’s multi-confessional political order. How did the Party and its institutions and the conceptions of space with which they worked seek to advance this agenda and to what effect?

Harat Hreik holds an important place in the political geography of the Southern Suburbs, of Beirut, and of Lebanon. Its growth over the past four decades into a vibrant and prosperous neighborhood tracks the rise of Lebanon’s Shi‘i communities from political, economic and geographic marginality prior to the Lebanese civil wars of 1975–1990, to self assertive communities today (Norton 1987, 2007). By 2000, the neighborhood was home to an emergent, educated and upwardly mobile Shi‘i middle class, eager to stake a claim to part of the capital city and the nation.
In the 1950s and early 1960s Harat Hreik was but one neighborhood in the ‘misery belt.’ On the eve of the Civil Wars in 1975, it housed a mixture of sectarian and ethnic identities. This changed dramatically with the war. By the late 1980s, the character of the neighborhood as mixed class and primarily Shi‘i was cemented. As a series of political and military conflicts with Palestinian organizations and the Shi‘i Amal Movement were decided in Hizballah’s favor, Harat Hreik became increasingly associated with the Party and its ideology. In this neighborhood, and others like it, the wartime Muqawama Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance) against Israeli occupation became linked to a larger middle-class movement for educational, material and spiritual progress and a growing claim for equal power within the Lebanese body politic.

According to Deeb (2006), this middle class movement reflects an ‘enchanted’ modernism, within which Shi‘a traditions and interpretive practices are transformed to anchor not only new forms of private but also, more importantly, public piety. At their center is a commitment to personal and societal uplift, the ultimate goal of which is the creation of what Deeb and Harb (2013, 11) call a Shi‘a ‘Islamic milieu’ (hala islamiyya). This milieu is the fluid product of an internal relation between ‘the spaces where certain ideas, norms, and ways of life are inscribed, facilitated, and negotiated, and the social environment constructed through those ideas and norms.’ As do all such movements, however, it too defines through processes of external and internal othering. While the former posits a secular and materialist as foil, the latter posits the poor, the rural, the ignorant and those whose Islamic practice is not rooted in ‘authentic’ interpretation of religion, as the constitutive outside, a point to which I will return below.

Harat Hreik was also in part produced by and productive of what Hizballah calls the ‘resistance society,’ which in addition entails support for the Party and for its military resistance against Israel (Abboud and Muller 2012, Deeb and Harb 2013). The neighborhood became home to many of Hizballah’s leading figures, the Party’s political offices and those of its vast network of health, education, social service and media organizations. It is within and through these highly professional organizations that this enchanted modernism grew and spread (Abboud and Muller 2012, 43–60). These organizations, linked to the party but often independent in defining and pursuing their respective missions include networks of hospitals, clinics and pharmacies and social service and educational NGOs, as well as micro-finance youth and sports organizations, and a newspaper, television station and online news websites that address social, cultural, political and economic topics (Harb and Leenders 2005). The concentration of these organizations within Harak Hreik, in combination with Hizballah leadership and growing numbers of followers in the years since the civil wars, transformed the neighborhood into a center of Shi‘i power. It was precisely because it anchored this movement and its institutions, Hizballah first among them, that Israeli war planners concentrated extraordinary firepower on this densely populated district (Figure 1).

**Hybrid sovereignties, reconstruction and the Solemn Promise Project**

As the ceasefire went into effect, a new war broke out over the financial, legal and institutional dimensions of reconstruction. Throwing into relief the politics of a Lebanese state fragmented by hybrid sovereignties (Fregonese 2012; Hourani 2013; cf. Jaffe 2013), the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his backers in Washington sought to distance themselves from what they call Hizballah’s ‘state within a state.’ It was, Siniora and his allies claimed, Hizballah’s illegitimate arrogation of state powers to itself through parallel institutions, and, more importantly, its decision to carry out a cross-border military
action without consultation that had brought on the war in the first place (Alamuddin 2010, 47–48). The government, they argued, could not allow the Party to operate as such in the context of reconstruction.

Hizballah responded to the state-within-a-state accusation by pointing out that the Lebanese state, as a set of institutions that may regulate, serve or even defend Lebanese citizens from hostile powers, does not exist today, if ever it has. It was, they argue, precisely the state’s historical abdication of responsibility for the welfare of Lebanese citizens, the long-marginalized Shi’i communities in particular, which made Hizballah indispensable to their well-being and security. Indeed, for the Party and its supporters, the professionalism with which it served its constituencies through affiliated institutions, charities, development NGOs, schools, was a point of particular pride. The Lebanese government’s failure to protect its people during the war and its absence in the immediate aftermath they argued, confirmed the Party’s position.

Siniora presented his insistence upon a role for ‘the state’ in reconstruction as a defense of state authority. In practice, he sought to aggregate and distribute the significant inflows of reconstruction aid through hybrid institutions he, himself, controlled (Hourani 2013), activating a small, long defunct administration within the Prime Ministry, the Higher Relief Council, which, virtually overnight, became the recipient of more than a billion dollars of US and Saudi aid. The Siniora administration drew heavily upon the market side of the neoliberal equation, as well. In line with the US aid conditionality, Siniora, who was one of the primary architects of the Solidere model, insisted upon the privatization of Harat Hreik’s reconstruction. As the Siniora government failed, however, to aid hundreds of thousands of displaced Lebanese, Hizballah and its own institutions took the lead.
In coordination with the Lebanese Order of Engineers (the main professional association of architects and urban planners), the Hizballah-affiliated organization *Jihad al-Bina’* (the construction jihad) dispatched damage assessment teams to the Southern Suburbs within 24 hours of the war’s end and coordinated private companies in rubble removal. Within a week, similar teams reached southern frontline villages and towns, met homeowners, assessed needs and provided funds to assist people in rebuilding their homes. Party officials coordinated with donor states and village councils and municipalities to streamline aid delivery. In some cases donors earmarked funds deposited with the central bank for use in a particular locale or coordinated with the Party to ‘adopt-a-village’ and distribute funds directly to local authorities. The reconstruction of Harat Hreik, where the destruction was as severe as in any of the frontline villages, was especially important to the Party. This neighborhood was where the Shi’i modernist movement, with Hizballah at the forefront, made its claim for a right to the capital city, and where the reconstruction most fully articulated a citizenship agenda rooted in what planners called *muqawama umraniyya* (see below).\(^1\)

Hizballah faced a dilemma in the aftermath of the war. Though many of its organizations survived intact and provided the bulk of relief services available, it could not undertake reconstruction on its own. The solution was the creation of a nonprofit NGO that would ensure the return of the people who lived, worked, played and prayed in pre-war Harat Hreik to their neighborhoods. ‘The Solemn Promise Project’ (*Mashru’ Wa’ad al-Sadiq*) drew its name from Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s post-war ‘Solemn Promise’ (*wa’ad al-sadiq*) to rebuild Harat Hreik ‘to be more beautiful than it was before.’ While administratively the project was under *Jihad al-Bina’*, the planning and the contracting of architectural and contracting firms was decidedly nonsectarian. The party convened a team of eight respected architects and urban planners from across the sectarian spectrum, and placed them under the direction of a Rahif Fayyad, a Christian, and president of the regional Order of Arab Architects. *Wa’ad* was tasked with managing the reconstruction of nearly 300 buildings containing 3100 apartments and housing more than 20,000 people.

*Wa’ad* was in many ways a pragmatic solution to a number of problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction. The first of the pragmatic considerations to overcome was the issue of financing. While the government finally announced in November 2006 that it would provide reconstruction aid to those who had lost their homes and businesses, the amounts promised were too small to cover the cost of reconstruction, and the distribution process was slow (Abu Zaki 2007, 2010). The formation of *Wa’ad* created an organization that could aggregate financing from a variety of sources. These included private donations from Lebanon and the Arab world, and aid from friendly states. These revenues, then, were added to the Party’s own contributions and individual right-holders’ government compensation to cover the full cost of reconstruction. *Wa’ad* ensured that right-holders received their compensation, and enabled the aggregation of these funds with monies from other sources, by utilizing the humble mechanism of power of attorney (*wikaleh*). Being contracted as a legal representative of individual residents, shopkeepers, building owners or companies also allowed *Wa’ad* to overcome collective action problems amongst owners, tenants and other right-holders. By the end of the process, according to Rahif Fayyad, 96% had appointed *Wa’ad* their representative to the state.\(^12\) The creation of a not-for-profit utilizing the simple solution of a power of attorney overcame a number of the problems that Solidere backers claimed, in the early 1990s, were insurmountable. More importantly, and in contrast to the market model, it ensured that the vast majority returned to the neighborhood and reclaimed their right to the capital city and so their full membership in the political community the capital represents.
Muqawama umraniyya: a citizenship agenda anchored in people and the particularity of place

The creation of Wa’ad enabled Hizballah to overcome obstacles and threats to the return of its constituency to its place in the city. In this sense, it challenged the hegemony of the Solidere model neoliberal urbanism in Lebanon and within the wider development industry by, it claimed, putting people before profit. At the same time, as a legally sanctioned institution backed by the political power of Hizballah, Wa’ad, it was able to engage or sidestep government when necessary in order to protect its constituency from the predation of both rival sovereignties and the market. Yet, Wa’ad’s approach to reconstruction, captured by Fayyad in the term muqawama umraniyya, went further. The adjective umraniyya modifies the noun muqawama, which means ‘resistance.’ The adjective is derived from umran, which today is often translated as ‘civilization’ or ‘culture.’ But in Fayyad’s usage, it is not ‘cultural resistance’ or ‘civilizational resistance.’ He draws on related meanings derived from the same root: to build (buildings or structures), to inhabit, to flourish, to be bustling with life, to become cultivated, civilized or urban.

Muqawama umraniyya, then, conveys a deeper set of resonating meanings, that link building with bustling life and the urban with inhabiting. These resonances stand in stark contrast to the thin image-driven place-making common to neoliberal urbanism (Harvey 1997; Klingmann 2007) and exemplified by Solidere. Fayyad’s term describes an urbanism that is irreducible to the subject–object ontology and therefore opposes the totalizing tendencies of modernism and the thin image-making of market urbanism.

Fayyad’s team began with a conception of urban space not as an abstract three-dimensional enframing of space to be divided into neat volumes to maximize efficiency or saleable square meters (cf. Fawaz 2014). So too did they set aside the urge to render the city a set of representations. Rather, they began with an understanding of the city akin to Lefebvre’s notion of perceived space; a living space produced by people, families, community through the practices of daily life (Lefebvre 1992; Purcell 2002). In other words, they imagined a living space that should and would inevitably, evolve outside of the planners’ control. For Fayyad and his team, resistance to modernism’s homogeneity and to the market’s addiction to image, is to be found in the mutual constitutions of people and place and the inevitable polyphony such relations produce. Thus, the reconstruction was not determined by a totalizing master plan imposed upon an imagined tabula rasa. Rather, the team sought to facilitate the production of spatial polyphony through small-scale and context-specific interventions. These ‘pockets of resistance’ (juyyoub muqawama) within the city’s existing socio-physical spaces would enable a polyphony of voices to come forward in daily life (Fayyad 2004, 28–31).

Indeed, within this discourse Fayyad likens the planner not to an all-seeing expert managing the city from on-high. Nor is the planner a painter composing an integrated image. Instead, Fayyad chooses a humble figure: a tailor engaged in the ‘rethi’ – stitching together or patching fabric (Al-Safir, 8 June 2007). Structures, images and perspectives may in part constitute juyyoub muqawama, but they are shaped in relation to existing fabric and the practices through which people adopt, adapt, work in and through them in the production of daily life. Unlike the subject–object underpinning Solidere’s image making, the people are not spectators standing outside as a consumer of a city-as-representation. In his or her concrete relations the urban dweller is an active participant in the constitution complex urban life (Editor, Al-Akhbar, 18 May 2007). In other words, whereas the Solidere discourse privileged profit and the image of the city over actual users
of space and community, Wa’ad privileged people and community in the production of urban space.

In this spatial understanding people and places are always already engaged in relations with their own past, as well. Long-gone urban structures and spaces, for example, live on and are given new meaning through active memory. Prior infrastructures and buildings are adapted, adopted or reused in the ongoing production of space. In this sense, the city operates as a discursive tradition (Asad 1986) linking past and present and so contouring possible futures. The memory of area residents, as embodied in the spatial practices and relations of people and families, will rise, persevere or fade. They need not be over-written by the planner from on high.

Indeed, in contrast to Solidere’s imaging of the city and nation, the Wa’ad approach to reconstruction, as a citizenship agenda, made a claim on behalf of the Shi’a to membership in the modern city-nation, but anchored that claim in the actual and diverse, constitutive practices of people and community. Accordingly, Wa’ad divided the project area into 30 zones, each of which contained existing urban fabric, partially demolished buildings, and open spaces where buildings had once stood. Each of these pockets was then contracted by local architectural firms, which oversaw its reconstruction. Each firm was free to combine their own architectural and urban vision with those of the owners and tenants themselves, and so the drivers of urban polyphony were multiple architectural visions in dialogue with physical and social surroundings, and with real people and families with real histories, needs and desires, as they sought to rebuild their lives and look forward into the future.

The promise of property
By 2012, a mere five years after the founding of Wa’ad, the reconstruction was complete. This is impressive, especially in comparison with Solidere, which 25 years on, remains mired in its own contradictions. While its heritage preservation and the architectural distinction of many of its developments are impressive, it failed to realize its promise of national renaissance. The company still faces shareholder insurrections and legal challenges from those whose rights it appropriated in 1994. More damaging is the fact that the neoliberal policies that made Solidere possible also produced a proliferation of competing luxury centers in Beirut. Large swaths of the new city center remain undeveloped (Hourani 2011). Its flagship development, a heritage-themed shopping mall affordable only to the regional super-rich, remains devoid of shoppers.

Harat Hreik is quite different. The majority of residents returned to the neighborhood, as did a number of prewar businesses. It is today even more vibrant than it was prior to the war, and is once again the urban heart of Lebanon’s Shi’i modernist movement. In enabling Shi’a claims to space in the capital city and the nation, reconstruction has been a success for the Party and its constituency. Yet, as with Solidere, the reconstruction of Harat Hreik also involves exclusions – in this case, of the other to the modernist movement.

There has been considerable tension between the muqawama umraniyya and other parts of the Party’s agenda, especially as that agenda has become tied to the upwardly mobile middle-class Shi’i modernist movement, which, as already noted, defines itself in part against what it considers the materially and spiritually backward. In Solidere, the vast majority of right holders suffered expropriation. This experience of widespread dispossession was, according to Wa’ad planners, not to be repeated. Fayyad made much of the distinction, declaring ‘There will be no real estate companies taking people’s ownership and stealing their rights as happened in other areas of Beirut’ (Al-Safir, 8 June 2007). In our 2009 discussions he was adamant. ‘Israeli attacks did not discriminate
between people based upon religion or class in this area, so we must return the people as they were,’ he told me, ‘We are not interested in restructuring the social in the arena [like Solidere].’

Yet, this citizenship agenda, organized with a right to the capital city and community at its core, nonetheless prioritized the propertied. It is here that Wa’ad’s seemingly radical people-centered planning, fragments against decidedly liberal attitudes that celebrate property ownership. One suspects that this is not an oversight. In discussing those with rights to return, company representatives were careful to use the term malikeen (owners) as opposed to the legally more inclusive category, ashab al-huquq (right-holders). Indeed, Wa’ad offered little to tenants. Estimated at 10–20% of right holders, tenants were not abandoned as such. As Fawaz (2014) points out, the majority of rentals in the Dahiya were informal and so leases, if they existed, were often not registered with their respective municipalities. Provided they could otherwise prove their claim, tenants received compensation to replace destroyed furnishings and to cover the rental of new premises for a year in premises that Party NGOs helped them locate. For those displaced longer, rental subsidies continued. In contrast to the owners, whose return was guaranteed, few commercial or residential tenants were able to do so.

Prospects for tenants who did return were not better. Those who signed rental contracts after 1992 are subject to a liberalized rental regime that cancelled tenant protections such as rent controls, long-term contracts and succession rights for heirs. Residential and commercial tenants are already finding themselves priced out of the neighborhood. When I asked Fayyad about Wa’ad’s position on this topic, he hesitated a moment, then retreated to the classic planner’s defense. ‘Wa’ad did not discuss these questions,’ he told me, for ‘Wa’ad is a technical and administrative body . . .’ Perhaps sensing my skepticism, he then continued, ‘In my personal view? I think this is a question that Hizballah should think about very seriously.’ Given the sophistication of its institutions and cadres, it seems unlikely that it hadn’t.

What was clear at the time was that gentrification, intended or not, was well underway in Harat Hreik. The reconstruction or renovation of hundreds of buildings, without any effort to prevent owners from immediately selling their newly modernized properties or from increasing rents, was having a definite impact on the social makeup of the area. By 2009, one year after the first Wa’ad-built building was delivered with great fanfare, residential prices and rents were already rising. ‘Things are getting hard,’ said one relatively well-off woman who owned a small restaurant near downtown Beirut, but who lives in Harat Hreik. ‘Rents are going up very quickly . . . Now to rent a two-bedroom apartment is 500 dollars per month. And you cannot buy [an apartment] for less than 150,000 dollars.’ The commercial makeup of the neighborhood is changing, too. Many pre-war businesses did not survive reconstruction or relocated elsewhere. Others were denied contract renewal as new entrepreneurs entered the neighborhood.

The shift is reflected in the social life of the neighborhood, as well, with new leisure venues – clubs, cafes and restaurants – catering to upwardly mobile and relatively wealthy Shi’i moderns in Harat Hreik (Deeb and Harb 2013). The Islamic Milieu, it seems, remains a class project. Hizballah’s approach to reconstruction, then, evidences a citizenship agenda that is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, incorporating residents’ everyday place-making practices but privileging the claims of a pious and propertied middle class.

**Conclusion**

Wa’ad planners’ community-based understanding of place is decidedly more sophisticated than Solidere’s image-based approach. It lent itself to and carried within it an ethno-religious
citizenship agenda articulated by Hizballah and the modernist movement of which it is a part. Indeed, it was a claim to full participation in urban life and the life of the nation. The reconstruction presents a direct challenge to the insistence of many Beiruti elites, that the Shi’a can never be truly modern or truly cosmopolitan, and so can never be equal citizens in either the city or the nation. The Solidere discourse, which asserted that the heart of the nation could only be restored only through privatized reconstruction, spoke of cosmopolitan unity. It promised to call the nation forth through the preservation of archaeology and ‘heritage architecture’ and their organization into a coherent narrative of the past that consecrates a national present. This city-as-representation relies upon a subject–object ontology, within which the individual stands apart from urban spaces and reads them as symbols or representations of a prior truth. As with all such totalizing projects, exclusions are inevitable. It is precisely through the constitutive outside that the cosmopolitan defines and knows itself. The subjects Solidere presupposed, global and Lebanese elite, required the exclusion of those coded as other to an imagined cosmopolitan nation: the nonelite and in particular the Shi’a.

Wa’ad’s reconstruction of Harat Hreik presented itself as resistance against Solidere-style neoliberal urbanism and the exclusions at its heart, even as it also resulted in classed displacement. In contrast to Solidere, it pressed a citizenship agenda rooted in Shi’i claims to a right to the city, reflected in the urbanism Wa’ad deployed. Unlike Solidere’s imaging, Wa’ad attended to the production of space as a social process within which people, in their concrete relations and daily practices create the polyphony that animates urban life. Yet, like all such projects Wa’ad carried within it exclusions. Respect for people and the preservation of social structure, the celebration of small scale and place memory might provide poles around which progressive architects and planners might rally, as many did around Wa’ad. However, as Harvey (1997) has pointed out, the question remains as to the veracity of design-based urbanism as a means of pressing such claims in the absence of a critique of private property relations. As he might predict Wa’ad came up against the powerful force that is the promise of private property and the interests and self understanding of its own middle-class constituency. In the absence of any institutional mechanism to ensure the return of tenants to their homes and shops in the area, or of any mechanism to prevent the transfer of newly reconstructed or remodeled buildings to wealthy Shi’i families, Wa’ad, in the end, risks contributing to the consolidation of social forces it was created to overcome.

Notes
1. See, for example, Rosaldo (1994) on education and Murphy (2013) on housing programs. In both cases, institutions articulate and inculcate notions of what Murphy calls ‘propriety,’ those modes of thought and behavior consonant with dominant conceptions of citizenship.
2. The Solidere Master Plan can be found at www.solidere.com
3. There are 17 recognized religious sects in Lebanon. The largest are the Shi’a, followed by the Sunni Muslims, the Shi’a and the Maronite Catholics, the leaders of which divide he most important state offices between themselves. The most powerful is the prime minister, who is always a Sunni. Next is the president, who is always a Catholic. Finally, the weakest, the speaker of parliament, is always a Shi’a. Sectarian identity pervades the mundane interactions with power as well, as religious authorities govern ‘personal status issues,’ such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, according to religious tenets.
4. Interview with a Solidere Public Relations officer, October 2000 (Beirut).
6. As a derogatory Mutawli connotes poverty, ignorance and a rural lack of sophistication akin to the terms ‘hick’ or ‘redneck’ used in the USA to describe individuals who are white, rural and poor.
8. The Ministry of the Displaced was founded to manage the return of refugees to their homes. As the Ministry was a hybrid institution controlled by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, whose militia displaced many of the people the Ministry successes in the 1990s were few. Complicating matters further, Prime Minister al-Hariri created the Central Fund for the Displaced, his own hybrid institution, to control the Ministry’s finances. It then expanded its mission to directly engage refugees, especially within Beirut, and cooperated with Solidere to evacuate refugees from the city center.


10. Personal interview with S. a Beirut based journalist, June 2012 (Beirut); and with M., Council for Development and Reconstruction, July 2012 (Beirut).


13. Personal Interview with Rahif Fayyad, December 2009 (Beirut).

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In this volatile moment in Latin America, when relations between the state and citizens are in flux, people at the margins of society draw on various notions of citizenship in social conflicts over proper behavior and the common good. I examine an inter-generational conflict over the legality of alcohol in an indigenous village in Guatemala to show how its protagonists creatively recombine different aspects of the various citizenship regimes that they have encountered. Elders have formed vigilante justice groups to combat the youth they consider gangsters. While the vigilantes draw upon a discourse of obligation to justify their actions, the generation below them counters with a language of rights. Some argue that citizenship is less meaningful in contexts where state power is ambiguous and extralegal violence is commonplace. I argue that in such contexts, it is not that citizenship does not have meaning, but rather that its meaning is intensely contested.

Keywords: vigilantes; gangs; Maya; Guatemala; citizenship regimes

Introduction

The outsourcing of security represents a key aspect of the changing relationship between citizens, markets, and the state in postwar Guatemala. While the rich have retreated to gated communities and turned private security into one of the nation’s leading industries, the poor have taken matters into their own hands and made extralegal security committees ubiquitous throughout the countryside. The predominantly Maya municipio of Todos Santos Cuchumatán in Huehuetenango has led the trend in do-it-yourself security. Community elders first organized a security committee in the early 2000s to confront the youth they considered gangsters. In 2008, the group expanded its mandate and prohibited the sale of alcohol throughout the municipio. On the day in 2011 when I went to ask the committee’s president if he would talk to some immigration attorneys visiting from the USA, I encountered him at an especially proud moment. Demetrio Matías declared:

What we have accomplished here, nobody else has dared to. We’ve taken on the rich who own the liquor industry. Here we are in this country where the laws aren’t enforced, where the government doesn’t bother to educate the young, but it’s okay to sell liquor to them. (Field notes, 10 January 2011)

The entities that emerge in this quote anticipate the leading characters in this paper about how people experience citizenship at the margins of the state. First, there is the ‘we’ of the local security committee, a group based on wartime paramilitarization that has been empowered by the recent recognition of the rights of indigenous people. This committee has emerged in the context of a government organized to protect the interests of the rich
and powerful, while it ‘doesn’t bother’ with the rest of the population. Then there are the young, who have a double character in this drama: while they require protection, they are also something that the community must be protected against, especially once they have a few drinks in them. The two sides of this struggle can be glossed as ‘vigilantes versus gangsters.’ While older men draw upon ideologies of communal obligation and service to justify their extralegal repression of the youth they consider gangsters, younger men use their experiences with formal education and migration to challenge the legality of vigilantism.

I use this intergenerational conflict over the meaning and morality of alcohol to explore the significance of shifting citizenship regimes in postwar Guatemala. Citizenship regime refers to the legal framework that determines the form, content, and boundaries of citizenship (Rasch 2011, 55; Yashar 2005). This struggle represents a microcosm of a larger historical shift in Latin America, as nation-states once built on the exclusion of indigenous peoples now publicly proclaim themselves multicultural, pluricultural polities. The extent of this inclusion, however, remains ambiguous, especially in Guatemala, where the legacy of its brutal civil war remains profoundly felt.

I found that different generations emphasize different aspects of the citizenship regimes that they have encountered. While elders valorized prewar forms of self-governance and ideas about the common good, younger people were more likely to draw upon discourses of individual rights learned during the postwar period. No one openly espoused the values learned during wartime paramilitarization. Nonetheless, this legacy remained evident in how people treated each other, along with their support for a punitive approach to alcohol addiction. Thus, while there are certain forms of political belonging that people publicly proclaimed, the impact of people’s experiences with the counterinsurgency state remained equally influential, if less openly discussed.

Guatemala has one of the largest indigenous populations in the Americas along with one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in the world. US-backed military dictatorships have kept a small Euro-descended oligarchy in power in this small Central American country. In the late 1970s, multiple Marxist guerrilla groups challenged this control. The Guatemalan government responded with overwhelming force that many have labeled a genocide against the Guatemalan Maya. After 36 years of conflict, the war officially ended in 1996. As part of the peace accords, indigenous people were formally included in the nation-state for the first time in its history. Some commentators argue that multiculturalism has opened up real political space for indigenous actors in Latin America (Gustafson 2002; Van Cott 2006). But in Guatemala, the ability of indigenous activists to make real on this rhetorical opening has been far more compromised as intransigent elites refuse to cede power (Brett 2013). Others point to the failure to codify the rights of indigenous people in the Guatemalan constitution, which leaves the interpretation of these rights up to judicial discretion (Sieder 2011). How meaningful this newfound citizenship status is in a country that continues to be plagued by poverty and violence remains unclear. But if the meaning of citizenship remained unclear, struggles over its meaningfulness were intense.

The data presented below grew out of long-term fieldwork in Todos Santos Cuchumatán. Todos Santos is a predominantly Mam Maya municipality in the northwestern highlands of Guatemala. It has a population of 30,000, and about 3000 people live in the town center. People used to get by on subsistence agriculture and seasonal labor migration. Now remittance dollars are an important source of income: an estimated 30% of the population lives in the USA. I have been visiting Todos Santos every year since 2004, and lived continuously in the village in 2010–2011. During that time
I tracked the emergence, consolidation, and subsequent decline of the power of its self-help security committee. I documented its public operations of power and conducted semi-structured interviews with its leaders, foot soldiers, and targets of disciplinary action.2

In the summers of 2009 and 2010, I also conducted fieldwork in the Todosantero community in California, where I volunteered at a legal aid agency that has pursued political asylum claims for thousands of indigenous Guatemalans. In the process, I befriended the agency’s lead attorneys, who later visited Todos Santos. Much of the fieldwork drawn upon for this piece emerged out of conversations produced by this visit, an issue that I discuss in greater detail below.

In the sections that follow, I begin by placing this work in the context of recent debates about citizenship. While some argue that citizenship is not a meaningful category for excluded populations, I argue that the concept of citizenship, even if it is unrealized, remains one with the power to unsettle social relations. The second section offers a brief overview of shifting citizenship regimes in Guatemala with an emphasis on the role of alcohol in this history. In the third section, I return to the moment with which I opened: the day in which the president of the Todos Santos security committee defended his organization to the attorneys from California. Matias’s exposition pivots on the central role of communal obligations in the practice of good citizenship. The fourth section is dedicated to the perspective of younger men who use their experiences with formal education and transnational migration to criticize the local alcohol ban. While elders cite prewar citizenship regimes, and youth invoke postwar ones, I conclude by considering the ongoing power of that which is not discussed: the role of wartime repression in how people enact their ideas about political belonging. I conclude that it is not that citizenship lacks meaning for excluded populations, but rather disagreements over what it should mean bring people into conflict.

**Theorizing citizenship among the excluded**

There are two trends in recent anthropological work on citizenship. The first move involves expanding the concept, making citizenship so capacious that it could refer to almost anything. In contrast, the second body of work questions the utility of the concept of citizenship. Although these positions are seemingly incommensurate, their conclusions are not so far apart, in that both reject the state-centrism of classical liberal notions of citizenship. I briefly outline these positions below before turning to the applicability of this work to the case at hand.

First, some scholars seek to expand the definition of citizenship (de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster 2015). They acknowledge a previous tendency to limit discussions of citizenship to relationships between citizens and states but question this narrowing of the term. Gordon and Stack (2007), for example, open up citizenship by defining it as an open set of elements that come to the fore in different contexts. These elements may include autonomy, rights, duties, and the commitment to some kind of polity or community. Others likewise emphasize that citizenship must be seen as a process bound by context and fraught with contingencies (Cornwall, Robins, and von Lieres 2011). In this work, citizenship may be more of an idea or an aspiration than an achieved status. As James writes about postapartheid South Africa, ‘Citizenship is aspirational, providing visions of what a future social order might look like, and of how political belonging and participation in that order might be structured’ (2013, 27). In settings where citizenship was previously denied, earlier social orders continue to reverberate in newer ones.

Much of the recent work on citizenship points out that the national framework of citizenship associated with Marshall’s (1963) work represented a relatively brief historical
moment. Lazar (2013), for example, deepens the term’s history by using Aristotle to argue that this concept should be framed in reference to the far more flexible term polis. In this formulation, citizenship names the relationship between person and polis, and which polis said person is relating to at any given moment shifts. People are members of multiple political communities, and the nation-state is just one context for these communities.

While some seek to expand and supplement citizenship, others argue that the term remains too connected to state-endorsed rights and official forms of participation to be applicable to post-neoliberal contexts. For example, Arias and Goldstein claim that citizenship is a liberal notion of limited utility in the violently plural democracies of post-authoritarian Latin America. As they write:

[C]itizenship itself gains meaning from the idea that individuals can gain access to rights by acting within a rule of law guaranteed by a democratic state. However, if state power and the rule of law are openly contested, with powerful armed or otherwise violent groups establishing contingent legal and political orders interspersed and interacting with state-based systems, the notion of a general set of reciprocal rights and obligations distributed widely among the population becomes less meaningful. (Arias and Goldstein 2010, 23)

Nuijten likewise questions the applicability of the concept of citizenship in contexts where many are excluded from the category. She argues that the term ‘political society’ may in fact be more useful. Subaltern people excluded from civil society make up political society, and their politics by necessity rely upon extralegal actions. As Nuijten writes, ‘Extra-legal means are often the only way for poor people to defend their “right of being” in a society that largely excludes them and sees them as superfluous’ (2013, 12). Significantly, these authors who question the applicability of citizenship do so by citing the widespread existence of often violent legal and political orders that exist beyond the state.

While these scholars cite the proliferation of violent non-state actors and ongoing exclusion to question the utility of the concept of citizenship, I argue that in such contexts citizenship is not necessarily meaningless, rather its meaning is contested. Many points made by the first group of scholars bear on the case at hand. In the first place, people frame political belonging in terms of multiple communities, including the local municipality, the Guatemalan nation-state, and the USA. In the process of this framing, they reference elements of different citizenship regimes from disparate moments in history: earlier social orders continue to reverberate in new ones. The following sections track the traces of some of these social orders.

**Shifting citizenship regimes in the highlands**

Any discussion of ‘citizenship’ in Guatemala must reference the fact that for most of the nation’s history, its majority indigenous population was excluded from formal citizenship and yet systematically exploited as part of its nation-building project. Alcohol played a major role in facilitating this exploitation. In Guatemala, the Castillo family owns the national brewery and the Botran family the national distillery. Both are among the handful of Euro-descended families who control the nation’s wealth. In the late nineteenth century, Guatemala’s elites discovered that an economy organized around coffee was a precarious one: the growing season was short and the international market fickle. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the alcohol monopoly system became the nation’s primary source of revenue. By the 1890s, taxes on legal rum production provided between a fourth and a third of the national budget (Carey 2012, 7).

Customs agents were some of the few representatives of the state to make their presence felt in rural indigenous Guatemala. Forcing rural Maya to purchase legally
licensed and taxed rum instead of locally made *cuxa* (moonshine) connected the highlands to the national grid. Labor contractors arrived during alcohol-fueled patron saints’ day celebrations to offer Maya cash advances that trapped them in debt peonage on coastal coffee and cotton plantations. Even though this practice was outlawed as part of the labor reforms during Guatemala’s decade of democracy (1944–1954), it continued unabated for decades.

Historian Garrard-Burnett (2012) argues that as Maya communities were increasingly pulled into wage labor outside of the village, the role of ritualized public drunkenness during fiestas became ever more important to reproducing a communitarian ethos. By drinking to excess together, Mayas strengthened communal ties strained by labor migration. At the same time, these social practices allowed Guatemalan elites to blame their nation’s subsidiary status in the world system on ‘backward, drunken Indians’ (Carey 2012; Pezzia 2013).

During the Marxist insurgency, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) occupied Todos Santos in 1981. They assassinated the local liquor vendor and banned the sale of alcohol (Perrera 1993). Kobrak (1997) writes that the EGP often killed liquor vendors when they took over towns in rural Huehuetenango. The Marxist insurgency sought to sever rural Guatemala’s links to the nation-state, blowing up roads and bridges, burning records, and banning booze. This attempt was short-lived.

The subsequent counterinsurgency campaign forcibly reconnected the space of remote Maya villages to the nation-state. The military’s main vehicle was the *Patrullas Autociviles*, or PAC, a system of forced labor all adult Maya men were made to participate in. During this period, any community leader was considered suspect. The army executed a generation of politicians and community leaders, along with Maya priests and other ritual experts. This campaign was later declared a genocide, which implies not only massive loss of life, but also the loss of a way of life (Godoy 2002). Military control replaced local systems of dispute resolution based on the restoration of harmonious social relations with ones based on force and brutality. Along with customary law, ritual knowledge was lost as well, including rites that involved the ritual consumption of alcohol.

Although Guatemala’s civil patrols were disbanded at the war’s end, in many highland towns they reorganized a few years later, this time with control in local hands. In Todos Santos, the presence of unruly youth that people considered ‘gangsters’ was the official reason for their reconstitution. These youth groups were not involved in any organized criminal activities. Instead, their main activity seemed to be drinking together. No longer attached to the ritual cycle, these youth turned drinking into an everyday activity.

Tellingly, the people of Todos Santos did not turn to the state to solve their problems, even though state presence has increased considerably in the postwar period. Many rural communities now house offices of the justice of the peace, who is charged with handling minor offenses: one opened in Todos Santos in 1993. Likewise the postwar police force, the *Policía Nacional Civil* also has an office in the town square with six to eight officers on duty at any given time. However, many consider the official justice system corrupt and costly, and prefer to take their troubles to the Mam-speaking leaders of the local security committee.

At its height, every neighborhood and hamlet in Todos Santos boasted a security committee, and all adult men took turns patrolling the streets at night on a rotating basis. The presidents of each of these local committees selected a wider governing board. This board of directors held court during the Saturday market, where they mediated conflicts that people brought to them. The group’s antigang campaign had widespread public support: their next target, alcohol, was considerably more controversial.
**Elders and obligation**

This section outlines the position of the elders who promoted the alcohol prohibition in Todos Santos. These community leaders were all around 50 years old. While the town’s teetotaling Evangelical Protestants certainly supported the alcohol ban, its intellectual authors were Catholics. These men often complained about evangelicals’ reluctance to involve themselves in worldly politics. Obligation emerges as a major theme in these antialcohol activists’ justification of their position. This concept represents a trace of an older citizenship regime, one based on the forms of self-governance developed in Maya villages prior to the war. But nostalgic references to traditional systems of authority are not the only historical formation evident in these accounts of the prohibition. The repressive tactics of elders reveal the long-lasting impact of Guatemala’s counterinsurgency state as well.

In the past, one could only acquire rights in a Maya municipio by gaining the respect of your elders by participating in communal work (e.g., La Farge and Byers 1931; Wagley 1949; Watanabe 1992). Rights were not abstract and universal, but rather earned through fulfilling one’s obligations to the community as a whole. Historically, these obligations were fulfilled through communal work, including civic services and an organization called the cofradía. Men moved through the ranks of this age-graded system of ritual obligation, gradually taking on greater responsibilities.

These forms of public service gradually declined over the course of the twentieth century. Beginning with the political reforms of 1944, party politics started becoming locally important (Handy 1984). In the 1950s, the Catholic Church started a missionization campaign that trained young Maya men in an orthodox Catholicism shorn of its Maya syncretic elements (Brinnell 1979). By the 1970s, evangelical Christianity started making inroads, and conversion meant opting out of the cofradía system entirely (Annis 1987). The impact of the war years hastened a process of decline that was already well under way. In a context where any kind of communitarianism was suspect, state-authorized patrols became one space where traditions of mutual aid and community service that had been the hallmark of Maya village life remained permissible (Kobrak 1997; Nelson 2010, 92).

In 2008, a new board of directors took over the leadership of the security committee. These leaders had an agenda. As their then president Don Macario explained, the problem was not just the youth. The kids were polite and respectful when they were sober, but once they got a few drinks in them, they became violent thugs. His second in command was even more explicit in connecting gangs to drinking: ‘What was the origin of the gangs? Liquor!’ (interview, 20 July 2008). But this problem, the problem of alcohol, was not just limited to the young people: most of the problems that the security committee dealt with, like street brawling and wife beating, could be blamed on excessive alcohol consumption.

Apart from violence, alcohol was holding back the economic progress of the village. ‘If there’s drinking there are children who go without shoes and sick women who go without medicine,’ Macario observed (interview, 3 August 2011). Or as Mateo put it, ‘Men go to the market and instead of spending their money on food, they buy beer and don’t come home for days’ (field notes, 12 July 2008). Drinking, an overwhelmingly male activity, made women and children suffer. After 2008, shutting down cantinas and beating, arresting, and fining the obviously inebriated became part of the mandate of the security committee.

For the men of this generation, doing something about alcoholism was an obligation, a collective responsibility to the welfare of the village and the progress of its people. These men set out to disarticulate the connection of ‘drunken’ to ‘Indian,’ a linkage that was
central to Guatemalan elite justifications for racism. Sobriety became a point of civic pride: they spoke disparagingly of other indigenous villages, places where liquor propaganda covered the walls, passed-out drunks littered the streets, and the womenfolk could only afford cheap plastic shoes.

Security leaders were especially alarmed by youth drinking. While older drunks were often indulged, younger ones bore the brunt of the committee’s disciplinary actions. The rationale for this double standard was that these youths should fulfill their responsibilities to their families before they spent their money on alcohol. Their policies also tried to make the liquor vendors responsible to the rest of the community. If someone died of drink, vendors were forced to pay funeral expenses and indemnity to the deceased’s family. In what the security committee called ‘the battle over alcohol,’ they felt justified in using force to impose their will. I take a closer look at the role of obligation in these justifications below, before turning to a discussion of the role of force.

When the immigration attorneys came to visit, they were curious to speak with leaders of the security committee they had heard so much about. At first, the asylum cases their organization facilitated were based on claims of political persecution stemming from the war. But during the early 2000s, they started getting cases that were based on the human rights violations committed by the security committee. Some security leaders, who felt unfairly maligned by things migrants said about them, agreed to speak to them when I asked. Don Fausto, one of the leaders of a neighborhood security committee, even invited us to observe one of their meetings.

The meeting had been called because a group of youth had gotten into a drunken rock-throwing fight with members of a rival neighborhood gang. These boys were at the meeting, and Fausto stood at the front of the room and lectured them. ‘You don’t bother to say “tat” or “nan,” anymore,’ he said, referring to the Mam Maya equivalents of ‘sir’ and ‘ma’am.’ ‘You don’t even bother to greet people,’ he said, ‘instead this is what you do.’ Then he demonstrated a palm-sliding, fist-bump handshake with a youth seated in the front row. The gathered youth broke into riotous laughter at the sight of this 60-year old imitating them. As Fausto continued, ‘You have rights, the right to food, to shelter, to your name, to health, to study, to dress well. But you also have obligations, like the obligation to respect your parents’ (field notes, 12 January 2011). In Fausto’s formulation, rights and obligations coexist. Youth, however, are failing to fulfill these obligations, especially the obligation to treat their elders respectfully.

In another conversation that took place during the attorney’s visit, rights and obligation appear again, but this time the two concepts are antithetical. According to security committee president Demetrio Matias, rights are a dangerous concept that is to blame for youth violence. In the interview that he granted, he stated:

I blame the system in Guatemala in which the young are only taught about their rights. ‘These are your rights. These are your liberties,’ and that’s it. So the system is bad. They don’t talk about ‘These are your obligations.’ Or ‘These are the sanctions.’ So the law prepares young people to be violent . . . We need to legalize [in the United States]. But the result is when they come here it’s like they have two nationalities, Guatemalan and American. So in Guatemala they can do anything they want, they can kill, and these kids turned up with tattoos of their organizations, and already there have been some deaths, and this was the result of them being protected there and then they come back here and bring violence with them . . . But many times the government itself, the laws themselves, makes this happen. The very same ones . . .

Universal rights, global rights are to blame for this. (Interview, 10 January 2011)

When Demetrio stated, ‘I blame the system in Guatemala in which the young are only taught about their rights,’ I believe he was talking about the school system, which many in
town considered the birthplace of the so-called gangs. Formal education had opened a
space where young people escaped the orbit of parental control and socialized with their
peers. They had responded to this space by creating a youth culture. Whether or not this
youth culture could in fact be considered a ‘gang’ is a perplexing point pondered by many
observers of rural Guatemala (Benson, Fischer, and Thomas 2008; Burrell 2013).
Although these youth sodalities borrowed the names and fashion sensibilities of larger
regional gangs, they seemed to have no formal connections to these criminal groups.
Demetrio asserts that ‘already there have been some deaths,’ and there had been a handful
of seemingly gang-related murders in town. But for the most part the crimes of these
youths seemed to be more about attitude and appearance – their tattoos, their baggy pants,
their drunken loitering, and their failure to return polite greetings or to defer to their elders.

Demetrio returned to the theme of obligation at a later point in his conversation with
the immigration attorneys, specifying that participation in the security committee itself
represented the fulfillment of a communal obligation. Many people in town were less than
enthusiastic about taking part in its disciplinary actions. They worried that they would
make enemies or risk legal liability for participating in a voluntary police force of
ambiguous legality. But men like Demetrio saw within the patrol resonances with older
systems of customary law in Maya villages. As he stated to the visiting human rights
advocates: ‘Our work as Guatemalans, as Todosanteros, is to safeguard order. Some
people say we do this work voluntarily, but no, as others have said, we do this because
we’re obligated.’

When Demetrio made this comment he was referencing an earlier conversation held at
a security meeting about policing the fiesta that year. Some of the men had decided that the
security committee should carry ropes so they could tie up any wrongdoers. Others argued
that this seemed like an unnecessarily repressive measure. In the course of the discussion,
an advocate for the use of ropes made an impassioned speech that impressed Demetrio
greatly: ‘They say that we are volunteers, but we are not volunteers. We are obligated to
take care of and protect the village.’ Demetrio warmed to this notion of obligation: it
connected the ad hoc, secular security committee to a much longer history of community
service and mutual aid. But this story also hints at some of the coercion and violent
potentiality condoned in the name of obligation. Wrongdoers were often beaten with ropes
or belts. According to many young men, sometimes just speaking disrespectfully to an
elder was enough to earn a beating.

Demetrio and other Maya leaders of his generation use a language of obligation to
critique the youth they see as disrespectful and rebellious. In Todos Santos, alcohol has
become a major site of struggle. Elders see alcohol as exacerbating violence, as keeping
them in poverty, and as keeping them in a stigmatized position in the nation’s racial
hierarchy. In this struggle, elders accuse youth of perpetrating violence. And sometimes
they do, as in the case mentioned above, get drunk and throw rocks at each other. Some
drunken incidences have ended in fatalities (see Burrell 2009, 2013). But just as often
these young men found themselves on the receiving end of violence. The next section turns
to the some of these experiences.

Youth and rights
The younger generation draws upon different types of citizenship regimes. These critics of
the ban have received more formal education than their parents’ generation, done stints of
labor migration in the USA, or both. I contend that these experiences have helped inculcate
the conviction that drinking is an individual decision, and an individual’s responsibility.
Formal education has exposed them to what some have called constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1998). People who had come of age after the war tended to be critical of their elder’s collective allocation of responsibility for drinking and are far more likely to cite the constitution as the law of the land that should be observed. In Guatemala’s internationally brokered peace process, constitutional changes marked stages in the long denouement of the conflict. As Guatemalans are given to saying, the postwar constitution is a beautiful document, in theory. Practice is another matter. Yet, given its historical role in inaugurating the end of the conflict, it is unsurprising that critics of vigilantism reference it in their efforts to oppose the disciplinary actions of the security committee. In what follows, I look at how three men who are all around 30 years old have experienced the alcohol ban.

Adrian left home as a teenager to go to high school in Guatemala’s second city. Upon graduation, instead of pursuing a profession within Guatemala, Anslemo went to the USA. He applied for political asylum and received it, which allowed him to go back and forth between the two countries. When we spoke, we talked about the immigration attorneys’ upcoming visit. Adrian had worked as a volunteer translator at their office. We both knew that if the young men whose asylum cases were based on persecution by the security committee were seen as gangsters rather than innocent victims, their cases would be compromised. So when I asked him about the existence of the gangs that his elders were always talking about, Adrian responded with a demurral:

I grew up in this and I was never a gang member. Security started because of the gangs, but they really don’t know the definition. Sure there are gangs in Huehuetenango, in Xela [Quetzaltenango], and in the capital, but not here. And while security started with the gangs they soon got involved in other things, like intervening in domestic violence, in debt repayment, in punishing people who have lovers, in alcohol, making justice their own way. The thing is that in none of these areas did they take the constitution into consideration. They just kept on taking over more space. (Interview, 10 December 2010)

In Adrian’s account, the constitution should set certain limits on what is legal and illegal in Guatemala. Instead, the leaders of the local security committee ignored the law of the land and made ‘justice in their own way.’ Adrian himself had run afoul of this justice, when he had a drunken altercation in the street with an equally drunken former mayor. He was seen as failing to fulfill his obligation to respect his elders. As punishment, he was beaten and forced to hand over his US driver’s license and permanent legal resident card. Getting these documents replaced had been a bureaucratic nightmare. But the beating, which his ailing mother had been forced to attend, had been even more humiliating.

As the confiscation of these documents suggests, security leaders blamed his rebelliousness, his violence, as Matias would put it, on his dual citizenship. But Adrian hurled the charge of violence right back at them, observing that ‘Tourism has declined a lot, and it’s their fault, for spending their time perpetuating violence instead of building schools, building parks, and developing sports programs’ (interview, 10 December 2010). Elders accused Adrian and his friends of violence, but he accused them of the same thing, as they insisted on taking a punitive approach to alcohol abuse, instead of providing young people with alternative forms of recreation.

Other men from Adrian’s generation echoed his use of the constitution to question the extrajudicial actions of the security committee. Beto had never left Guatemala, but like Adrian he had a high school education. His mother had supplemented her income by selling beer out of their house. But in 2008 the mayor arrived with a mob and told them that they had to respect the will of the people. Then the crowd cut their water supply. Three years later, Beto still flushed red with rage when he described this event. We were talking in my kitchen,
and he picked up a little notebook that was lying on the table between us, brandishing it as he said, ‘What has happened in this town with the constitution? In my opinion what has happened here is unconstitutional. People say that indigenous people have rights,’ he said, waving the notebook, ‘But no, everything is in the constitution.’ Beto continued,

They’ve made things illegal here that aren’t illegal in Guatemala. The president hasn’t said that alcohol is illegal, it’s not in the constitution that alcohol is illegal. It’s a person’s decision to drink in moderation. I drink when I have money. When I don’t, I don’t. (Field notes, 16 September 2011)

Beto laid claim to national citizenship, as a citizen with constitutionally protected rights, as well as to the sovereignty of the individual decision. This claim put him at odds with his elders who saw stamping out problem drinking as their collective responsibility.

After the security committee put small vendors like Beto’s mom out of business, a thriving black market emerged. Memo was not in the liquor business before, but after he was deported from the USA for working under a false social security number, he saw selling liquor in his hometown as a risky but lucrative business opportunity. He opened a clandestine cantina in 2008. Two years later, Memo found himself on the receiving end of a mob action. He had been accused of a crime and publicly flogged by the security committee several years before, so when he saw the crowd approaching, he ran for his life. These antialcohol activists broke into his house, apprehended his wife and children, and confiscated his stock.

Memo and several of his fellow vendors took the security committee to court. Their initial complaint read ‘we are working people’ who were ‘victims of an act that did not respect our persons, our rights, or our property as clearly guaranteed by the constitution of Republic of Guatemala.’ In conversation, however, Memo was more likely to mention his experience with rights in the USA than his faith in the Guatemalan constitution. Even though Memo had ended up on the wrong side of the law in the USA, this experience with the power of rule of law informed his belief that the law could be a meaningful and enforceable category in Guatemala as well. As he remarked, ‘It’s taken a whole year with this legal process, but I’ve been to the United States, and I know it’s not right to enter your house and take your things’ (field notes, 4 July 2011).

In the words of the elder generation, the battle against alcohol was in many ways a heroic quest. Alcoholism was undeniably a nasty problem. It was sad to see drooling drunks passed out in puddles of urine. Even more alarming was evidence of the aftermath of men’s drunken rages, the numerous women missing front teeth, the child who lost an eye. However, there was also an ugly side to the way the security committee went about enforcing the ban. This sample gives a glimpse of what it was like to cross security committee decisions. Both Adrian and Memo had been beaten in public. In part, their use of baggy pants made them targets of these actions: people suspected that they were gang members. Beto and Memo experienced the terror of having a large group of machete-brandishing townsfolk break down their doors. Youth complained that their elders did not like to talk about the war. But the ghosts of wartime experiences still permeated the present, expressing themselves in the repertoire of disciplinary techniques practiced by local security committees. Their use of corporal punishment and mob violence reveal the extent to which impunity permeates all levels of governance in postwar Guatemala.

Discussion

Observers of human behavior have long commented on the tension between what people say about what they do and what they actually do. In Todos Santos, this split
came to the fore in the way people talked about violence: violence was always something that someone other than the speaker was guilty of perpetrating. But the attribution of violence had high stakes in Todos Santos, one that is intimately connected to struggles over citizenship, and one that formed a subtext for much of the fieldwork discussed here. During the war, many indigenous Guatemalans sought refuge and citizenship in the USA. Currently, the political asylum process offers one of the only avenues for the undocumented to obtain citizenship status in the USA. Many Todosanteros have successfully pursued asylum claims, and many more are in the process of doing so.

Winning an asylum case requires constructing an individualized narrative of politicized violence and persecution that grossly oversimplifies the lived experience of asylum seekers (Coutin 2001). In the context of Guatemala, political violence is still usually seen through a cold war lens. In these accounts, the descendants of the Marxist insurgency continue to do battle with the inheritors of the counterinsurgency state. But on the ground, this tidy political binary has shattered. In the aftermath of a world undone by violence, people sift through the ideological rubble, creatively recombining available histories and discourses (Sharp 2014).

In this discussion, I have highlighted the clash between two of these fragments: a prewar ideology of obligation and a postwar one centered on individual rights. Although I focused on people’s articulation of these particular aspects of two divergent citizenship regimes, these were certainly not the only logics that people deployed. In addition to elders’ references to prewar notions of obligation, they were also just as likely to cite the postwar recognition of the rights of indigenous people in their discussions of their right to impose the prohibition. In this vision, local-level autonomy was protected by transnationally recognized legal regimes. A wartime education in a Marxist-inspired class analyses also came through in their reasoning: Matias was not alone in seeing the alcohol ban as ‘taking on the rich.’

Meanwhile, critics of the ban across all age groups mentioned the importance of liquor revenues to the Guatemalan state. As mentioned above, historically, taxes on liquor played an important role in filling national coffers; in the postwar period, they continue to do so. Schemes to fund health care through alcohol taxes made for good public relations for the liquor industry (Reyes, de la Cruz, and Marin 2013). Many opponents of the ban pointed to the economic necessity of taxes on legally produced liquor, a concern that resonates with an older citizenship regime in which policing of liquor consumption represented an important tie between Maya and the nation-state.

In contrast, people’s direct experiences with wartime violence were rarely discussed. I am not sure that the counterinsurgency state can be considered a ‘citizenship regime’ per se. But it was certainly a regime, one in which respect for either communal obligations or basic human rights was superseded by authoritarianism and impunity. This much less romantic history was not one people claimed publicly, not like nostalgia for the Maya village of old, where generations socialized together, and the young respected the old, or a belief in the inalienability of human rights. Nonetheless, this history expressed itself to the extent that violence had become a relatively normalized part of everyday life in the village, where young people play at being gang members, while their elders respond to this insolence with force. The most extreme response was lynching, or public, extrajudicial execution (Sharp 2012). Postwar Guatemala is infamous for its high incidence of lynching (Godoy 2002). While there has not been a fatal lynching in Todos Santos for many years, this ever-present possibility underwrote the power of its security committee.
Conclusion

Recently many scholars of citizenship have sought to expand the term, using it to refer to almost any kind of political belonging. Citizenship seen this way in Guatemala is a fraught category, composed of shifting frames of reference and the traces of multiple histories. I have examined an intergenerational conflict over the legality of alcohol in an indigenous village in Guatemala to show how its protagonists creatively recombine different aspects of the various citizenship regimes that they have encountered. A close look at the contestations surrounding this particular moment reveals some of the ambiguity and complexity of the relationship between indigenous people and citizenship in post-neoliberal states, including the effects of the devolution of responsibility to local actors and the tensions between collective and individual rights in a context of economic austerity. Some contend that citizenship is less meaningful in contexts where state power is ambiguous and extralegal violence is commonplace. I conclude that it is not that citizenship lacks meaning for excluded populations, but rather that its meaning constitutes a site of sometimes violent struggle.

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Disclosure statement

Any errors, of course, are my own.

Notes

1. The names used here are pseudonyms.
2. While I interviewed equal numbers of men and women during my fieldwork, vigilante activists and their victims were overwhelmingly male. In this paper, I focus on men’s perspectives on the intergenerational struggle taking place between them.

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Citizenship agendas, urban governance and social housing in the Netherlands: an assemblage approach

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This article combines recent conceptualizations of citizenship beyond the nation state with new perspectives on governance assemblages comprising both state and non-state actors. Focusing on Dutch social housing, this study explores how such governance assemblages produce agendas that attempt to shape citizenship. Employing an assemblage approach, this study first demonstrates how state and non-state actors amalgamate by providing a historical overview of the urban governance of social housing in the Netherlands. Second, taking account of the territory that the assemblage claims, it shows how underprivileged neighbourhoods become the spatial locus of these assemblages. Third, examining what this amalgam produces, the article shows how the assemblage imposes a citizenship agenda on the population of these neighbourhoods, distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens. Acknowledging that citizenship agendas are produced by a multifaceted amalgam of state and non-state actors, this article emphasizes the need for rigorous academic analysis of such governance assemblages.

Keywords: citizenship; social housing; assemblage; urban governance; the Netherlands

Introduction

In this article, I show how an analysis of housing policy and practice can reveal the production of citizenship agendas by both state and non-state actors. Bringing together recent insights from different fields, this article combines the conceptualization of citizenship beyond the nation state with the notion of hybrid state/non-state governance assemblages. The governance of Dutch social housing – affordable rental housing – which contains state actors such as national government and municipalities and non-state actors such as private housing corporations, who together provide subsidized housing to lower-income families, is used to illustrate this theoretical intervention.

Most studies of the framing of citizenship focus on the state–subject relationship. Citizenship, in this view, is produced within this relationship and finds its expression both in state policies and in the rights and responsibilities of subjects vis-à-vis the state. In line with recent contributions to the field of citizenship studies, I suggest reconceptualizing citizenship within wider governance assemblages that crosscut the state/non-state divide. While such wider assemblages and their effects on urban residents have been analysed in detail in studies of urban governance, the notion of ‘citizen’ is not usually understood outside the state–subject relationship.

I employ an assemblage approach to demonstrate, first, how state and non-state actors cooperate and amalgamate given the historical context of the urban governance of social

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housing in the Netherlands. The governance of social housing started with private initiatives, namely housing associations that operated parallel to the state, and over time evolved to include the national government, municipalities and housing associations. After the national government privatized the housing associations, they became autonomous actors, involved in commercial and social activities, yet they still cooperated with the national government and local municipalities.

Second, taking account of the territory claimed by the assemblage, the analysis of the historical and current governance of social housing demonstrates that underprivileged neighbourhoods become the assemblage’s spatial locus much more so than the national territory that is so often invoked in citizenship studies. In so doing, this approach generates a more fragmented view on the territoriality of political community and critiques the prevalent methodological nationalism that assumes national territory as the locus of citizenship.

Third, this approach looks for what is produced by the assemblage. Tying together recent academic studies and policy documents, I demonstrate how urban governance generates a politically instilled framing of citizenship that distinguishes between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens. Good citizens are considered to demonstrate upward social mobility, be (potential) homeowners, participate actively in policy meetings and behave well. Bad citizens, in contrast, are those whose social mobility is stagnant, who remain tenants, who do not participate and who, allegedly, behave badly. The issues discussed in this article emerged while doing anthropological fieldwork between 2009 and 2012 on urban renewal in Overvecht, an underprivileged neighbourhood in the city of Utrecht, which at that time was characterized by 79% social housing (Municipality of Utrecht 2010b). I draw upon some empirical instances from that field research to illustrate this article’s theoretical intervention. In the next section, I outline my position within the debates on citizenship and the notion of citizenship agendas, give a brief analysis of studies of state/non-state governance and clarify what I mean by ‘an assemblage approach’. The remainder of the article employs this approach in a historical overview of the urban governance assemblage of social housing in the Netherlands, followed by an analysis of its citizenship agenda.

Citizenship agendas, urban governance and assemblages

Citizenship agendas

For the purpose of combining insights from different debates, I first discuss recent developments in the field of citizenship studies, followed by a discussion of recent studies of governance. Classically, citizenship is defined as the rights-bearing membership to a nation state. Less attention is given to more complex governance assemblages that may also produce citizenship within territorial settings other than the nation state. In the classic view, citizenship is a legal status tied to the nation state: citizens are subjects under the government of a particular territory and bearers of particular rights, such as the right to shelter and freedom of expression, and responsibilities, such as the obligation to vote or to pay taxes (Marshall 1950). More recently, citizenship has been analysed in terms of bundles of practices that constitute encounters between the state and its subjects (Arexaga 2003). In both of these understandings, the nation state remains the locus and framework of citizenship. Citizenship is formed and negotiated in relation to the particular territory of the nation state and all citizenship practices and narratives refer to the idea of the nation state. While non-state institutions, organizations or movements could influence the scope and contents of citizenship – for example in the expansion of rights – in this framework the conception of citizenship remains anchored in the state–subject relationship (Turner 1990).
In this article, I conceive of citizenship differently, as the ‘subjectification’ to governance, including all those institutions concerned with what Foucault called the ‘conduct of conduct’, which takes place through both direct intervention and the more subtle alignment of subjects’ self-regulating capacities (Foucault 1991; Osborne and Rose 1999). Although Foucault never used the term ‘citizenship’ to describe subject relations that did not include the nation state, others have pointed at the usefulness of extending the concept of citizenship in this direction, articulated as ‘citizenship beyond the state’ (Gordon and Stack 2007) and ‘hybrid citizenship’ (Jaffe 2013). Other subject relations exist that resemble but cannot be reduced to the state–subject relationship. However, taking the individual whose conduct is ‘conducted’ as a synonym for the citizen would subsume virtually all subject relations into citizenship. Instead, I would argue, more narrowly, that citizenship is always bound to a certain territory.\(^1\) While institutions like churches or schools may frame the conduct of their members, they do not impose this frame on the population of a particular territory. In contrast, citizenship distinctly implies belonging to a polis with physical parameters, which may be but is not necessarily the nation state. As Feldman (2007) argues, what the polis is, needs to be established in different temporal and spatial contexts. I propose that we understand citizens as subjects of a political community that may also include non-state actors who cooperate in a regime of subjectification towards the population of a certain territory. These non-state actors may be extra-legal organizations or corporate actors, as long as they have a determined territorial basis (Jaffe 2015; Ong 2000; Sharp 2015).

Like the other contributions to this collection, this article focuses on ‘citizenship agendas’, the normative framings of citizenship that prescribe what norms, values and behaviour are appropriate for particular subjects (de Koning, Jaffe, and Koster 2015). Citizenship agendas are concerned with defining the meaning of membership beyond legal or formal citizenship status. They may be produced, as the introduction to this issue argues, by an amalgam of state and non-state actors. Citizenship agendas identify particular groups of subjects, in a particular territory, and target them for policy intervention, implying models for more and less desirable citizens and ways to transform the latter into the former. Such agendas may strive for egalitarian citizenship or contribute to creating difference and inequality between citizens (Holston 2011; de Koning 2015).

In the classic view of citizenship outlined above, the nation state designs and imposes such agendas on the population of its territory; subjects may then demand rights and make claims upon the nation state in order to rework such agendas and realize alternative notions of citizenship (Kabeer 2005). Yet, it is arguably more typical that state–subject relationships largely gain shape through institutions other than the state. Collective civil society organizations may give rise to forms of ‘mediated citizenship’ (Lazar 2012), and the state–subject relationship may also be mediated, often informally, by individuals acting as political brokers (Koster 2012; van Hulst, de Graaf, and van den Brink 2012). In addition to studying their mediating role, we can also consider non-state actors’ direct influence on setting the terms of citizenship in and beyond the state. Ong (2000) demonstrates how the stakes of commercial actors have an increasing impact on the ways in which citizenship is framed, especially when it comes to the distinction between profitable and unprofitable subjects. Nuijten (2013) shows how both state and commercial actors may coproduce a citizenship agenda that sets out to civilize allegedly ‘uncivil’ subjects. Building on these studies, I propose that citizenship agendas may be the product of assemblages of both public and private actors, on a local, national and international scale, that amalgamate in governing the subjects of a particular territory.
Urban governance

To understand this amalgamation, I turn to recent debates on how public and private actors have, in a context of neoliberal globalization, entered into networked forms of governance, shifting and blurring the lines between different institutions and between the public and private spheres (Kingfisher and Maskovsky 2008; Sassen 2008). This gives rise to forms of governance beyond the state (Swyngedouw 2005) in which the classic triangle of ‘state’, ‘society’ and ‘market’ seems no longer useful for analytical distinction (Lund 2006). While this is neither a novel nor a purely neoliberal phenomenon, as the historical overview of the Dutch social housing sector below demonstrates, the debates still provide us with analytical tools to better understand how state and non-state actors, at different hierarchical and geographical levels, may become situationally connected (von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber 2006).

Studies of urban governance have shown how close cooperation of national government, local authorities, and commercial, voluntary and community actors has become increasingly common across different countries (Burger and Dekker 2001; Larner and Walters 2000). In the Netherlands as elsewhere, local municipalities, private housing corporations and the national government have become amalgamated in governing subjects (Kokx and van Kempen 2010; Ruys, Bruil, and Dix 2007). These public–private governance assemblages subject urban residents to particular normative framings that attempt to shape the behaviour of residents according to what is thought good, appropriate and responsible conduct. These assemblages distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens, in which the former are homeowners rather than tenants, self-responsible and well behaved; participate in policy-making; and strive for upward social mobility (e.g. Uitermark 2009).

While these studies on the impact of urban governance assemblages may take account of the differentiation that emerges from particular framings of citizenship (Manzi 2010; Uitermark 2009), they ultimately define citizenship within the state–subject relationship. McIntyre and McKee (2012, 237[italics added]) argue, for instance, that such citizens ‘may be subject to targeted state interventions designed to reconstruct them as “good” citizens who can access markets and direct their own normalised acts of consumption’. Other studies move away from a purely state-centred approach to the framing of citizens by employing a governmentality approach that focuses on how programmes of state and non-state actors construe particular policy discourses that promote the ‘good’ citizen (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010; Uitermark 2005). This governmentality approach demonstrates how techniques of governmentality make specific urban subpopulations into targets of interventions through a (moral) language and discourse that produces and legitimates a differentiation of citizenship (Schinkel and van den Berg 2011). However, the governmentality approach also ‘regard[s] citizenship as a state regulated mechanism of in- and exclusion’ (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010, 697). Rather than privileging the state and its programmes when investigating the interventions into citizens’ lives, I attempt to shift the attention towards non-state, yet state-like, actors that also shape the contours of citizenship. To do so, I take up an assemblage approach.

An assemblage approach

To understand the complex and dynamic composition of urban governance, containing discourses, practices, institutions and other actors, I draw on the concept of the assemblage. In recent years, often inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand
Plateaus ([1987] 2013), the concept of the assemblage has been employed in many ways. Within this extensive body of literature, McFarlane (2011b, 23) distinguishes between assemblage as an object and assemblage as a methodology attuned to practice, materiality and emergence. In this article, I use assemblage as an approach that opens up new ways for rethinking governance and the production of citizenship agendas. While this approach shares with the governmentality approach an emphasis on how power relations are structured, it is distinct from governmentality studies – which typically limit their focus to the reproduction and impact of abstract policy discourses – by also looking into the connections between different elements that govern particular populations (Murray Li 2007). In addition, an assemblage approach helps to shed a critical light on the methodological nationalism prevalent in much research on citizenship, by drawing attention to how subjects in a certain territory are governed by an amalgam of state and non-state actors.

This assemblage approach focuses on three different elements: how different elements amalgamate into networked wholes, the territory these wholes claim and what they produce. First, assemblages have been described as networked collectives with distributed agencies. Assembling is a process of ‘forging alignments’ (Murray Li 2007, 265) and ‘co-functioning’ (Anderson and McFarlane 2011, 125) which gives shape to a provisional unity. Assemblages consist of a ‘fitting’ or ‘fixing’ together of different actors and institutions (Phillips 2006). This fitting together may be rather impromptu, yet assemblages may also be durable and consist of more or less fixed and historically rooted connections. McFarlane (2011a), rethinking the city through the lens of the assemblage, brings together both the emergent character and the durable dimension of assemblages. Discussing the latter, he speaks of ‘the crucial role of urban histories in shaping trajectories of urban policy and economy’ and particular ‘habits of practice’ (McFarlane 2011a, 654).

As shown by the historical overview of Dutch social housing below, in the ‘fitting together’ of national government, private housing corporations and municipalities ‘relations may change, new elements may enter, alliances may be broken, new conjunctions may be fostered’, yet there is always a (temporary) structure (Anderson and McFarlane 2011, 126).

Second, an assemblage approach attends to the territory that is claimed by the amalgam of different actors. Assemblages always claim a territory (Wise 2005). According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1987] 2013), territory could be considered a (temporarily) stabilized assemblage. Anderson and McFarlane (2011, 124) echo this, when they see assemblages as ‘the composition of diverse elements into some form of provisional socio-spatial formation’. As assemblages are provisional and fragile, they are never completely stable: they are open to change, to deterritorialization. The cooperation of different institutions may be disrupted or affected by particular events or external interventions. These events and interventions then become components of the assemblage, which then reterritorializes (Dovey 2012).

Third, an assemblage approach sets out to analyse what such an amalgam produces. As Anderson and McFarlane (2011) argue, its (temporary) structure is always productive of certain effects. Murray Li (2007), more specifically, demonstrates how assemblages produce interventions in the lives of populations. Deleuze and Guattari’s ([1987] 2013) notion of agencement (translated to English as assemblage) signifies a productive aligning of different elements (McFarlane 2011a, 653). Sansi (2013, 23) puts it this way: ‘an assemblage [is] a jumbling together of discrete parts or pieces, objects and subjects, that is capable of producing effects; the assemblage in this sense is something more, or something else, than the mere accumulation of these parts’. In seeking out what works
together, in relation to what territory, and to what end, the assemblage approach also opens
spaces to rethink whether the terms of citizenship are ultimately set by the state through
non-state institutions, as in the case of mediated citizenship (Lazar 2008), or together with
non-state institutions, giving rise to hybrid forms of citizenship (Jaffe 2013).

The amalgam of Dutch social housing governance: a historical overview

Social housing: from private initiative to semi-public system

The following overview demonstrates how the governance of social housing in the
Netherlands has evolved through a particular amalgam of different actors. An assemblage
approach gives attention to both the durable histories and deeply rooted connections
within this amalgam, yet also to its unexpected events and interventions. The territorial
dimension centres upon the spatial convergence of activities and policies towards
underprivileged urban areas.

Adequate housing is a fundamental right that Dutch citizens have vis-à-vis the state,
anchored in the constitution. Yet, the specific provision of social housing in the
Netherlands has been carried out in assemblages that extend beyond the state. Currently,
the social housing sector in the Netherlands consists of 2.4 million dwellings – one-third
of the total housing market – that are owned by private housing corporations (Beekers
2012). Tenants pay rents below commercial rates; for those with very low incomes,
additional subsidies are provided by the national government.

In the Netherlands, social housing started as a private initiative in the 1850s, when
churches, industrial employers, philanthropists and trade union leaders founded private
associations to construct good-quality housing for workers and their families, with the
purpose of countering urban poverty, increasing hygiene and civilizing the ‘uncivilized’
parts of the citizenry (Helderman and Brandsen 2011). These efforts were coupled with a
commercial interest, and carried out parallel to the state, which, within a context of
nineteenth-century liberal laissez-faire policy, did not interfere with resource allocation to
particular groups of citizens (Beekers 2012). In 1901, in a political climate that moved
from laissez faire to a more interventionist stance towards societal problems, the national
government decreed housing a municipal responsibility, to be assisted by housing
associations. ‘Private forces’ and the state ‘had to cooperate as powerfully as possible’
Municipalities, financially backed by the national government, granted loans and subsidies
to selected housing associations that were approved by the state. These associations had to
exclusively provide housing for the needy, declare their non-commercial character and
allow for permanent state supervision – mostly through the relevant city hall – under the
threat of nationalization if they did not comply (Beekers 2012, 119–120; WRR 2004).

Over the years, a ‘semi-public system’ evolved in which housing associations received
subsidies to build dwellings that met the conditions of the state (Beekers 2012, 17). The
state had made itself co-responsible for affordable housing stock and conditioned its
construction, quality, pricing and allocation (Beekers 2012). Following the Second World
War, the national government actively encouraged the participation of housing
associations in the post-war reconstruction process (de Jong 2013; WRR 2004). In this
period, the associations became increasingly institutionalized as components of state
operations. Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, their role moved beyond the provision of
affordable housing, as they became co-responsible for more and more societal issues
concerned with welfare and democracy: public health, security, encouragement of
people’s civic participation and the emancipation of (female) migrants, and the social
cohesion of different ethnic and socio-economic groups (de Jong 2013). Wittebrood, Permentier, and Pinkster (2011, 16) aptly argue that these policies were concerned with the ‘planning of neighbourhood well-being’ (wijkwelzijnplanning).

Privatization
In the mid-1990s, in line with its neoliberal agenda, the national government privatized the associations, which became housing corporations. Strictly speaking, they had always been private, but now they were financially decoupled from the national government. With this change, housing had to become a local and decentralized issue, as this was believed to be more effective and efficient (de Jong 2013). The national government and the housing corporations negotiated an agreement: the state cancelled all its subsidies to the housing corporations in exchange for a remittance of the corporations’ debts to the state. The corporations were to keep all the benefits from their housing stock, yet they also would have to finance its maintenance and renovation. The corporations gained a great deal of financial independence and positioned themselves as not-for-profits, engaging in commercial activities in order to enable the performance of their social tasks. Many of these commercial activities were related to financial products (Priemus 2008). Housing corporations could make their own choices about which type of dwellings to build and for what segments of the population, as long as they also provided social housing. As a result, they moved into building for the more affluent segments of the population.

In the second half of the 1990s, the national government stimulated the expansion of market mechanisms for social housing and further diminished regulation (de Jong 2013). Due to rapidly increasing real estate prices, the housing corporations’ capital increased enormously. Larger corporations became paramount players in the real estate sector, land speculation and various parts of the financial sector. They had access to low-cost land, credit and financial concessions, and played a key role in ‘large urban renewal projects beyond the reach of government’ (Blessing 2012, 203). Housing corporations became important operators of financial products. In retrospect, their development can be considered as moving ‘from semi-government to a financial institution’ (NRC next 2012).

In this period, the national government pressed housing corporations to engage more in social projects. This was part of the Big Cities Policy (Grotestedenbeleid), an influential public–private partnership that aimed at improving the Dutch major cities in terms of living, working and ‘the social’ (education, quality of life, safety and care) (VROM 1997). Those working for housing corporations often told me that, in their view, the government wanted the corporations to do something in return for the enormous capital they had gained since privatization. Special departments of housing corporations carried out social work, ranging from projects to increase social cohesion, security and public health to emancipating and democratizing residents through encouraging their participation in neighbourhood activities. A recent report written for the National Association of Housing Corporations says about this period: ‘Together with other civil society organizations, a large number of new services was developed [by housing corporations], such as care service, integrated social support to avoid eviction, debt assistance and educational trajectories’ (de Jong 2013, 31).

Increased regulation
After 2009, EU regulations prohibited housing corporations from engaging in mainstream profit-making activities, as this would disturb competition. Housing corporations had to
shift their focus back to housing for households from low-income brackets (Beekers 2012; de Jong 2013). In addition, cracks in the assemblage appeared when the national government restricted the corporations’ entrepreneurial activities and increased regulations on their financial transparency because several corporations made headlines due to scandals (Laan 2009). Excessive executive salaries and severance pays (e.g. a €3.5 million ‘golden handshake’ for a departing director), mismanagement and risky investments leading to bankruptcy gave rise to a critical public and political debate on the legitimacy of these institutions (Blessing 2012; Vermeer and Wester 2012). Although these recent developments have led to restrictions on corporations’ commercial activities, their activities have not changed completely. Currently, housing corporations may contain many subdivisions with corporate goals and have financial stakes in construction, renovation and design agencies. Employees of housing corporations whom I talked to referred to this as ‘Christmas tree construction’, with the not-for-profit part of the organization as the star atop a partly corporate tree. To date, housing corporations are still involved in many social, cultural and health-related projects, varying from neighbourhood festivities to physical exercise for obese children to aging problems for the elderly, in tandem with municipalities and voluntary organizations (e.g. Nouws 2011).3

Through this historical overview, I have showed how the amalgam of housing corporations, municipalities and the national government gained shape to a background of structural changes in the economy, political ideologies and emergent, unforeseen events. With regard to citizenship, it points at the institutional cooperation of state and non-state actors in the governance of housing and other themes that bear relevance to the citizenship of residents of social housing.

The citizenship agenda of urban governance

The ‘good citizen’: upward social mobility and homeownership

The historical context shows some of the impact of the social housing assemblage on urban residents. In this section, which focuses on the last decade, I demonstrate that the assemblage imposes a citizenship agenda on the residents of underprivileged urban neighbourhoods. The national government, municipalities and housing corporations framed citizenship in such a way as to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizen, in which the good citizens strive for upward social mobility, are (potential) homeowners, participate actively in policy-making and behave ‘well’. A review of recent policy documents and literature on urban governance supports this argument.

To start with, the good citizen strives for upward social mobility and is a potential homeowner. In 2006, the national government presented the leading policy document City and Upward Mobility: Upward Social Mobility as the Guide for Urban Renewal (VROM-raad 2006). Upward mobility was supposed to find its culmination in homeownership. Social housing was problematized in Dutch politics, while homeownership was considered the fulfilment of an emancipatory process. Homeowners were believed to ‘lift up’ the lives of their tenant neighbours, serving as role models and increasing social capital in the neighbourhood, which would in turn lead to better opportunities in the labour market and enhanced emancipation. In short, homeowners were considered both the embodiment of and a catalyst for upward social mobility (Smets and Salman 2008; van Kempen and Bolt 2009).

This view was manifested in the creation of mixed-tenure neighbourhoods, with social housing, market-priced rented houses and houses for sale. As such, underprivileged neighbourhoods were redesigned to attract higher-income groups and keep residents who
demonstrated the possibility of upward mobility. Although evidence on the effects of mixed tenure is scarce and contradicting (Pinkster 2009; van Eijk 2010), the national government conveyed this ideal of mixed-tenure neighbourhoods in a key policy document (VROM 2009, 5):

Many physical programs in underprivileged neighbourhoods, regarding both demolition and the building of new houses, are strongly focused on keeping the advantaged groups [kansrijken] in the neighbourhoods. Through substituting part of the most inexpensive housing stock with more expensive rental and privately owned houses, those who demonstrate upward social mobility can continue living in the neighbourhood, while also attracting advantaged groups [kansrijken] from outside the neighbourhood. Especially theories on social capital lie behind this policy: in mixed-tenure neighbourhoods the weak can benefit from the stronger. If a neighbourhood has more people who have something to spend [overhebbers], those who are mainly surviving [overlevers] can lean on them.

Based on the neoliberal idea that people take good care of their private property to increase its value, the governance assemblage celebrates homeowners for not only taking good care of their own house, but also of their whole neighbourhood — in both physical and social terms — as this will lead to an increased value of their real estate. De Jong (2013, 31) shows how housing corporations carried out initiatives ‘to bridge the divide between rental and private housing. An important drive behind this was the desired emancipation of residents. To increase their ownership over their own housing and living situation would lead to the empowerment of residents’. Both government and corporations ardently supported this policy goal.

In Utrecht, as in many other Dutch cities, in addition to selling relatively inexpensive former social housing, many new ‘starter homes’ were planned, houses that would appeal to first-time buyers. Selling houses would provide financial benefits to corporations that they could well use after facing the new regulations outlined above. In so doing, the local urban governance assemblage imposed its agenda on the population of underprivileged neighbourhoods like Overvecht, opening up its territory for property-owning residents, while displacing tenants and diminishing the chance of their possible return. In 2010, the municipality argued in their ‘View on Housing’ (Woonvisie), a leading policy document in which the expectations for the following decade were outlined:

Households with a low income that demonstrate upward mobility in socioeconomic terms and an increasing income should also get the opportunity to keep living in their own environment. Upward social mobility and one’s ‘housing career’ within the neighbourhood offer opportunities for our primary target group and increase the differentiation and potential of the neighbourhoods as a whole. (Municipality of Utrecht 2010a, 39)

Doing so, it continued its 2002 plan for housing, which intended to increase the number of privately owned houses from 40% to 55% of the city’s total housing stock by 2010 (Municipality of Utrecht 2002). Much of this increase had to take place in the city’s underprivileged neighbourhoods such as Overvecht.

The housing corporation shared the intentions of the municipality. It states the following on its website about Overvecht’s history:

In the 90s plans were made for a new, liveable future for Overvecht. Part of the neighbourhood development plan is the demolition of inexpensive apartment buildings to create space for new (privately owned) houses. The arrival of richer and higher educated residents ought to give the neighbourhood a new stimulus. (Mitros 2014)

Renewal projects in Overvecht tied into this goal. For instance, after the demolition of a social housing estate in 2011, the same number of houses was rebuilt, yet with only 30% social housing (Municipality of Utrecht 2010b). Tenants were displaced and had to leave
their homes for substitute housing. Some tenants could return to the new social housing if they could afford the higher rent. Meanwhile, they were, through mailings and meetings, encouraged to buy the new houses. A representative of the housing corporation said about this:

Overvecht needs more people who have something to spend – who will bring the neighbourhood in balance. [...] We will restructure some sites in Overvecht. So, these people [who live there] will be lifted up, because they will go and live somewhere else. They will move to a better environment. Then, by improving the sites where they came from, we will improve the whole neighbourhood and pull it up.

In so doing, the governance assemblage expressed a preference for homeowners who are considered both the embodiment of and a catalyst for upward social mobility, while it frames as bad citizens in need of targeted interventions. These preferences are part of a citizenship agenda that is produced by both state and non-state actors who operate closely in the field of social housing. Below, I show how this agenda also included particular behaviour as a qualification for good citizenship.

The ‘good citizen’: participation and good behaviour

In the last decade, the Dutch national government has emphasized participation and good behaviour as prerequisites for good citizenship (see, e.g., Schinkel [2010] on immigration/assimilation policies). Such as citizenship agenda can also be found in the domain of social housing. In 2007, the Big Cities Policy received impetus from the Neighbourhoods Approach [Wijkenaanpak], in which municipalities and housing corporations worked together closely and citizen consultation and participation were key methods (Visitatiecommissie Wijkenaanpak 2011). The Neighbourhoods Approach, with its specific territorial focus on a selected set of underprivileged neighbourhoods in different cities, implemented a frame for citizen participation in urban renewal. In this approach, a key role is fulfilled by residents’ committees, in which local residents participate in decision-making.

In Utrecht, the municipality and the housing corporations explored ways to move from participation in the sense of talking together to participation in the sense of giving citizens material responsibility or ownership of public spaces and goods (Visitatiecommissie Wijkenaanpak 2011, 35). As one articulation of the Neighbourhoods Approach put it, citizens need to be developed from ‘clients and consumers to producers’ of the neighbourhood quality of life, and this should give rise to a form of ‘co-creation’ between municipalities, housing corporations and citizens (Visitatiecommissie Wijkenaanpak 2011, 30–31). Within this frame, residents of social housing estates are obliged to negotiate planned changes with the housing corporation through the residents’ committees. For this, they are assisted by municipality-funded social welfare organizations. Actively participating, as Schinkel (2010) points out, is considered a virtue, like many other forms of allegedly civilized behaviour.

In Overvecht, emphasizing the importance of both participation and civilized behaviour, the municipality and the housing corporation invited residents to take part in clean-up campaigns and neighbourhood meetings. At the meetings, they encouraged residents to discuss the cleanliness of shared entrances and other communal spaces. Stories about tenants who did not clean shared spaces and allegedly allowed their sons to urinate in the building’s hallway were used to condemn particular tenants. In so doing, urban governance condemns certain types of behaviour while encouraging other types of behaviour thought to change residents into ‘good’ citizens (Manzi 2010). It also sanctions the alleged antisocial behaviour of ‘bad’ citizens (Flint and Nixon 2006). In Overvecht, for
instance, in cases of the so-called excessive problems, teams made up of representatives from the municipality and the housing corporation, social workers, and sometimes a police officer, together visit residents at home and decide upon solutions, with relocation of the problem tenant as the ultimate solution.

A representative of the housing corporation argued that homeowners behave better than tenants. In her view, the former were more cooperative and willing to improve their neighbourhood. She pointed to a particular estate in Overvecht where part of the social housing had been sold:

We have been busy with this for a few years already. And, yes, from the start, you see a different group of residents move in and they fix up the whole building. What comes into being is a mix of homeowners and tenants. A good cooperation has emerged between them. People are very positive towards each other. While, at first, there were mainly people who merely tried to survive, now there are people who say ‘come on, let’s do this together’. […] There are many people who buy an apartment here, who come from outside the neighbourhood. […] It is good to see a new group of people in this kind of neighbourhood.

A municipal official emphasized the importance of mixed tenure by referring to behaviour, saying:

If one fool comes to live in a street, the whole street will do something, they will bring a bowl of soup or anything. The street will take care [of him]. If there are two fools, this support will diminish. If three or four fools come to live in the same block, everybody retreats.

This is why, he concluded, it is important to bring balance to a neighbourhood by mixing privately owned and social housing.

As in other domains, this citizenship agenda around social housing is largely articulated along ethnic lines (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010). Other studies have pointed at how (urban) governance in the Netherlands categorizes residents in terms of ethnicity and culture (Hurenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2011; Uitermark, Rossi, and van Houtum 2005). While these studies deal with issues of multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants, the ethnic distinction can also be seen in the citizenship agenda analysed in this article. This agenda is imposed on particular territories, underprivileged neighbourhoods, with a largely non-white population. These populations, often of migrant offspring, are mostly confronted with the imagery of good and bad citizens and the consequences of being labelled or displaced as undesirable citizens.

Discussion and conclusions

The historical overview and the analysis of the last decade presented here show how a governance assemblage of state and non-state actors has impacted framings of citizenship. An assemblage approach directs attention towards a structured, yet never completely stable, amalgam of different state and non-state actors. Both deeply entrenched historical processes and emergent events structured and changed the governance of social housing in the Netherlands (see Deleuze and Guattari [1987] 2013). Tracing the cooperation of actors, mainly the national government, municipalities and private housing corporations, demonstrates how the assemblage gained shape along historically rooted trajectories, such as evolving political ideologies and regulations, yet also through unforeseen events, such as the bankruptcy of corporations and the commotion about the self-enrichment of its directors. The forging of alignments clearly had a particular sociospatial focus, as the assemblage of national government, municipality and housing corporations converged its activities on the population of underprivileged urban areas. The governance assemblage produced a citizenship agenda targeting the population of
underprivileged neighbourhoods, one that distinguished between good and bad citizens and suggested that homeownership, civic participation and mixed-tenure neighbourhoods would encourage upward social mobility, turning bad citizens into good. In a context of neoliberalism, the urban governance assemblage underscored the importance of autonomy, of being able to survive without any support, and problematized tenants for being dependent, unemancipated and ‘pulling down’ the neighbourhood as a whole. This framing of tenants legitimated interventions among the population of a certain territory, and manifested in the displacement of tenants who had to make way for homeowners.

Much has already been written on how neoliberal politics have propelled a preference for social upward mobility and property ownership (McIntyre and McKee 2012; Uitermark 2009) and self-responsible and participatory behaviour (Newman and Tonkens 2011; Schinkel 2010). The role of non-state actors within neoliberal politics has also been widely debated (Swyngedouw 2005). In this article, I have tried to demonstrate the importance of pulling these insights into the debates on how citizenship is framed. I proposed using an assemblage approach in order to problematize the mutual presupposition between citizenship on the one hand and the nation state with its national territory on the other. This article aims to broaden our view of how subjects are governed and to avoid downplaying the role of non-state actors in governance assemblages. Whereas the nation state is usually considered the locus and focus of citizenship, I have showed how citizenship may be tied to other territories, such as underprivileged neighbourhoods, and may be shaped by governance assemblages that do not coincide with the nation state. Acknowledging that citizenship agendas are produced by a multifaceted amalgam of state and non-state actors calls for a more rigorous academic analysis of how these assemblages gain and change shape, and the different stakes that emerge within these assemblages. Studying these assemblages and their citizenship agendas should give rise to a better understanding of configurations of power and the analysis of a polis that does not coincide with the nation state.

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Notes
1. Although the political prospectus of notions such as ‘transnational citizenship’ may be to loosen ties between citizenship and territory, its current realizations, in which individuals belong to or express allegiance to different nation states, still have territorial connotations.
2. As this study is not concerned with materiality, I will not take account of non-human actants, as ANT-inspired studies on assemblages would have (as explained by McFarlane [2011a], for example).

3. Recently, as several representatives of housing corporations told me, there is a tendency to put the focus back on housing instead of on social tasks, mostly for financial reasons; hence, the governance assemblage keeps on changing.

References


The idea of citizenship has today emerged as a global horizon under which a proliferating range of claims and demands for recognition, visibility, care, moral dignity, and inclusion are made. Initially a legal concept tied to self-determination and national sovereignty, the global human rights agenda has made citizenship less tied to the nation-state and instead a carrier of multiple cultural and political meanings and agendas from the global level to the most localized context. But can there be meaningful forms of citizenship that are not guaranteed by a sovereign state?

**Keywords**: self-determination; human rights; global horizon; nation-state

Edmund Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenology, argued that human experience and interpretation of the world always unfold within distinct contexts of memory and potentiality. These Husserl called horizons. A horizon is always situated, historical, and subjective. It structures thought and limits imagination and it is only by knowing and understanding the horizons we live by that phenomenology, the science of experience, can advance toward higher levels of universal understanding of the human as such (Husserl [1950] 1999, 44–45). Such was Husserl’s proposition.

Today, at the beginning of the twenty first century, it seems to me that the idea of citizenship has become more than a mere concept, it has become a meaningful and effective horizon for political imagination across the globe. This is true both in a socio-historical sense and in a conceptual sense.

**From national citizenship to human rights**

The term ‘citizenship’ condenses three bundles of political and social values that have global purchase and rich vernacular lives across the world: (1) fundamental political and legal rights, (2) social entitlements, and (3) loyalty, belonging, and civility. Citizenship is also a metaphor for the political properly civilized, a perpetual promise of inclusion and public recognition of individual and groups. Few other terms are so capacious and protean and yet so clearly tied to an Ur form of (supposedly) civilized political community, the Greek polis. Few other terms in our global political vocabulary are so universally accepted as a desirable norm and aspiration. In the twentieth century, the two other fecund concepts flanking citizenship’s horizon-defining power were those of national self-determination and human rights. The linking of citizenship to national sovereignty and the nation-state provided the most powerful political promise in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a promise that was the driving force in anticolonial movements for independence, and in the
building of inclusive welfare states and ‘great societies.’ Only within the confines of a nation-state could true and deep citizenship be realized, the logic of self-determination went. Only here could the political rights and social entitlements that millions had aspired to for generations be founded upon the bedrock of deep cultural loyalty and emotional attachment.

However, as it became clear all too soon, the nation-state was as often curtailing and withholding rights and recognition as it was enabling them. It is not surprising that the excesses of World War II and the new utopianism expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights meant that the idea of rights began to be disentangled from the nation-state. Human rights emerged from the 1970s as the more expansive paradigm from where to imagine what citizenship could mean and encompass (Mazower 2012). Both more universal, and applicable to individuals regardless of location and culture, human rights provided an ever-expandable set of social and cultural rights, the ‘right to nationality’ now merely one of many rights, and not the precondition for citizenship and belonging as within the paradigm of self-determination. This in turn enabled a shift away from looking at rights as formal inclusion in a sovereign nation-state, or a national community, toward looking at the quality and depth of rights, and how recognition as citizens was experienced by groups and individuals. Within this expanding canvas of rights, cultural and religious minorities, underrepresented communities, indigenous people, and those who had suffered historical wrongs, and many others, could find resources for claims to inclusion, dignity, ‘full citizenship,’ and public recognition. This is really the moment where ‘citizenship agendas’ gradually emerged as a dominant form of claim-making, a globally expanding modality of how demands are conceived, framed, and presented. In short, when citizenship became a horizon (Moyn 2012).

Several of the papers in this special issue throw fascinating light on how ‘citizenship agendas’ – the idea of enjoying rights, and to be included and recognized within a political community – today are regarded as foundational by people in widely different historical contexts. From Hourani’s (2015) incisive account of how the inhabitants in South Beirut pin their hopes on Hezbollah’s ‘resistance society’ providing a more powerful alternative mechanism for inclusion and protection than that of a distant and fragmented Lebanese state, to Perkins’ (2015) description of the controversy over the use of amplified sound to calls for prayer among residents of a city in Michigan. Perkins details how the sound of the muezzin went from having no place in the imagining of what citizenship could entail, or sound like, to become included within a new and more capacious horizon of citizenship. Jaffe (2015) shows that, in Jamaica, decades of violent street politics and a hollowing out of the state’s monopoly of violence has meant that citizenship and public recognition now are powerfully associated with political parties that in several cases have all but merged with criminal organizations. Here, effective citizenship, understood as protection and access to resources, is neither a very ‘civil’ nor legal affair but loyalties to political formations are deeply felt and experienced as horizons.

de Koning (2015) describes how nostalgic references to a supposedly purer and more intense citizenship and neighborhood in twentieth-century Netherlands frame interventions that aim at transforming unruly immigrant youngster into ‘good’ self-disciplined citizens that do not disrupt the experience of seamless ‘social cohesion.’ The enigmatic and nostalgic rhetoric of ‘cohesion’ is invoked across continental Europe today, and it also reverberates through Koster’s (2015) piece on efforts at turning ‘poor’ residents of Dutch neighborhoods into more enterprising citizens, vested in their locality. Sharp (2015) describes how an older generation of men in Guatemalan towns and villages mobilize...
older, indigenist frames of ‘cohesion’ and custom against what they see as unruly young men returned from the USA, contaminated by gang culture. In these cases, we can see that the horizon of citizenship, while expansive and emancipatory in some configurations, also can have both conservative and exclusionary potentials in other cases.

Citizenship as an analytical frame

Mirroring the political vernaculars of our time, academics have increasingly used citizenship as an analytical lens and focus. This special issue, and indeed this journal itself, testifies to the rich and broad field of studies and concerns that are explored under the rubric of citizenship. This reflects the protean force of citizenship as an ‘emic’ and political category but it raises the question of the analytical force of the term ‘citizenship’ itself. My contention here is that citizenship is perhaps better thought of as a horizon for thought and imagination, a field of action rather than a precise category, as a promise rather than a thing or a precise legal status. It is striking, for instance, to see how often the notion on ‘full citizenship’ is directly or indirectly invoked in a staggering range of work – from political philosophy and critical race theory to migration studies, studies of inequality, and social exclusion to the proliferating genre of studies of immigrant ‘integration.’ In all these cases, scholars, activists, or advocates they work with, as well as officials, measure the situations of deprivation, injustice, or the policy problem they grapple with against a standard of ‘full citizenship’ to be achieved. It is rarely clear what this fullness may entail and herein lies the protean force of the idea of citizenship: it is a never fully realized ideal that always has to be invoked, revisited, and discursively reconstructed in order to be effective. At the same time, it is equally clear that the idea of ‘full citizenship’ derives considerable force from the global circulation of models of what inclusion, recognition, reparation, and protection can look like in other societies and contexts. Hence, its force as a horizon, as potential rather than as actual experience.

This circulation and proliferation of what citizenship agendas may look like, and what ‘fullness’ citizens may aspire to, has a direct bearing on the relationship between citizenship and the so-called ‘non-state actors.’ In classical liberal perspectives inspired by Mill and Tocqueville, citizenship grows from below, from associational life and civic spirit that, then, is aggregated and legally protected by the government. It is only in the twentieth century that the modern state assumes a role as an arbiter and grantor of citizenship and recognition of an expanding array of rights from ‘above’ as it were – turning citizenship into an ever ‘thicker’ compact of rights and entitlements embedded in national cultures and language ideologies. Neoliberal ideology aims at a return to a ‘thinner’ idea of rights that gives the power of recognition and mediation of citizenship back to the ‘non-state actors’ that supposedly populate what the Tory’s call ‘big society’ as opposed to big government. Neveu’s (2015) intriguing contribution suggests that the invocation and involvement of ‘ordinary citizens,’ as opposed to political activists or social movements, are central to the legitimacy of this new aspiration toward more ‘direct’ modes of government in contemporary France. However, she also demonstrates that the association of ordinariness with ‘the people’ – the most foundational of all modern political concepts – gives the idea of the ordinary (streets, people, routines, everyday life as such) a symbolic potency that also becomes a rallying point for anticapitalist activists critical of the state and organized politics. Perkins’ example from Hamtramck, Michigan, provides an example of how the meaning of citizenship can be cautiously expanded into the realm of cultural and sensory experience within the relatively ‘thin’ model of citizenship in the USA where the citizen, at least in principle, is supposed to freely
celebrate any culture and religion. By contrast, the attempts at engineering ‘society,’ ‘good’ public behavior, and proper civic sense in the Netherlands, described by de Koning and Koster, demonstrate how deeply the ideals of citizenship and rights are ‘culturalized’ and enmeshed in the ‘thick’ culture of discrete nation-states in Western Europe.

However, in many postcolonial societies marked by experiences of states and governments that were both more fragmented and more despotic at the same time, it is most often non-state actors that are ready at hand as vehicles for citizenship aspirations. Yet, these actors also generate deep ambivalence. In such societies, i.e., in most of the world, the promise of ‘full citizenship’ remains indelibly connected with the imagining of a properly functioning and comprehensive structure of government. Within the powerful global horizon of citizenship, it is probably impossible to get this imagined genie of the benevolent state that recognizes and guarantees social, political, and cultural rights back in the bottle. In such contexts, as that of the Shi’ite residents of South Beirut, one can legitimately ask: what is the value and staying power of citizenship that is provided by a non-state actor but not guaranteed by a legitimate and sovereign state? Can there be citizens without states as, Arendt ([1950] 1968, 290) asked in 1950? That question, and the quality and depth of citizenship, has defined the better part of global politics ever since.

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